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ABSTRACT 
  The Supreme Court of the United States based its landmark 
decision in Shelby County v. Holder on the proposition that the 
Constitution contains “a fundamental principle of equal sovereignty 
among the States.” For the central holding of a blockbuster 
constitutional case, that assertion was surprisingly unsupported. The 
Court simply declared it to be true and made little effort to 
substantiate it. That naked conclusion prompted savage criticism not 
only from the left, but also from the right. The consensus critical 
reaction was epitomized by Judge Richard Posner’s remark that “the 
court’s invocation of ‘equal sovereignty’ is an indispensable prop of 
the decision. But . . . there is no doctrine of equal sovereignty. The 
opinion rests on air.” Critics also worried that, because there are 
countless federal laws that can be said to treat the states disparately, 
the Court’s brand-new equal sovereignty principle is, as Justice 
Ginsburg put it in her strident dissent, “capable of much mischief.” 
This Article contends that the critics of Shelby County are only half 
right—and that the Shelby County majority, despite its cursory 
analysis, is half right too. The critics are correct that the Court 
seemingly pulled the equal sovereignty principle out of thin air—that 
it played a little too fast and loose with precedent and failed to wrestle 
adequately with constitutional text, structure, and history. 
Nonetheless, this Article concludes—after performing the thorough 
examination of the traditional sources of constitutional law that was 
missing from the ipse dixit of Shelby County—that there is indeed a 
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deep principle of equal sovereignty that runs through the Constitution. 
In James Madison’s words, the Constitution contemplates “a 
government of a federal nature, consisting of many coequal 
sovereigns.” Properly understood, however, the equal sovereignty 
principle is not a guarantee of state equality in all respects. It 
guarantees only equal sovereignty—that is, equal capacity for self-
government—which makes it more fundamental, but also less 
expansive, than critics have feared. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Shelby County v. Holder,1 a sharply divided Supreme Court of 
the United States struck down a portion of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965, as reauthorized in 2006, on the ground that the statute 
discriminatorily imposed onerous limitations on election-based state 
lawmaking in some states—the “covered jurisdictions”—but not 
 
 1. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).  
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others.2 This the Constitution will not tolerate, explained Chief 
Justice Roberts on behalf of the five-Justice majority, because “[n]ot 
only do States retain sovereignty under the Constitution, there is also 
a ‘fundamental principle of equal sovereignty’ among the States.”3 
For the central holding of a blockbuster constitutional case, that 
assertion was surprisingly unsupported. The Court simply declared it 
to be true, and made little effort to substantiate it.4 That naked 
statement prompted savage criticism not only from the left, but also 
from the right.5 Typical of the liberal response were the remarks of 
David Gans of the Constitutional Accountability Center, who ripped 
the Court for “[i]gnoring the actual Constitution” by relying on a 
“principle of equal sovereignty of the states,” despite the fact that “no 
such principle exists.”6 “No matter how many times one reads our 
Constitution,” Gans declared, “the simple fact is that there is no 
 
 2. See id. at 2622–28 (striking down the “coverage formula” established by Section 4 of 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 70 Stat. 438, previously codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b)).  
 3. Id. at 2623 (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 
(2009)). 
 4. See Eric Posner, John Roberts’ Opinion on the Voting Rights Act is Really Lame, SLATE 
(June 25, 2013, 1:44 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_breakfast_table/
features/2013/supreme_court_2013/supreme_court_on_the_voting_rights_act_chief_justice_
john_roberts_struck.html [http://perma.cc/UH7N-98E4] (“Yet Roberts is able to cite only the 
weakest support for this principle—a handful of very old cases that address entirely different 
matters. None of the usual impressive array of founding authorities show up in his analysis, even 
though the founding generation took state sovereignty much more seriously than we do 
today.”).  
 5. See Edward Cantu, The Roberts Court and Penumbral Federalism, 64 CATH. U. L. REV. 
271, 310 (2015) (noting that scholars “were virtually unanimous in their rejection of equal 
sovereignty as a legitimate and controlling aspect of either the Court’s federalism jurisprudence 
or the meaning of the Constitution as an original matter,” and asserting that, “[a]ccording to a 
vast majority of commentators, equal sovereignty as a constitutional rule was implausible and 
the product of rhetorical trickery”); Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active 
Avoidance: The Modern Supreme Court and Legal Change, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2109, 2133 n.103 
(2015) (“The legal commentariat generally viewed the doctrine as an invention.”). 
 6. David H. Gans, In Recent Rulings, Supreme Court Views Constitution’s Promise in 
Vastly Different Ways, LOUISVILLE COURIER-J. (July 7, 2013), https://theusconstitution.org/
news/recent-rulings-supreme-court-views-constitutions-promises-vastly-different-ways [https://
perma.cc/GN7Q-KAW3]; see also Edward Cantu, The Separation-of-Powers and the Least 
Dangerous Branch, 13 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 13 (2015) (“[T]he ‘fundamental principle of 
equal sovereignty’ is clearly not.”); Joseph Fishkin, The Dignity of the South, 123 YALE L.J. 
ONLINE 175, 177 (2013) (“This principle has a nice ring to it. But as a constraint on the federal 
government’s power to treat states unequally, it has no basis either in constitutional text or in 
existing constitutional doctrine.”); Jon Greenbaum, Alan Martinson & Sonia Gill, Shelby 
County v. Holder: When the Rational Becomes Irrational, 57 HOW. L.J. 811, 846–54 (2014) 
(arguing that the equal sovereignty principle is utterly lacking in support); Richard L. Hasen, 
Shelby County and the Illusion of Minimalism, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 713, 714, 733 
(2014) (referring to the equal sovereignty principle as “unjustified” and “made up”). 
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‘Equality of States Clause’ in it. Such an amendment might be on 
many conservatives’ wish lists, but it is simply not part of the 
Constitution.”7 Stanford Law School’s Michael McConnell offered a 
similar (if less inflammatory) critique from a conservative perspective: 
“This is a nice idea; it might be on my list of desirable constitutional 
amendments. But it is not in the Constitution we have.”8 The 
consensus critical reaction was epitomized by Judge Richard Posner’s 
remark that “the court’s invocation of ‘equal sovereignty’ is an 
indispensable prop of the decision. But . . . there is no doctrine of 
equal sovereignty. The opinion rests on air.”9 
In an incredulous dissent, Justice Ginsburg opined that the 
Court’s brand-new equal sovereignty principle was not only utterly 
made up, but also “capable of much mischief.”10 She listed a number 
of federal statutes that treat the states disparately and thus appear to 
be imperiled by the Court’s revolutionary new principle. First among 
them was the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 
1992 (PASPA), which prohibits sports gambling, but exempts Nevada 
from its scope.11 As it happens, PASPA was at that moment being 
challenged in litigation by the state of New Jersey.12 New Jersey’s case 
was argued in the Third Circuit just a day after the Supreme Court 
handed down its decision in Shelby County. At the oral argument, the 
state’s lawyers, including former Solicitor General Theodore Olson, 
placed heavy weight on Shelby County, sensing that its impact could 
be momentous. But they seemed uncertain of just what to make of 
it13—as did the Third Circuit judges when they ultimately rejected the 
state’s argument three months later.14 Because the Supreme Court’s 
 
 7. Gans, supra note 6.  
 8. Town Hall Debate: McConnell and Rosen on the Voting Rights Act, YAHOO NEWS 
(June 25, 2013, 6:45 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/town-hall-debate-mcconnell-rosen-voting-
rights-act-184607340.html [http://perma.cc/ZJX2-JYN7].  
 9. Richard A. Posner, The Voting Rights Act Ruling is About the Conservative 
Imagination, SLATE (June 26, 2013, 12:16 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/
the_breakfast_table/features/2013/supreme_court_2013/the_supreme_court_and_the_voting_
rights_act_striking_down_the_law_is_all.html [http://perma.cc/JA46-KY62].  
 10. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2649 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 11. See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 3704 (2012)). For a summary of PASPA and its exemptions, 
see Thomas B. Colby, Revitalizing the Forgotten Uniformity Constraint on the Commerce Power, 
91 VA. L. REV. 249, 250–52 (2005). 
 12. See NCAA v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013).  
 13. See Oral Argument, NCAA, 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013) (Nos. 13-1713, 13-1714 & 12-
1715), http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-recordings (select “All Oral Argument Files”; 
scroll down and select “13-1713, 13-1714 & 13-1715 NCAA et al. v. Gov. of N.J. et al.wma”).  
 14. See NCAA, 730 F.3d at 237–39.  
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discussion of its new equal sovereignty principle had been so 
surprisingly undeveloped, it was impossible to say just what the 
principle meant or what application it should have, and the judges felt 
obligated to confine it primarily to the narrow context of the Voting 
Rights Act.15 
This Article contends that Shelby County’s critics are only half 
right—and that the Shelby County majority, despite its cursory 
analysis, is half right too. The critics are correct that the Court 
seemingly pulled the equal sovereignty principle out of thin air—that 
it played a little too fast and loose with precedent and failed to 
wrestle adequately with constitutional text, structure, and history.16 
Nonetheless, this Article maintains that there is indeed a deep 
structural principle of equal sovereignty that runs through the 
Constitution. And, in fact, statutes like PASPA are constitutionally 
questionable17 (though most of the federal statutes listed by Justice 
Ginsburg and others as potentially imperiled are not). The Court’s 
critics have therefore misdirected their fire. They would be better 
advised to focus their criticism on the Shelby County Court’s 
conclusion that there was no adequate justification for the Voting 
Rights Act’s deviation from the principle of equal sovereignty—a 
dubious proposition upon which I express no firm opinion here—
rather than on the Court’s conclusion that such a principle exists in 
the first place. That is to say, there is a strong argument that the 
Voting Rights Act should have survived the heightened scrutiny 
triggered by its contravention of the principle of equal sovereignty. 
But the notion that the Constitution does not contain such a principle 
at all is misguided. 
This Article seeks to articulate the constitutional argument—
conspicuously missing from the ipse dixit of Shelby County—in favor 
of the equal sovereignty principle, and to begin to develop a 
framework for its operation. At this point in time, as exemplified by 
 
 15. See id. at 239 (declaring that “there is nothing in Shelby County to indicate that the 
equal sovereignty principle is meant to apply with the same force outside of the context of 
‘sensitive areas of state and local policymaking’” (quoting Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2624)).  
 16. See Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 5, at 2136 (arguing that “the Court should not have 
adopted the equal sovereignty doctrine with so little ventilation”). 
 17. In 2005, I published an article in the Virginia Law Review raising that very possibility. 
See Colby, supra note 11. That article posited a relatively narrow doctrinal rule—that Congress 
cannot discriminate between the states in its exercise of the commerce power. Id. This Article 
comes at the issue from a different angle, exploring the more fundamental constitutional 
principle of equal state sovereignty. 
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the Third Circuit’s throw-its-hands-up-in-the-air decision in the 
PASPA case, no one knows what the equal sovereignty principle 
means, whether it is legitimately a part of our Constitution, where it 
comes from, and what effect it has.18 This Article endeavors to defend, 
develop, and explain the principle (as well as to sensibly cabin it), and 
to start to answer those questions.19 
Part I summarizes and criticizes the Court’s inadequate 
discussion of equal sovereignty in Shelby County and sets out a 
superficially compelling case—grounded in precedent, text, and 
history—against the equal sovereignty principle. Part II drills down 
further into the sources of constitutional law to undermine that initial 
case, constructing in its place a more compelling argument—again 
grounded in precedent, text, and history (but this time more deeply), 
and also in constitutional structure—in support of the principle of 
equal sovereignty among the states. And finally, Part III briefly 
sketches out what a better-grounded equal sovereignty principle 
would look like in practice. Properly understood, the equal 
sovereignty principle is not a guarantee of state equality in all 
respects. It guarantees only equal sovereignty—equal capacity for 
self-government—which makes it more fundamental, but much less 
expansive, than Justice Ginsburg and other critics have feared. 
 
 18. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Court Affects Each of Us: The Supreme Court Term in 
Review, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 361, 369–70 (2013) (“What part of the Constitution did Section 4(b) 
violate? What level of scrutiny was the Court using? What is the constitutional basis for the 
principle of equal sovereignty? None of these questions was addressed by the Court.”); Katyal 
& Schmidt, supra note 5, at 2134 (“The Court’s creation of the equal sovereignty 
principle . . . raised many more questions than it answered. . . . Where does the equal 
sovereignty principle come from? Is there a textual hook, or is it just an inference from 
constitutional structure?”); id. at 2136 (noting that “federal courts will have to grapple with the 
logic and limits of the equal sovereignty principle for a while”). Thus, for instance, a number of 
public-interest groups and law professors filed an amicus curiae brief in King v. Burwell 
speculating that it might conceivably violate the equal sovereignty principle to read the 
Affordable Care Act to disallow federal subsidies in states that do not choose to operate their 
own health insurance exchanges. See Brief of Amici Curiae Jewish Alliance for Law and Social 
Action (JALSA) et al. in Support of Respondents at 12–35, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 
(2015) (No. 14-114), 2015 WL 350366. Part III of this Article suggests that it would not, insofar 
as all states are afforded the same sovereign right to establish health insurance exchanges. 
 19. Shortly before the publication of this Article, I was made aware of another not-yet-
published article—written contemporaneously with this one, but only posted online after a draft 
of this Article had been posted—that seeks to accomplish some of these same objectives, albeit 
largely on different grounds. See Jeffrey M. Schmitt, In Defense of Shelby County’s Principle of 
Equal State Sovereignty, 68 OKLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016). 
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I.  THE INADEQUACY OF SHELBY COUNTY AND THE SUPERFICIALLY 
COMPELLING CASE AGAINST THE EQUAL SOVEREIGNTY PRINCIPLE 
The Supreme Court first floated the idea that the Voting Rights 
Act might run afoul of some principle of equal sovereignty among the 
states in dicta in the 2009 case of Northwest Austin Municipal Utility 
District Number One v. Holder,20 also authored by Chief Justice 
Roberts. In that case, the Court flagged “serious” constitutional 
questions surrounding the Voting Rights Act, but concluded that 
those questions were not squarely raised by the facts of the case.21 The 
entirety of the Court’s off-hand discussion of equal sovereignty in 
Northwest Austin consisted of the following three-sentence 
paragraph: 
The [Voting Rights] Act also differentiates between the States, 
despite our historic tradition that all the States enjoy “equal 
sovereignty.” United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 16 (1960) (citing 
Lessee of Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 223 (1845)); see also Texas 
v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725–726 (1869). Distinctions can be justified in 
some cases. “The doctrine of the equality of States . . . does not 
bar . . . remedies for local evils which have subsequently appeared.” 
[South Carolina v.] Katzenbach, [383 U.S. 301], at 328–329 
[(1966)] (emphasis added). But a departure from the fundamental 
principle of equal sovereignty requires a showing that a statute’s 
disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the problem 
that it targets.22 
When the Court squarely confronted the constitutional issue four 
years later in Shelby County, and directly concluded that the Voting 
Rights Act’s coverage formula contravenes the constitutional 
mandate of equal sovereignty, its discussion was no less compact and 
offhand. Indeed, the Court relied on the above paragraph from 
Northwest Austin as the core authority for its conclusion. Here is the 
Court’s analysis of the existence of the equal sovereignty principle, in 
full: 
Not only do States retain sovereignty under the Constitution, there 
is also a “fundamental principle of equal sovereignty” among the 
States. Northwest Austin, [557 U.S.], at 203 (emphasis added). Over 
a hundred years ago, this Court explained that our Nation “was and 
 
 20. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009). 
 21. See id. at 204, 206–11. 
 22. Id. at 203 (alterations in original); see Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 5, at 2134 (“The 
Court’s creation of the equal sovereignty principle was as cursory as it was disruptive . . . .”). 
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is a union of States, equal in power, dignity and authority.” Coyle v. 
Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 567 (1911). Indeed, “the constitutional equality 
of the States is essential to the harmonious operation of the scheme 
upon which the Republic was organized.” Id. at 580. Coyle 
concerned the admission of new States, and Katzenbach rejected the 
notion that the principle operated as a bar on differential treatment 
outside that context. [Katzenbach,] 383 U.S., at 328–329. At the 
same time, as we made clear in Northwest Austin, the fundamental 
principle of equal sovereignty remains highly pertinent in assessing 
subsequent disparate treatment of States. [Northwest Austin,] 557 
U.S., at 203. 
The Voting Rights Act departs from these basic principles.23 
This breezy analysis—making fundamental constitutional law in 
a few conclusory sentences—combined a troubling misuse of 
precedent with a surprising failure to make any detailed attempt to 
ground the equal sovereignty principle in either the Constitution’s 
text or its history.24 This Part endeavors to demonstrate that—at first 
glance, anyway—precedent, text, and history all appear to belie the 
Court’s naked conclusion. 
A. Precedent 
The Northwest Austin Court’s quotation of South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach25 comes across as practically Orwellian. In Katzenbach, 
the Justices in fact rejected the argument that the Voting Rights Act 
runs afoul of a doctrine of equality among the States, squarely 
declaring that “that doctrine applies only to the terms upon which 
States are admitted to the Union.”26 Yet the Northwest Austin Court 
audaciously quoted that very sentence from Katzenbach as primary 
support for its contrary argument, using an ellipsis to skip over the 
 
 23. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623–24 (2013) (citing parenthetical and parallel 
citations omitted).  
 24. See generally Zachary S. Price, NAMUDNO’s Non-Existent Principle of State Equality, 
88 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 24 (2013) (criticizing Northwest Austin along these lines and 
anticipating and condemning the Court’s forthcoming move in Shelby County). 
 25. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
 26. Id. at 328–29. The full sentence from Katzenbach reads as follows: “The doctrine of the 
equality of States, invoked by South Carolina, does not bar this approach, for that doctrine 
applies only to the terms upon which States are admitted to the Union, and not to the remedies 
for local evils which have subsequently appeared.” Id. 
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part of Katzenbach that renders reliance on that case untenable.27 
That is to say, the Court brazenly quoted Katzenbach “as support for 
the idea that a ‘doctrine of the equality of the states’ exists—
concealing the part about how ‘that doctrine applies only to the terms 
upon which the States are admitted to the Union’ behind a 
strategically placed ellipsis.”28 
In Shelby County, the Court then took the apparent ruse one 
step further. The Chief Justice begrudgingly acknowledged (for the 
first time) that Katzenbach had actually limited the applicability of 
the doctrine of state equality outside of the context of the admission 
of new states.29 But he then relied on Northwest Austin for the 
proposition that, nonetheless, “the fundamental principle of equal 
sovereignty remains highly pertinent in assessing subsequent 
disparate treatment of the States.”30 
This amounted to a double sin. First, the Court tried to minimize 
the meaning and scope of Katzenbach by declaring that Katzenbach 
simply “rejected the notion that the [state-equality] principle 
operated as a bar on differential treatment outside th[e] context” of 
“the admission of new States.”31 But Katzenbach did not just say that 
the state-equality doctrine fails to impose a categorical bar on all 
differential treatment of the states outside of the context of admission 
to the Union. It said that that doctrine has no effect at all outside of 
that context—that it “applies only to the terms upon which States are 
admitted to the Union.”32 
Second, having deceptively carved out of Katzenbach space for a 
state-equality doctrine that might operate (short of a categorical bar) 
outside of the context of the admission of new states, the Court 
immediately declared that that space had already been filled by 
Northwest Austin: “[A]s we made clear in Northwest Austin, the 
fundamental principle of equal sovereignty remains highly pertinent 
in assessing subsequent disparate treatment of States.”33 This sleight-
 
 27. See Price, supra note 24, at 30–31 (“Note the ellipses and added emphasis. The quote in 
[Northwest Austin] omits key phrases from Katzenbach, thereby reversing the implication of the 
quoted passage.”).  
 28. Fishkin, supra note 6, at 177; see also Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 5, at 2133. 
 29. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623–24 (2013) (“Katzenbach rejected the 
notion that the principle operated as a bar on differential treatment outside that context.”).  
 30. Id. at 2624. 
 31. Id. at 2623–24. 
 32. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328–29 (1966). 
 33. Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2624. 
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of-hand simply bootstrapped Northwest Austin’s blatant 
mischaracterization of Katzenbach into a brand-new constitutional 
rule.34 As Justice Ginsburg bemoaned in her dissent, “the Court 
ratchet[ed] up what was pure dictum in Northwest Austin, attributing 
breadth to the equal sovereignty principle in flat contradiction of 
Katzenbach.”35 And it did so “with nary an explanation of why it finds 
Katzenbach wrong, let alone any discussion of whether stare decisis 
nonetheless counsels adherence to Katzenbach’s ruling on the limited 
‘significance’ of the equal sovereignty principle.”36 
Aside from Katzenbach, which in fact had expressly limited the 
state-equality doctrine to the admission of new states, and Northwest 
Austin, which had patently misread Katzenbach, the Court in Shelby 
County and Northwest Austin cited only a handful of other cases in 
support of the equal sovereignty principle. But those cases—Coyle v. 
Smith,37 United States v. Louisiana,38 and Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan39—
which the Court did not analyze at all, were all decided under the 
“equal footing doctrine”—the doctrine requiring equality for newly 
admitted states.40 
In a recent article in the New York University Law Review 
responding to Northwest Austin, Professor Zachary Price makes a 
compelling argument that the equal footing doctrine is a narrow one 
that covers new states only and provides no support whatsoever for a 
 
 34. This was an especially egregious sin, given that the Northwest Austin Court purported 
not to reach the constitutional issue. See Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 5, at 2134–35 (arguing 
that by purporting only to flag, rather than decide, the issue in Northwest Austin, but then 
relying on Northwest Austin as dispositive in Shelby County, “[t]he Court was . . . able to use the 
avoidance canon to effect and then mask its major doctrinal transformation”). 
 35. Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Guy-Uriel E. Charles 
& Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, State’s Rights, Last Rites, and Voting Rights, 47 CONN. L. REV. 481, 
519–21 (2014). 
 36. Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Town Hall Debate: 
McConnell and Rosen on the Voting Rights Act, supra note 8 (remarks of Michael McConnell) 
(“I do not believe the Court is rigidly required to comply with all precedent, but I do believe we 
are entitled to explanation when it does not.”). 
 37. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911). 
 38. United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960). 
 39. Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845). 
 40. Actually, the Court cited one other case—Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 
(1869)—which has nothing explicit to say about state equality at all, holding only that the states 
retain sovereignty under the Constitution and that the Southern states had not lawfully seceded 
from the Union because our nation is “an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible 
States.” See Price, supra note 24, at 32 n.9. The possible relevance of White is discussed infra 
note 353. 
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broader principle of equal sovereignty among existing states.41 That 
doctrine, explains Price, is concerned with a specific problem.42 
Because the admission of new states on equal terms with the existing 
states would water down the power and influence of the existing 
states in Congress, Congress (composed, of course, entirely of 
representatives from the existing states) might be tempted to admit 
new states on less favorable terms instead—giving itself more power 
over those states than the Constitution gives it over the original 
states.43 The equal footing doctrine simply precludes Congress from 
doing so.44 In the Supreme Court’s words, it rejects “the contention 
that any [new] State[s] may be deprived of any of the power 
constitutionally possessed by other States, as States, by reason of the 
terms in which the acts admitting them to the Union have been 
framed.”45 
The equal footing doctrine provides that, whatever powers are 
reserved to the states by the Constitution—whatever protections the 
architecture of constitutional federalism provides to the states—those 
powers and protections are the same for all states, regardless of when 
they entered the Union.46 It is in this respect that new states enter the 
Union on “equal footing” with existing states. But, argues Price, the 
“equal footing principle says nothing about whether federal 
legislation, validly enacted pursuant to Congress’s enumerated 
powers, must treat states equally. Insofar as Congress could treat the 
original states unequally, it can do the same to the new states . . . .”47 
And whether Congress could treat the original states unequally is 
simply not the province of the equal footing doctrine.48 That doctrine 
is about discrimination against new states, not about discrimination 
among existing states. It does not speak to the issue of discrimination 
among existing states. 
 
 41. See Price, supra note 24, at 32–39. 
 42. Id. at 33.  
 43. Id. 
 44. See id. (“[S]uch conditions are enforceable only if Congress could have imposed them 
on an existing state.”).  
 45. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 570 (1911).  
 46. Price, supra note 24, at 33–34. 
 47. Id. at 34.  
 48. See id. at 32 (“The equal footing doctrine . . . provides no support for a requirement of 
equal treatment of states in federal legislation.”). 
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Price then canvasses the Supreme Court’s equal footing cases to 
elicit ample support for his conclusion.49 For instance, the Court’s 
most important equal footing decision, Coyle v. Smith, held 
unenforceable a provision in the federal statute admitting Oklahoma 
to the Union that precluded the new state from moving its state 
capital.50 That provision was invalid because Congress could not 
impose a similar requirement on the existing states.51 Choosing where 
to locate a state capital is an exclusive state prerogative—an incident 
of state sovereignty—that lies beyond the power of the federal 
government.52 Congress cannot use an admission statute to burden a 
new state with a prohibition or obligation “in respect of matters 
which would otherwise be exclusively within the sphere of state 
power.”53 But the Coyle Court went on to explain that Congress 
remains free to impose conditions in admission statutes that “are 
within the scope of the conceded powers of Congress over the 
subject.”54 If the Constitution provides that Congress can regulate in a 
particular area, then Congress could interfere with the sovereignty of 
the existing states in that area—in which case there is nothing unequal 
about its interfering with the sovereignty of a new state in that area. 
From this, Price concludes that the equal footing doctrine—the 
only actual authority relied upon by the Northwest Austin and Shelby 
County decisions to support the equal sovereignty principle—in fact 
provides no support for that principle at all.55 The doctrine establishes 
only that if Congress could not impose a burden on an existing state, 
it cannot impose it on a new state. It has nothing whatsoever to say 
about whether Congress can discriminate among the existing states. 
 
 49. See id. at 34–38.  
 50. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 579 (1911).  
 51. See id. at 565 (“That one of the original thirteen States could now be shorn of [the 
powers to locate and change its state capital] by an act of Congress would not be for a moment 
entertained.”). 
 52. Id.  
 53. Id. at 568. 
 54. Id.; see also id. at 574: 
It may well happen that Congress should embrace in an enactment introducing a new 
State into the Union legislation intended as a regulation of commerce among the 
States, or with Indian tribes situated within the limits of such new State, or 
regulations touching the sole care and disposition of the public lands or reservations 
therein, which might be upheld as legislation within the sphere of the plain power of 
Congress.  
 55. See Price, supra note 24, at 38 (“In sum, the equal footing doctrine provides no support 
for a general requirement that federal legislation treat states equally.”).  
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B. Text 
If the Court’s treatment of precedent in establishing the equal 
sovereignty principle was rushed and seemingly less than completely 
sincere, its treatment of the Constitution’s text was nonexistent. 
Nowhere in the Court’s terse discussions of equal sovereignty in 
Northwest Austin and Shelby County does it so much as mention a 
single provision of the constitutional text. 
That absence is, of course, damning on its own; if there were a 
provision of the Constitution that actually supported the Court’s 
holding, surely the Court would have cited it. But the omission may 
be even more egregious than that. In fact, even a cursory examination 
of the constitutional text—an examination that the Court 
conspicuously did not perform—seems to reveal not only that there is 
no explicit constitutional principle of state equality, but also that there 
can be no such principle implicit in the Constitution either. That is to 
say, the text is not just damning in its silence; it affirmatively cuts 
against the Court’s conclusion. 
Textually, the Constitution does explicitly mandate the equal 
treatment of the states, but only in several particular respects. Under 
the Tax Uniformity Clause, for instance, “all Duties, Imposts, and 
Excises [imposed by Congress] shall be uniform throughout the 
United States.”56 Likewise, the Naturalization and Bankruptcy 
Clauses empower Congress to “establish [a] uniform Rule of 
Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies 
throughout the United States.”57 And the Port Preference Clause 
provides that “[n]o Preference shall be given by any Regulation of 
Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of 
another.”58 The existence of these narrow and specific textual 
demands for state equality strongly implies the absence of an 
unwritten, general equality mandate.59 It would make little sense for a 
 
 56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.  
 57. Id. cl. 4.  
 58. Id. § 9, cl. 6. 
 59. See Price, supra note 24, at 27 (“The text of the Constitution, moreover, implies the 
absence of a general principle of state equality by mandating some forms of equal treatment but 
not others.”); id. at 28 (arguing that “at least in the absence of some compelling reason to infer a 
constitutional principle of state equality, the specificity of guarantees such as the Tax 
Uniformity Clause and the Port Preference Clause suggests that no general rule otherwise 
guards states against unequal treatment in federal legislation”); Town Hall Debate: McConnell 
and Rosen on the Voting Rights, supra note 8 (remarks of Michael McConnell): 
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Constitution that implicitly requires equality among the states across 
the board to contain a handful of particular and limited explicit state-
equality provisions. 
C. History 
The Court’s treatment of history resembled its treatment of 
text—in that it, too, was nonexistent. And just as with the text, a 
cursory examination of the history that the Court ignored seems quite 
damning. 
To begin with, even the narrow (and seemingly inapplicable, in 
any event) equal footing doctrine is historically dubious. At the 
Constitutional Convention, the Framers affirmatively rejected a 
provision that would have required all new states to be admitted on 
equal footing with the existing states.60 Although James Madison and 
others supported that provision,61 it was removed from the 
Constitution on the motion of Gouverneur Morris,62 who later 
explained that his intention in striking the provision was to allow for 
Congress, when admitting new states, “to govern them as provinces 
and allow them no voice in our counsels.”63 So, in fact, the history 
shows that the equal footing doctrine was intentionally left out of the 
Constitution. 
It is true that the equal footing doctrine nonetheless enjoys a 
long historical pedigree in the sense that Congress (or the president) 
 
More importantly, this “fundamental principle” is not to be found in the 
constitutional text. There are specific provisions requiring equal treatment of states, 
such as the one prohibiting any “Preference . . . by any Regulation of Commerce or 
Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another,” or the one stating that 
bankruptcy laws must be “uniform”–or even the neglected requirement of the 
Spending Clause that money may be expended only for the “general” welfare, as 
opposed to the sort of local projects Congress now feels free to fund. But there is no 
generalized equal protection clause for the states. 
 60. See 5 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF 
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 492 (Jonathan Elliot ed., J.B. Lippincott & Co. 2d ed. 1891) 
[hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES] (summarizing the debate over the motion to strike a proposed 
clause providing that “the new states shall be admitted on the same terms as the original 
states”).  
 61. See id. (“Mr. Madison opposed the motion; insisting that the Western States neither 
would, nor ought to, submit to a union which degraded them from an equal rank with the other 
states. . . . Mr. Sherman was against the motion, and for fixing an equality of privileges by the 
Constitution.”).  
 62. See id. at 492–93.  
 63. William A. Dunning, Are the States Equal Under the Constitution?, 3 POL. SCI. Q. 425, 
437 (1888) (quoting an 1803 letter from Morris); see also 5 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 60, at 
492 (“Mr. Langdon was in favor of the motion. He did not know but circumstances might arise 
which would render it inconvenient to admit new states on terms of equality.”). 
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has always promised equality to the new states in their formal 
admission resolutions,64 and the Supreme Court has formally 
condoned the doctrine for well over a century.65 But it would seem 
that peeling back the façade of this historical pedigree reveals nothing 
of substance underneath. Actual historical practice, rather than the 
empty formality of abstract legislative and judicial proclamations, 
reveals routine discrimination against new states throughout history.66 
In the very same enactments in which it has always offered pro forma 
promises of equal footing, Congress has explicitly imposed all sorts of 
obligations on new states that it has not—and often could not—
impose on existing states: from bans on polygamy to mandates for 
Prohibition, jury-trial rights, and open public schools.67 Congress may 
have claimed to be admitting the new states on equal footing, but 
what it actually did belies what it disingenuously said. In the words of 
one historian who has exhaustively canvassed the historical record,  
“[T]he history of the use of conditions [imposed by Congress on new 
states]—used unequally against states that are perceived as different 
or disloyal, in areas far removed from the enumerated federal 
powers of Article I, and to subordinate states to an overarching 
federal system—raises questions about the historical grounding for 
the Court’s legal conclusions [about the equal footing doctrine].”68 
In addition, if we turn to history for insight on the real question 
at issue—whether Congress can discriminate among existing states, 
rather than against new states—we see a similar story. Congress has a 
long track record of discriminating among the existing states in a wide 
variety of respects.69 Congressional budgetary “earmarks” benefit 
certain states, and not others.70 Congress uses its power over federal 
property to benefit some states—by, for instance, establishing jobs-
 
 64. See Peter S. Onuf, New State Equality: The Ambiguous History of a Constitutional 
Principle, 18 PUBLIUS 53, 54–55 (1988). 
 65. See infra Part II.A. 
 66. See Eric Biber, The Price of Admission: Causes, Effects, and Patterns of Conditions 
Imposed on States Entering the Union, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 119, 120 (2004) (“Of the thirty-
seven states admitted to the Union since the adoption of the Constitution (plus the eleven 
Southern states readmitted after the Civil War), almost all of them have had some sort of 
condition imposed on them when they were admitted.”); Onuf, supra note 64, at 55 (“Yet new 
states were not in fact equal to old states.”).  
 67. See Biber, supra note 66, at 130–31; Onuf, supra note 64, at 55; infra note 114.  
 68. Biber, supra note 66, at 124.  
 69. See Colby, supra note 11, at 327–34, 341–46; Price, supra note 24, at 28–29. 
 70. See Price, supra note 24, at 28.  
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providing military bases—and to burden others—such as sticking 
Nevada with most of the nation’s high-level nuclear waste.71 Congress 
sets differing agricultural quotas for the various states.72 Congress 
sometimes enacts pilot programs that operate only in some states, as a 
means of testing particular federal initiatives.73 Congress has enacted 
regulatory laws that apply in some states, but not others,74 has 
exempted some states from certain federal regulatory obligations,75 
has “grandfathered” some states from certain federal regulatory 
requirements,76 and has even allowed some states the leeway to enact 
their own regulatory programs, while denying that leeway to other 
states.77 In the words of one historian, “[t]he conclusion from all the 
historical facts seems to be that at no time since the formation of the 
present constitution have all the states of the Union been in the 
enjoyment of equal powers under the laws of Congress.”78 
In sum, the history, like the text and the caselaw, seems not to 
support the equal sovereignty principle at all. 
II.  THE CASE FOR THE EQUAL SOVEREIGNTY PRINCIPLE 
The preceding Part sets out what, at first glance, seems to be a 
potent—perhaps even devastating—argument against the equal 
sovereignty principle: the Court’s new doctrine apparently lacks any 
grounding in precedent, text, or history. But this Part digs deeper into 
all three of those inquiries, with an emphasis on constitutional 
structure as well. In so doing, it seeks to establish that there is, in fact, 
something to the equal sovereignty principle—something substantial 
and important. The lack of a clear textual mandate is far less 
significant than it might first appear, and both the history and the 
caselaw, along with the underlying structure of our constitutional 
system, actually provide powerful support for a constitutional 
commitment to equal sovereignty.79 
 
 71. See Colby, supra note 11, at 334 n.305. 
 72. See id. at 346. 
 73. See Price, supra note 24, at 28 & n.23. 
 74. See Colby, supra note 11, at 346. 
 75. See id. at 341. 
 76. See id. at 341–42. 
 77. See id. at 343–45; Price, supra note 24, at 29. 
 78. Dunning, supra note 63, at 452.  
 79. Aside from its express support for some measure of structural reasoning, this Article is 
intentionally agnostic as to the proper method of constitutional interpretation. What follows 
will, I believe, establish that nearly all of the traditional modalities of constitutional argument, 
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A. The Equal Footing Doctrine 
Perhaps the best place to start is with the equal footing 
doctrine—both because it touches directly on text, history, structure, 
and precedent, and because it was the equal footing cases upon which 
the Shelby County Court purported to rely. As noted above, it is true 
that the equal footing doctrine has dubious originalist credentials, 
insofar as the Framers chose not to include it within the constitutional 
text.80 But we should be careful not to make too much of that 
omission. Gouverneur Morris, who made the motion to strike the 
provision, later explained that he, personally, was motivated by a 
desire to admit future states on less compelling terms: “I always 
thought that, when we should acquire Canada and Louisiana it would 
be proper to govern them as provinces, and allow them no voice in 
our councils.”81 But Morris did not express that view clearly to his 
fellow delegates, precisely because he did not think that they would 
agree: “In wording the third section of the fourth article, I went so far 
as circumstances would permit to establish the exclusion. Candor 
obliges me to add my belief, that, had it been more pointedly 
expressed, a strong opposition would have been made.”82 The most 
that can be comfortably said about the framing history, then, is that 
the Framers chose not to resolve the equal footing issue explicitly at 
the Convention.83 
 
see PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12–13 (1982), cut in favor of the 
existence of a flexible and sensibly cabined equal sovereignty principle. Thus, one need not take 
sides in the interpretive debates to agree with the conclusions presented here.  
 80. See supra Part I.C. 
 81. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 404 (Max Farrand ed., 
1911) (1803 letter from Gouverneur Morris to Henry W. Livingston).  
 82. Id.  
 83. See Valerie J.M. Brader, Congress’ Pet: Why the Clean Air Act’s Favoritism of 
California Is Unconstitutional Under the Equal Footing Doctrine, 13 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 119, 132 (2007) (“Even Morris admitted that many other founders would 
not have agreed with his interpretation, and the debates make it clear that a contentious issue 
was essentially resolved with compromise language that had as its chief asset room for 
ambiguity.”). Admittedly, the Framers did, in one particular respect, textually preserve greater 
sovereignty for old states than for new ones, at least temporarily. The ninth section of Article I 
provides that the “Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing 
shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one 
thousand eight hundred and eight.” U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl.1 (emphasis added). This clause 
“implicitly allowed Congress to ban transatlantic slave imports to new states even before 1808.” 
AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 275 (2005). This was as much 
of a concession as the antislavery forces could obtain without scaring the deep Southern states 
away from the Convention. 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 60, at 452 (James Wilson in the 
Pennsylvania ratifying convention): 
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1. The Equal Footing Pedigree.  The equal footing doctrine may 
not have been explicitly woven into the constitutional text, but it 
nonetheless has a long and unbroken statutory pedigree. At the very 
same time that the Philadelphia Convention was punting on the issue 
of equality for new states, the Continental Congress in New York was 
crafting the Northwest Ordinance,84 which explicitly required that any 
new states carved from the Northwest Territories must enter the 
Union “on an equal footing” with the original states.85 Virtually every 
admission statute in our nation’s history has followed the lead of the 
Northwest Ordinance.86 Time and time again, new states have been 
 
[I]t was all that could be obtained. I am sorry it was no more; but from this I think 
there is reason to hope, that yet a few years, and it will be prohibited altogether; and 
in the mean time, the new states which are to be formed will be under the control of 
Congress in this particular, and slaves will never be introduced amongst them. 
; id. at 115 (General William Heath in the Massachusetts ratifying convention) (“The federal 
Convention went as far as they could. The migration or importation, &c., is confined to the 
states now existing only; new states cannot claim it.”). As Professor Gillian Metzger has noted, 
the inclusion of this “provision could signal either that the Framers accepted that new states 
might have lesser powers, or (by operation of the expressio unius maxim) that in all other 
regards the states were to be equal.” Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate 
Relations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1468, 1518 n.210 (2007). Professor Akhil Amar argues in favor of 
the latter interpretation:  
True, the words “equal footing” did not appear [in the Constitution]. Yet this idea 
shone through in the document’s general structure and in many of its specific rules. 
Apart from [the 1808 Clause], the Constitution nowhere distinguished between the 
original states and later ones. . . . Gouverneur Morris later bragged about how he had 
successfully blocked a specific guarantee of equal footing; but regardless of the 
outcome of this textual battle, Morris had lost the structural war. The original 
thirteen states would have no privileged place within America’s New World order. 
AMAR, supra, at 274–75.  
 84. See Jack N. Rakove, Ambiguous Achievement: The Northwest Ordinance, in 
NORTHWEST ORDINANCE: ESSAYS ON ITS FORMULATION, PROVISIONS AND LEGACY 14–15 
(Frederick D. Williams ed., 1988). 
 85. An Act to Provide for the Government of the Territory North-West of the River Ohio, 
art. V, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 53 n.a (1789) (incorporating the original Northwest Ordinance under the 
newly ratified Constitution). The Northwest Ordinance was first enacted by the Continental 
Congress. After the ratification of the Constitution, the first Congress voted to keep the 
ordinance in effect under the new government. See Brader, supra note 83, at 133. (Although the 
First and Second Continental Congress and the Congress of the Confederation were the 
nation’s legislative bodies before the U.S. Constitution went into effect, this Article refers to 
both of these legislatures as the Continental Congress to reduce confusion.)  
 86. See Onuf, supra note 64, at 54 (“[The Northwest Ordinance] was extended directly or 
by implication to other territories. Every state was admitted—whether by act or joint resolution 
of Congress or by presidential proclamation—with an express declaration of equality.”). 
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explicitly “admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the 
original States in all respects whatsoever.”87 
The equal footing doctrine has a long judicial pedigree as well.88 
The Supreme Court has recognized and enforced it since the 1830s.89 
Early on, the Court was unclear about whether the doctrine was 
simply a statutory one—dictated by the new states’ admission 
statutes—or whether it contained a constitutional component 
(notwithstanding the Constitution’s textual silence on the matter).90 
But in 1845, the Court made clear that the doctrine is of 
constitutional dimension. The Justices declared that a statutory 
provision seeking to admit a new state on unequal terms—with an 
unequal “municipal right of sovereignty”—would be “void and 
inoperative.”91 Since then, the Court has repeatedly emphasized the 
constitutional nature of the equal footing guarantee.92 As the Court 
put it in 1857, “[c]learly Congress could exact of the new State the 
surrender of no attribute inherent in her character as a sovereign 
independent State, or indispensable to her equality with her sister 
States, necessarily implied and guarant[e]ed by the very nature of the 
Federal compact.”93 
Over the last 180 or so years, the Court has applied the equal 
footing doctrine in a number of contexts, many of which touch 
directly on the mandate of equal sovereignty among states. In 
Permoli v. Municipality No. 1 of New Orleans,94 for instance, the 
 
 87. E.g., An Act to Enable the People of Wisconsin Territory to Form a Constitution and 
State Government, and for the Admission of Such State Into the Union, ch. 89, 9 Stat. 56, 56 
(1846). 
 88. See Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 195 (1987) (“The equal 
footing doctrine is deeply rooted in history . . . .”). 
 89. See Brader, supra note 83, at 136–37 (discussing the early cases). 
 90. See Price, supra note 24, at 33 n.48 (citing Mayor of New Orleans v. De Armas, 34 U.S. 
(9 Pet.) 224, 235–36 (1835)). 
 91. Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 223 (1845); see also Mayor of Mobile 
v. Eslava, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 234, 258–59 (1842) (Catron, J., concurring) (stating that new states 
have “equal capacities of self-government with the old states, and equal benefits under the 
constitution of the United States”).  
 92. See, e.g., Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 511 (1896) (“[T]he language of the act 
admitting Wyoming into the Union, which recognized her coequal rights, was merely 
declaratory of the general rule.”); Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 434 (1892) (“[T]he 
equality prescribed would have existed if it had not been thus stipulated.”); Escanaba & Lake 
Mich. Trans. Co. v. City of Chicago, 107 U.S. 678, 688–89 (1883) (“[Illinois] was admitted, and 
could be admitted, only on the same footing with [the original states].” (emphasis added)). 
 93. Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 84, 93 (1857).  
 94. Permoli v. Mun. No. 1 of New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589 (1845). 
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Court rejected the notion that Congress could force Louisiana to 
protect religious liberty rights. Although prior to the Fourteenth 
Amendment “[t]he Constitution [made] no provision for protecting 
the citizens of the respective states in their religious liberties,” 
Louisiana’s enabling act—the federal statute allowing it to become a 
state—required it to protect religious freedom as a condition of 
statehood.95 The Court held that the enabling act had no effect once 
Louisiana was admitted to the Union. Congress could require the 
state to include a particular provision in the state constitution as a 
condition of admission—because until that point, Louisiana was just a 
territory without equal sovereignty rights—but once Louisiana gained 
admission to the Union, Congress lost control over the contents of its 
law and its state constitution.96 Louisiana was free to amend its 
constitution to remove a provision whose inclusion Congress had 
previously mandated as a condition of statehood. 
Similarly, in Coyle v. Smith, discussed briefly above,97 the Court 
held unconstitutional Congress’s attempt to limit Oklahoma’s ability 
to move its state capital. Oklahoma’s enabling act of 1906 required 
the new state to keep its capital in Guthrie at least until 1913.98 But in 
1910, the state legislature enacted a law to move the capital to 
Oklahoma City.99 The Supreme Court held that the state was free to 
do so, notwithstanding the contrary provision in its enabling act. “The 
power to locate its own seat of government and to determine when 
and how it shall be changed from one place to another . . . are 
essentially and peculiarly state powers.”100 The notion that “one of the 
original thirteen States could now be shorn of such powers by an act 
of Congress would not be for a moment entertained.”101 Because a 
new state cannot “be placed upon a plane of inequality with its sister 




 95. Id. at 609.  
 96. See id. at 610. 
 97. See supra Part I.A. 
 98. See Oklahoma Enabling Act, ch. 3335, § 2, 34 Stat. 267, 268–69 (1906). 
 99. See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 563–64 (1911).  
 100. Id. at 565.  
 101. Id.  
 102. Id. 
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2. Equal Footing and Congressional Power.  These and other 
cases emphasize that the equal footing doctrine mandates that 
Congress cannot impose a burden on a new state, in the state’s 
enabling act, that it would not be able to impose upon an existing 
state. A corollary of that proposition, however, is that if the burden 
imposed by the enabling act is one that Congress could also impose 
on an original state—because it falls within the scope of a power 
delegated to the federal government by the Constitution—then 
Congress does not violate the Constitution by imposing it on the new 
state. This is a point that the cases have emphasized as well.103 
This could suggest one of two things. First, it could suggest that 
the states have a residual degree of sovereignty protected by the 
enumerated-powers doctrine and recognized by the Tenth 
Amendment.104 What the equal footing doctrine does is simply 
establish that new states have that same residuum of sovereignty. So 
whenever Congress is acting within a legitimate sphere of federal 
power, rather than in a sphere exclusively reserved to the states under 
the Tenth Amendment, the equal footing doctrine does not come into 
play at all. As such, that doctrine does not tell us anything about 
 
 103. See, e.g., id. at 573:  
[W]hen a new State is admitted into the Union, it is so admitted with all of the powers 
of sovereignty and jurisdiction which pertain to the original States, and . . . such 
powers may not be constitutionally diminished, impaired or shorn away by any 
conditions, compacts or stipulations embraced in the act under which the new State 
came into the Union, which would not be valid and effectual if the subject of 
congressional legislation after admission. 
; see also id. at 574 (“It may well happen that Congress should embrace in an enactment 
introducing a new State into the Union legislation intended as a regulation of commerce among 
the States . . . which might be upheld as legislation within the sphere of the plain power of 
Congress.”); Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 229 (1845):  
By the 8th section of the 1st article of the Constitution, power is granted to Congress 
“to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states.” If, in the 
exercise of this power, Congress can impose the same restrictions upon the original 
states, in relation to their navigable waters, as are imposed, by this article of the 
compact, on the state of Alabama, then this article is a mere regulation of commerce 
among the several states, according to the Constitution, and, therefore, as binding on 
the other states as Alabama. 
In United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913), the Court upheld a provision of the New 
Mexico enabling act that prohibited introducing alcohol into Indian country on the ground that 
the Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, as well 
as an unenumerated power to “exercis[e] a fostering care and protection over all dependent 
Indian communities,” id. at 45–46, and “[b]eing a legitimate exercise of that power, the 
legislation in question does not . . . disturb the principle of equality among the States,” id. at 49. 
 104. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.”). 
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whether Congress can discriminate (in terms of respecting 
sovereignty) between the states in the course of exercising its 
legitimate powers; if Congress could discriminate among the original 
states, then it can discriminate among the new ones too. Whether 
Congress could or could not discriminate among the existing states 
when legislating within its legitimate spheres of influence is a question 
utterly distinct from, and completely unaffected by, the equal footing 
doctrine. Equal footing is about discrimination against new states 
only. This is Professor Price’s view.105 
These cases could also mean something different, however. The 
statements about how burdens imposed on new states are valid if they 
could have been enacted pursuant to a legitimate federal power might 
mean simply that the equal footing doctrine does not grant new states 
any greater protection from federal regulation—any greater degree of 
sovereignty—than the Constitution gives to the original states. In 
other words, they might simply be an expression of equal sovereignty. 
At no point do these cases come out and say that Congress is free to 
enact discriminatory, unequal burdens on the sovereignty of the new 
states, so long as it is exercising a legitimate federal power. Rather, 
the cases might be suggesting that Congress could not do so. The 
cases could be saying that Congress cannot admit a new state without 
making it the sovereign equal of the other states, not simply because 
of a narrow equality principle governing the admission of new states, 
but rather because of a broad, generalized principle of equal state 
sovereignty. On this view, the equal footing doctrine is just a 
particular, concrete aspect of a broader and deeper principle. No 
state, new or old, can have more or less sovereignty than the other 
states. New states are admitted into the Union on these terms, with 
the understanding that they, just like the existing states, will now and 
always be on equal footing and have equal sovereignty with all of the 
other states. And that means that Congress cannot, even when 
 
 105. See supra Part I.A. It is also Justice Ginsburg’s. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 
2612, 2649 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (chastising the majority for its “unprecedented 
extension of the equal sovereignty principle outside its proper domain—the admission of new 
States”). Going one step further, one could read these cases not to be irrelevant to the question 
of Congress’s ability to discriminate among existing states in exercising its legitimate powers, 
but instead to affirmatively support the view that Congress can do so. See Greenbaum et al., 
supra note 6, at 848 (reading Coyle to say that “Congress can enact laws affecting states 
differently at admission where its powers would allow it to do so in any event,” and declaring 
that, “[i]mplicit in this, of course, is the notion that Congress may enact legislation that affects 
different states differently”). 
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exercising one of its legitimate powers, enact legislation that treats 
any of the states (new or old) as unequal sovereigns. 
It is true that the equal footing cases all involve the admission of 
new states, because those are the circumstances in which Congress is 
most tempted to try to make second-class citizens of particular states. 
And those are the circumstances in which Congress is most able to do 
so—when the states being discriminated against do not yet have 
representation in the Congress doing the discriminating. But that 
does not mean that the true nature of the principle at play is 
necessarily the narrower concept, rather than the broader one. 
Indeed, when we stop to think about it, the broader concept 
seems far more intuitive. To say that the new states must be admitted 
on equal footing with the old states would seem to imply, almost by 
necessity, that the old states are already on equal footing with each 
other.106 What else could it mean? If new states must be on equal 
footing with old states, but old states are not on equal footing with 
each other, then to require that new states be admitted on equal 
footing with old states is to say that new states need not be on equal 
footing with the other states—which would be gibberish. 
In addition, Madison’s notes from the Constitutional Convention 
summarizing the discussion that led to the decision not to include the 
equal footing doctrine explicitly in the constitutional text make it 
plainly evident that the Framers were assuming that the original 
states were all on equal footing.107 The issue was simply whether to 
 
 106. See United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 77 (1960) (noting that the “concept of equal 
footing” involves the “political sovereignty guaranteed equally to all States”); Pollard’s Lessee, 
44 U.S. at 224 (noting that “the municipal sovereignty of the new states will be complete, 
throughout their respective borders, and they, and the original states, will be upon an equal 
footing, in all respects whatever”); cf. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: 
THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789–1801, at 104 (1997) (“[Under the Northwest Ordinance,] the 
new states were to be admitted ‘on an equal footing’ with the old; there would be no second-class 
members of the Union. Vital as it was to harmonious relations, the equal footing doctrine was 
later found implicit in the Philadelphia Constitution; the Ordinance was its source and its 
inspiration.” (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)).  
 107. See Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional 
Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 288 (1992) (noting that, even if the 
Framers did not agree on whether new states needed to be admitted on equal footing, “there is 
no evidence that any of the [original] thirteen were to be less than equal”); see also 3 THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 81, at 469 (1825 letter from 
William Steele to Jonathan Steele recounting the words of Jonathan Dayton, Convention 
delegate from New Jersey) (explaining that when the Convention initially resolved to have 
proportional representation in the Senate, the small-state delegates met and issued an 
ultimatum to the Convention that, if that decision were not overturned, “and the smaller states 
COLBY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/21/2016 10:25 PM 
1110 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:1087 
extend that same privilege to new states. Madison, who opposed the 
motion to strike the equal footing language, explained that no states 
“would, nor ought to, submit to a union which degraded them from 
an equal rank with the other states.”108 Hugh Williamson, who 
supported the motion, disagreed on the merits, but explicitly shared 
the underlying assumption: “Mr. Williamson was for leaving the 
legislature free. The existing small states enjoy an equality now, and 
for that reason are admitted to it in the Senate. This reason is not 
applicable to new Western States.”109 
Once we accept—as I think we must—that the equal footing 
doctrine exists, has long been understood to be of constitutional 
dimension, and implicitly necessitates the proposition that all states 
are on equal footing, then the only way to avoid the fundamental 
constitutional principle of equal sovereignty among the states is to say 
that, although all states (old and new) are on equal footing, that does 
not mean that they enjoy equal sovereignty—that equal footing 
entails some form of state equality that is distinct from, and somehow 
less than, equal sovereignty. But that is simply not consistent with 
historical practice. The equal footing doctrine has always been 
understood to include—indeed, to consist primarily of—a guarantee 
of equal sovereignty. The mandate has always been for the new states 
to be admitted “upon an equal footing with the 13 Original States, 
having the same rights of freedom, sovereignty, and Independence as 
the said States.”110 The Supreme Court has routinely reiterated that 
equal footing is about an equal “municipal right of sovereignty”111—
“equal capacities of self-government.”112 In short, as the Supreme 
Court has made clear, “[t]he ‘equal footing’ [doctrine] has long been 
held to refer to political rights and to sovereignty.”113 
 
put upon an equal footing with the largest,” the small-state delegates would walk out of the 
Convention).  
 108. 5 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 60, at 492. 
 109. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 110. 30 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 249 (John C. 
Fitzpatrick ed., 1934) (May 10, 1786) (reporting the work of the committee tasked with 
developing a plan for governing the western territories).  
 111. Pollard’s Lessee, 44 U.S. at 223. 
 112. Mayor of Mobile v. Eslava, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 234, 259 (1842) (Catron, J., concurring) 
(“This is the extent of the guarantee.”); see also Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 573 (1911) 
(declaring that “when a new State is admitted into the Union, it is so admitted with all of the 
powers of sovereignty and jurisdiction which pertain to the original States”). 
 113. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 716 (1950). 
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So then we are left only with the possibility that even though all 
states are on equal footing, and thus must have equal sovereignty, 
that principle is nonetheless not offended by acts of Congress that 
discriminate between states by affording some states greater 
sovereignty than others, so long as Congress is acting pursuant to one 
of its legitimate powers. This is the most charitable interpretation of 
the narrow view of the equal footing cases. It reads those cases in dual 
sovereignty, Tenth Amendment terms to say only that the basic 
federal–state balance is the same for the new states as it is for the old 
states. Congress cannot regulate or limit the sovereignty of the new 
states except in areas in which it is constitutionally empowered to act 
vis-à-vis all of the states. It is in this limited respect that the new states 
possess the same degree of sovereignty as do the original states; since 
Congress cannot limit New York or Virginia’s ability to move its state 
capital, it cannot limit Oklahoma’s ability either. But when Congress 
exercises one of its legitimate powers—acts within one of its 
legitimate spheres—it is free to afford more sovereignty to Oklahoma 
or New York than it affords to Virginia. If Congress could burden all 
of the states, then it can burden only some of them, or just one of 
them. 
But the fundamental problem with this narrow conception of the 
equal footing doctrine—that it guarantees new states the same 
sovereignty as the original states in the limited sense of confining 
Congress to the same pool of powers to act over them, but has 
nothing to say about whether Congress can discriminate between 
states (old or new) in exercising its legitimate constitutional powers—
is that it seems ultimately pointless. Why would we care whether the 
new states are on equal footing with the old states if Congress is free 
to discriminate among any and all states? If Congress is already free 
to discriminate against whatever states it wants, then telling the new 
states that they are on equal footing with the old states does not really 
help them; it does not protect them from discrimination. And in that 
case, the doctrine seems irrelevant. 
To be fair, this is overstating the point. The narrow view of the 
equal footing doctrine does not render the doctrine entirely 
irrelevant. Confining Congress only to its lawful powers when it seeks 
to regulate new states undoubtedly affords important protections to 
those states. And this was especially true before the New Deal, when 
the sphere of legitimate federal authority was understood to be 
substantially smaller than it is today. Many of the permanent 
limitations that Congress attempted to impose upon new states over 
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the years were in fact unconstitutional under even the narrow 
understanding of equal footing—from limitations on polygamy and 
alcohol consumption, to English language mandates, to requirements 
for religious toleration and open public schools—because Congress 
was, at the time, not considered to have any authority in those 
areas.114 But, according to the narrow view, when Congress is 
legislating pursuant to a legitimate federal power, equal footing does 
not come into play, and discrimination is perfectly constitutional. The 
Constitution does not guarantee equal sovereignty to the states. 
3. Equal Footing Is Grounded in Equal Sovereignty.  But that is 
not what the Supreme Court seems to have had in mind in the equal 
footing cases. That is not what it seems to have meant when it noted 
that conditions imposed on new states would be valid if they could be 
imposed pursuant to a legitimate federal power. Although the facts 
and holdings of the equal footing cases are generally consistent with 
 
 114. See Biber, supra note 66, at 130–31 (listing conditions imposed by Congress). Most of 
these limitations never gave rise to litigation. But some did, and were struck down. See, e.g., 
Coyle, 221 U.S. at 568 (striking down Congress’s attempt to preclude Oklahoma from moving its 
state capital); Bolln v. Nebraska, 176 U.S. 83, 87–89 (1900) (upholding a provision of the 
Nebraska Constitution that permitted prosecution of felonies on the basis of information, 
despite a provision in the state’s enabling act that arguably required the use of grand juries); 
Permoli v. Mun. No. 1 of New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589, 609–10 (1845) (holding that it 
would violate the equal footing doctrine for Congress to mandate that Louisiana must protect 
religious liberties after statehood); Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1068 (10th Cir. 1985) 
(discussing Coyle and assuming arguendo that Congress’s attempt to permanently preclude 
Utah from adopting polygamy was unconstitutional, but noting that Utah has never sought to 
introduce polygamy since becoming a state); Williams v. Hert, 110 F. 166, 169 (C.C.D. Ind. 
1901) (holding that an attempt by Congress in a new state’s enabling act to guarantee criminal 
procedure rights in the state’s courts that must “forever remain unalterable” violates the equal 
footing doctrine). The fact that Congress imposed so many of these conditions, while 
simultaneously paying lip service to the equal footing guarantee, should not be taken as 
evidence that such conditions are constitutional, especially given the fact that judges slapped 
them down when the conditions were tested in court. It should be viewed, instead, as evidence 
that the members of those Congresses, “like other politicians, could raise constitutional ideals 
one day and turn their backs on them the next.” Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 626 (1992) 
(Souter, J., concurring). Keith Whittington explains, 
Such decisions did not stop Congress from using its statehood enabling acts (and 
comparable bills) to make declarations about what the future states could “never” do, 
but it was now widely understood as it had not been before that such declarations had 
no legal force. They were symbolic and hortatory. The courts would not enforce the 
supremacy of federal law in such cases.  
Keith E. Whittington, Judicial Review of Congress Before the Civil War, 97 GEO. L.J. 1257, 1315 
(2009). In any event, since the critics of the equal sovereignty principle accept the equal footing 
doctrine (at least when narrowly construed), and seek only to confine it to the admission of new 
states, the existence of these conditions on new state admissions undermines their interpretation 
as much as it undermines mine.  
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either view of the doctrine, the reasoning and rhetoric of the cases 
clearly express the broader view: Congress is obligated to respect a 
core constitutional principle that all states are entitled to equal 
sovereignty. 
Take Coyle v. Smith. In explaining the equal footing doctrine, the 
Coyle Court noted that there is no express equality requirement in 
the provision of Article IV that provides that “‘new States may be 
admitted by the Congress into this Union.’”115 “But what is this 
power?” asked the Court.116 “It is not to admit political organizations 
which are less or greater, or different in dignity or power, from those 
political entities which constitute the Union.”117 To the contrary, 
“[t]he power is to admit ‘new States into this Union.’”118 “‘This 
Union,’” the Court explained, “was and is a union of States, equal in 
power, dignity and authority.”119 The Court continued, “To maintain 
otherwise would be to say that the Union, through the power of 
Congress to admit new States, might come to be a union of States 
unequal in power.”120 And that would violate the Constitution, which 
contemplates—indeed necessitates—a union of equal sovereigns. 
Thus, Congress may not “by the imposition of conditions in an 
enabling act, deprive a new State of any of those attributes essential 
to its equality in dignity and power with other States.”121 
In other words, the Court was saying that the equal footing 
doctrine is not just an unmoored doctrine about the permissible terms 
of admission for new states. It is instead a specific manifestation of a 
general principle of state sovereign equality that is “necessarily 
implied and guarant[e]ed by the very nature of the Federal 
compact.”122 As one federal court put it in the late nineteenth century,  
“[t]he doctrine that new states must be admitted . . . on an ‘equal 
footing’ with the old ones does not rest on any express provision of 
the constitution . . . but on what is considered . . . to be the general 
 
 115. Coyle, 221 U.S. at 566 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3).  
 116. Id.  
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 567.  
 119. Id.  
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 568, 570. 
 122. Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 84, 93 (1857).  
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character and purpose of the union of the states . . . —a union of 
political equals.”123  
Or, in the Supreme Court’s words, the “perfect equality” of all 
“members of the Confederacy” with regard to their “attributes 
as . . . independent sovereign Government[s]” “follow[s] from the 
very nature and objects of the Confederacy, [and] from the language 
of the Constitution.”124 As such, the equal sovereignty principle, upon 
which the equal footing doctrine is based, is not limited to the 
admission of new states. Rather, “[e]quality of constitutional right 
and power is the condition of all the States of the Union, old and 
new.”125 “There can be no distinction between the several States of 
the Union in the character of the jurisdiction, sovereignty and 
dominion which they may possess and exercise over persons and 
subjects within their respective limits.”126 
The cases are thus expressly grounded in the broad view of the 
equal footing doctrine, not the narrow one. They articulate an 
understanding of the equal footing doctrine that is premised on—and 
necessitates the existence of—the equal sovereignty principle.127 They 
stand for the proposition that Congress, regardless of the power that 
it seeks to exercise, is constrained to respect the constitutionally 
mandated sovereign equality of all of the states. 
And it is this broad view that better accords with the structure of 
constitutional federalism. The narrow view seems to be implicitly (if 
unintentionally) premised on an unduly cramped understanding of 
the nature of state sovereignty in our federal system. It seems to 
assume that state sovereignty exists only in those areas protected by 
the Tenth Amendment—only in those spheres in which the federal 
government is disempowered from acting. If that were true, then 
limiting the federal government to its legitimate spheres when 
admitting new states would be sufficient to vindicate the lofty vision 
of equal state sovereignty forcefully advanced in the equal footing 
cases. 
 
 123. Case v. Toftus, 39 F. 730, 732 (C.C.D. Or. 1889). 
 124. Withers, 61 U.S. at 92.  
 125. Escanaba & Lake Mich. Trans. Co. v. City of Chicago, 107 U.S. 678, 689 (1882). 
 126. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 434 (1892). 
 127. See PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1227 (2012) (noting, essentially, that 
“the basis for the equal footing doctrine” is the “principle” that all of “the States in the Union 
are coequal sovereigns under the Constitution”). 
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But it is not the case that the states are sovereign only in the 
areas in which they possess exclusive sovereignty under the Tenth 
Amendment. There are, instead, many areas in which the states and 
the federal government possess concurrent sovereignty.128 As 
Alexander Hamilton explained in the Federalist Papers, because “the 
plan of the Convention aims only at a partial union or consolidation, 
the State Governments . . . clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty 
which they before had and which were not . . . exclusively delegated to 
the United States.”129 “The necessity of a concurrent jurisdiction in 
certain cases results from the division of the sovereign power,” 
Hamilton expounded.130 Thus, “the rule that all authorities, of which 
the States are not explicitly divested in favour of the Union, remain 
with them in full vigour, is not only a theoretical consequence of that 
division, but is clearly admitted by the whole tenor of the . . . 
constitution.”131 
Of course, the Supremacy Clause132 gives Congress the greater, 
ultimate authority in those areas of concurrent sovereignty, in the 
sense that Congress gets the final word. But the states retain genuine 
sovereignty within those spheres nonetheless.133 And so, federal laws 
in those areas implicate and infringe state sovereignty, even though 
they do not generally violate the Constitution.134 Thus, for instance, 
 
 128. See, e.g., Gilman v. City of Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 727 (1865) (noting that 
sometimes “the power to regulate commerce may be exercised by the States”); McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 425 (1819) (“That the power of taxation is one of vital 
importance; that it is retained by the States; that it is not abridged by the grant of a similar 
power to the government of the Union; that it is to be concurrently exercised by the two 
governments: are truths which have never been denied.”). 
 129. THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 200 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 130. Id. at 203. 
 131. Id. 
 132. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in 
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding.”). 
 133. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990) (“[U]nder our federal system, the States 
possess sovereignty concurrent with that of the Federal Government, subject only to limitations 
imposed by the Supremacy Clause.”); Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 669–70 
(1981) (“It has long been recognized that, ‘in the absence of conflicting legislation by Congress, 
there is a residuum of power in the state to make laws governing matters of local concern which 
nevertheless in some measure affect interstate commerce or even, to some extent, regulate it.’” 
(quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945))). 
 134. See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 290 (1981) 
(“Although such congressional enactments obviously curtail or prohibit the States’ prerogatives 
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the Supreme Court has long employed a presumption against 
preemption that is explicitly grounded in respect for the 
constitutionally significant sovereignty of the states in areas of 
concurrent authority.135 As the Court has noted, 
because the States are independent sovereigns in our federal system, 
we have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt 
state-law causes of action. In all pre-emption cases, and particularly 
in those in which Congress has “legislated in a field which the States 
have traditionally occupied,” we “start with the assumption that the 
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the 
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of 
Congress.”136 
Once we appreciate that federalism recognizes and respects state 
sovereignty even in areas in which Congress is empowered to act, it 
becomes clear that, in order to vindicate the passionate assertion in 
the equal footing cases that “[t]here can be no distinction between the 
several States of the Union in the character of the jurisdiction, 
sovereignty and dominion which they may possess and exercise over 
persons and subjects within their respective limits,”137 Congress 
cannot be allowed to use its legitimate powers in a way that affords 
more sovereign authority to some states than to others. In the words 
of the Supreme Court at the turn of the twentieth century, 
[T]he whole Federal system is based upon the fundamental principle 
of the equality of the States under the Constitution. The idea that 
one State is debarred [by Congress], while the others are granted, 
the privilege of amending their organic laws to conform to the 
wishes of their inhabitants, is so repugnant to the theory of their 
equality under the Constitution that it cannot be entertained.138 
 
 
to make legislative choices respecting subjects the States may consider important, the 
Supremacy Clause permits no other result.”).  
 135. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 533 (1992) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (noting the 
“principles of federalism and respect for state sovereignty that underlie the Court’s reluctance 
to find pre-emption”).  
 136. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (citations omitted) (quoting Rice v. 
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)); see also id. (“That approach is consistent 
with . . . federalism concerns . . . .”). 
 137. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 434 (1892). 
 138. Bolln v. Nebraska, 176 U.S. 83, 89 (1900).  
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4. Equal Footing Even When Congress Is Exercising a Legitimate 
Federal Power.  Perhaps there are those who doubt—despite the 
unambiguous rhetoric—that the Court in the equal footing cases was 
really employing the broader conception of state sovereign equality. 
To placate those doubters, we would presumably need an equal 
footing case involving a situation in which Congress discriminated 
against a new state in an area of concurrent authority, where 
Congress is generally empowered to act with regard to all states. In 
other words, we would need a situation in which Congress limited the 
sovereignty of a new state, but did not do so for the other states, even 
though it could, if it so desired, have done so for all of the states 
through the exercise of one of its legitimate powers. A situation like 
that would squarely tee up the question whether the equal footing 
doctrine gets at a deeper principle of state sovereign equality, or just 
establishes that the dual sovereignty system and the Tenth 
Amendment apply to new states. But those situations were few and 
far between in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—the time 
period in which the Union was expanding and the Court was deciding 
the major equal footing cases—because the scope of legitimate 
federal power was understood to be much more limited then. 
Consider the hot-button question of whether it was 
unconstitutional for Congress to admit new states on the condition 
that those states permanently ban slavery. In 1819 and 1820, during 
the build-up to the Missouri Compromise, Congress fiercely debated 
imposing such a condition on Missouri. That prospect raised equal 
footing concerns because “if Missouri was required to renounce 
slavery it would be deprived of the right to resolve the issue for itself 
as other states could; it would not have the same sovereign rights that 
other states enjoyed.”139 Those congressional debates recognized that 
there could be no reasonable objection to conditioning admission to 
the Union on the new state’s compliance with a mandate that 
Congress had the independent constitutional authority to impose.140 
But the question whether Congress, in exercising its legitimate 
powers, has the constitutional authority to impose a sovereignty-
curtailing mandate on a new state without also imposing it on the 
other states was not presented, because it was generally understood at 
 
 139. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS, THE JEFFERSONIANS 1801–
1829, at 243 (2001). 
 140. See id. at 238; id. at 239 (“Everyone seemed to agree that what Congress could 
prescribe by ordinary legislation it could make a condition of statehood.”).  
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that time that Congress’s legitimate powers were not expansive 
enough to encompass abolishing slavery in the states at all.141 Thus, 
even on the narrow conception of equal footing, imposing such a 
condition on Missouri would have been unconstitutional.142 
But, as it happens, there is a line of equal footing cases that 
provides substantial insight—those involving the free navigation of 
waterways.143 The Supreme Court has held since the days of John 
Marshall—that is to say, even before judicial recognition of the equal 
footing doctrine—that the power to regulate intrastate navigable 
waters that connect to the interstate waterway system is a concurrent 
power, shared by the federal government and the states.144 Rivers 
“constitute navigable waters of the United States . . . when they form 
in their ordinary condition by themselves, or by uniting with other 
waters, a continued highway over which commerce is or may be 
carried on with other States or foreign countries.”145 Both the states 
and the Congress have the sovereign authority to regulate those 
waterways, but in the event of conflicting regulations, the federal law 
will trump pursuant to the Supremacy Clause.146 
 
 141. See, e.g., Declaration of the Anti-Slavery Convention (Dec. 4, 1833), in PROCEEDINGS 
OF THE ANTI-SLAVERY CONVENTION, ASSEMBLED AT PHILADELPHIA, DEC. 1833, at 15 (New 
York, Door & Butterfield 1833) (“We fully and unanimously recognize the sovereignty of each 
State, to legislate exclusively on the subject of slavery which is tolerated within its limits; we 
concede that Congress, under the present national compact, has no right to interfere with any of 
the slave States, in relation to this momentous subject.”); Paul Finkelman, Lincoln, 
Emancipation, and the Limits of Constitutional Change, 9 SUP. CT. REV. 349, 354 (2008) (“In 
1860 a claim of federal power to end slavery in the states was simply unthinkable for someone 
like Lincoln, who took law and constitutionalism seriously.”).  
 142. See Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82, 93–94 (1850); CURRIE, supra note 139, at 
244–45; Onuf, supra note 64, at 62 & n.19. But see John C. Eastman, Re-evaluating the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 123, 129–33 (2003) (advocating an even narrower 
conception of equal footing based on the fact that the Northwest Ordinance purported to 
permanently ban slavery from new states while at the same time guaranteeing their admission 
on equal footing).  
 143. See Sands v. Manistee River Improvement Co., 123 U.S. 288, 293 (1887); Cardwell v. 
Am. River Bridge Co., 113 U.S. 205, 208 (1885); Escanaba & Lake Mich. Trans. Co. v. City of 
Chicago, 107 U.S. 678, 688 (1883); Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 84, 88–89 (1857); Huse 
v. Glover, 15 F. 292, 293 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1883) (Harlan, J.).  
 144. See Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252 (1829) (Marshall, 
C.J.). 
 145. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).  
 146. See Willson, 27 U.S. at 252; see also Gilman v. City of Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 
713, 729 (1865) (“The States have always exercised this power, and from the nature and objects 
of the two systems of government they must always continue to exercise it, subject, however, in 
all cases, to the paramount authority of Congress, whenever the power of the States shall be 
exerted within the sphere of the commercial power which belongs to the nation.”). 
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In Escanaba & Lake Michigan Trans. Co. v. City of Chicago,147 
the Supreme Court heard a case filed by a company that operated 
steamships in interstate commerce on Lake Michigan and various 
connecting waterways. The City of Chicago, acting under a grant of 
authority from the State of Illinois, constructed several drawbridges 
over the Chicago River. The plaintiff shipping company sought to 
compel the City to take down those bridges, as their frequent closings 
impeded shipping along the river.148 The company noted that the Acts 
of Congress enabling the creation of and admitting the State of 
Illinois mandated that the navigable waters of the new state, including 
the Chicago River, “shall be common highways and forever free.”149 
Thus, argued the company, the bridges were erected in violation of 
federal law.150 
In rejecting that argument, the Supreme Court began by 
observing that the “Chicago River and its branches must . . . be 
deemed navigable waters of the United States, over which Congress 
under its commercial power may exercise control.”151 But, at the same 
time, “the States have full power to regulate within their limits 
matters of internal police,” which “power embraces the construction 
of . . . bridges.”152 Invoking the Supremacy Clause, the Court 
explained that “[i]f the power of the State and that of the Federal 
government come in conflict, the latter must control and the former 
yield.”153 “But until Congress acts on the subject, the power of the 
State over bridges across its navigable streams is plenary.”154 
The Court then considered and dismissed the shipping 
company’s argument that Congress had acted on the subject—by 
requiring in the state’s enabling act that navigation of the Chicago 
River be “forever free.”155 The Court held that that limitation “could 
not control the authority and powers of the State after her 
admission,” because “[o]n her admission she at once became entitled 
 
 147. Escanaba & Lake Mich. Trans. Co. v. City of Chicago, 107 U.S. 678 (1883). 
 148. Id. at 679.  
 149. Id. at 688 (quoting the Northwest Ordinance, 1 Stat. 50 (1789)).  
 150. Id. at 682.  
 151. Id. at 683. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. (noting that this doctrine was approved by Gilman v. City of Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (2 
Wall.) 713, 729 (1865), and Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252 
(1829)). 
 155. Id. at 688.  
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to and possessed of all the rights of dominion and sovereignty which 
belonged to the original States. She was admitted, and could be 
admitted, only on the same footing with them.”156 The power to 
regulate navigable waters within the state’s boundaries—although 
subject to the superior authority of Congress—was nonetheless within 
the “inherent sovereignty” of the state.157 It was within Congress’s 
power to regulate navigable rivers, but Congress could not use that 
power to grant Illinois less sovereign authority to regulate her rivers 
than other states have to regulate theirs.158 
Here we have a situation in which Congress imposed a condition 
on a newly admitted state that it could have—but did not—impose on 
the existing states pursuant to one of its enumerated powers (in this 
case, the commerce power). And yet the Court still invoked the equal 
footing doctrine and still struck the condition down. Not on the 
ground that all limitations on a state in its enabling act have no effect 
after statehood; to the contrary, this line of cases recognizes the 
aforementioned principle that a limitation imposed in an enabling act 
remains in effect if it can be justified as a valid exercise of Congress’s 
legitimate powers.159 But this provision, by denying the equal 
sovereignty of the states, was not a valid exercise of Congress’s 
commerce power.160 
 
 156. Id. at 688–89. The Court went on to hold in the alternative that, in any event, the acts of 
the City of Chicago did not contravene the language of the state’s enabling act. See id. at 689–91. 
 157. Brief for Appellee at 3, 10, Escanaba, 107 U.S. 678 (No. 1057) (quoting Barney v. 
Keokuk, 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 324, 338 (1876)). 
 158. See Escanaba, 107 U.S. at 689 (“Equality of constitutional right and power is the 
condition of all the States of the Union, old and new. Illinois, therefore, . . . could . . . exercise 
the same power over rivers within her limits that Delaware exercised over Black Bird Creek, 
and Pennsylvania over the Schuylkill River.”).  
 159. See Econ. Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113, 120–21 (1921) (noting that 
“so far as [the Northwest Ordinance] established public rights of highway in navigable waters 
capable of bearing commerce from State to State, it did not regulate internal affairs alone, and 
was no more capable of repeal by one of the States than any other regulation of interstate 
commerce enacted by the Congress”); Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1, 9–10 
(1888) (“In admitting some of the new States, [a free navigation clause] has been inserted in the 
law . . . ; and it has been supposed that in this new form of enactment it might be regarded as a 
regulation of commerce, which Congress has the right to impose.”). 
  The first case that Escanaba cited for the proposition that Illinois must be able to 
exercise the same power over rivers within her limits as Delaware and Pennsylvania may 
exercise over their rivers was Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, in which the Court had explained that 
provisions in state enabling acts restricting the state’s authority over navigable waters are 
constitutional if they are valid exercises of the commerce power. See Escanaba, 107 U.S. at 689 
(citing Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845)). 
 160. See Econ. Light, 256 U.S. at 121 (noting that Congress generally has the power to 
regulate navigable waters, and observing that the rules governing navigable rivers set down in 
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This line of cases emphasizes that the power of a state to regulate 
the navigable waters within its boundaries is one of its “necessary 
attributes as an independent sovereign Government.”161 Thus, when 
infringing this attribute of state sovereignty, Congress cannot “inhibit 
or diminish [a state’s] perfect equality with the other members of the 
Confederacy.”162 “[A]mong the incidents of that equality, is the right 
to make improvements in the rivers, water-courses, and highways, 
situated within the State.”163 The Court later explained that the 
“principle which underlies [this branch of] the equal footing 
doctrine . . . is that navigable waters uniquely implicate [state] 
sovereign interests”164—notwithstanding the fact that Congress is also 
empowered to regulate those waters (and indeed, its regulations take 
precedence).165 
This indicates that the equal footing doctrine is not just a 
principle that establishes that new states, like the original states, are 
sovereign in those spheres in which the Constitution does not 
empower the Congress to act. The doctrine does not just provide that 
the Tenth Amendment applies to new states as much as it does to the 
old states. It also establishes that, even when Congress operates 
within its legitimate spheres of authority, it cannot limit or remove 
the sovereignty of some states, but not others. Congress can 
effectively remove the sovereignty of all states over their navigable 
waters through preemption.166 And it can override a state’s decision to 
 
the Northwest Ordinance and the state enabling acts that were struck down in the Escanaba line 
of cases would have remained in effect after statehood and would have trumped contrary state 
laws if they had been valid exercises of the commerce power).  
 161. Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 84, 92 (1857). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 93. 
 164. Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 284 (1997).  
 165. Cf. Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842) (“[W]hen the 
Revolution took place, the people of each state became themselves sovereign; and in that 
character hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters . . . subject only to the rights since 
surrendered by the constitution to the general government.”); Palmer v. Cuyahoga Cty., 18 F. 
Cas. 1026, 1027 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843) (No. 10,688) (“A state, by virtue of its sovereignty may 
exercise certain rights over its navigable waters, subject, however, to the paramount power in 
congress to regulate commerce among the several states.”). 
 166. See Econ. Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113, 121 (1921) (upholding, 
under Escanaba, a federal law regulating all of the navigable waters of the United States); Lake 
Shore & Mich. S. Ry. v. Ohio, 165 U.S. 365, 366 (1897) (recognizing the power “of Congress to 
deprive the several States of all authority to control and regulate any and every structure over 
all navigable streams”); Gilman v. City of Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 731 (1865) 
(“[Congress] may regulate all bridges over navigable waters . . . .”); Navigable Waters—Power 
of a State and of the U.S.—Bridges, 20 Op. Att’y Gen. 101 (1891).  
COLBY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/21/2016 10:25 PM 
1122 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:1087 
allow, or not allow, a particular bridge in a particular location.167 What 
Congress cannot do is what it allegedly tried to do to Illinois: preclude 
only one state (or several states) from building any bridges—
categorically, statewide—while allowing other states to do so.168 That 
 
 167. See Cardwell v. Am. Bridge Co., 113 U.S. 205, 209 (1885) (“When Congress acts 
directly with reference to the bridges authorized by the State, its will must control so far as may 
be necessary to secure the free navigation of the streams.”); Escanaba & Lake Mich. Trans. Co. 
v. City of Chicago, 107 U.S. 678, 687–88 (1883) (noting that while state and local authorities can 
decide whether to erect bridges over navigable streams located entirely in one state, “Congress 
[has] the power at all times to interfere and supersede their authority whenever they act 
arbitrarily and to the injury of commerce”). It is true that such a regulation of commerce would 
apply in only one state, not nationwide, and would limit that state’s sovereignty in the minimal 
sense that the state would no longer be able to make a decision about whether or not to place a 
bridge at that particular location. But the Constitution limits the sovereignty of all fifty states to 
that same minimal degree, by empowering Congress to have the final say on all of these 
individual, one-off, localized matters. See Dunning, supra note 63, at 443 (“[I]t is idle to seek for 
inequality among the states in this particular. Congress controls the Hudson and the 
Susquehanna to precisely the same extent that it does the Missouri and the Arkansas.”). 
 168. This principle comes through most clearly when examining the cases that immediately 
followed Escanaba—Cardwell and Willamette—which involved provisions in the admission acts 
of California and Oregon, respectively, that were materially identical to the one struck down in 
Escanaba. Prior to the Supreme Court’s Escanaba decision, the lower court in Hatch had held 
that the Oregon admission-act provision was a controlling congressional regulation of 
commerce that precluded the state from constructing bridges over navigable rivers. See Hatch v. 
Wallamet Iron Bridge Co., 6 F. 326, 337–38 (C.C.D. Or. 1881).  
  After the Supreme Court’s decision in Escanaba, another lower court in the same 
circuit was asked to rule in Cardwell on the identical California admission-act provision. The 
court noted that the case was “clearly within the rule as laid down” in Hatch, and considered 
whether Escanaba effectively “overrules the principle announced” in Hatch. Cardwell v. Am. 
River Bridge Co., 19 F. 562, 562 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884). The judge noted that “there is language in 
the [Escanaba] opinion that favors that view,” and he was “by no means certain” whether the 
Supreme Court “intend[ed] to go as far as its broadest language indicates.” Id. The judge 
further explained that his own view was that the California admission act was a valid regulation 
of commerce, and that Escanaba could perhaps be distinguished on the ground that the Illinois 
admission act had not directly guaranteed free navigation in the same way that the California 
act did (but rather had simply cross-referenced the Northwest Ordinance, which was held to be 
no longer valid after statehood). See id. at 563–65. The judge did “not understand it to be held, 
or intimated,” in Escanaba “that Congress cannot, by legislation in the interest of interstate 
commerce, take control of any one, or all, of the navigable waters, either of Illinois, Delaware, 
or Pennsylvania. Only it has not yet done so.” Id. at 565. Indeed, he said, his own view was that 
Congress “might take control, generally, of all the navigable waters of any particular state, 
without reference to the waters of other states,” without “affect[ing] the ‘constitutional right or 
power,’ or the equality, of the states.” Id. Still, in light of the broad language to the contrary in 
Escanaba, he decided to treat Escanaba as binding, but urged the Supreme Court to distinguish 
it on appeal. See id. at 566–67. 
  Shortly thereafter, the lower court in Hatch was asked to reconsider its ruling in light of 
Escanaba. In that instance, the judge flat-out rejected what he considered to be dicta in 
Escanaba, and “respectfully submit[ted]” that the free navigation provision in the Northwest 
Ordinance “was a valid commercial regulation” and was “still in force in Illinois.” Wallamet 
Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 19 F. 347, 359 (C.C.D. Or. 1884). In any event, he concluded, 
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would eviscerate Illinois’s core sovereignty—“her powers as a 
government”—in an impermissibly discriminatory manner, depriving 
her of equal sovereignty with her peers.169 
This principle is not just about new states. It is about all states. It 
is about the nature of statehood and the nature of the Union. On this 
point, the Escanaba Court was quite clear: “Equality of constitutional 
right and power is the condition of all the States of the Union, old and 
new.”170 
 
Escanaba could be distinguished on the same grounds suggested by the circuit court in Cardwell. 
See id. at 351 (rejecting as “without a shadow of foundation in either reason or authority” the 
argument that “if Congress has the power to regulate the navigation of the Wallamet river, as a 
navigable water of the United States, it cannot do so by a special act . . . applicable alone to the 
waters of Oregon, but only by a general law, which shall operate uniformly upon all such waters 
in the United States”). This argument could not possibly be true, said the judge, because 
Congress has often regulated specific bridges or rivers. See id. at 351–52.  
  Both cases were then appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court decided Cardwell 
first. Counsel for the bridge company explained that, of course, Congress can regulate specific 
bridges or rivers. But the broad provision in the California admission act did “not [just] say such 
and such a stream . . . may be bridged.” Brief and Points of the Appellee at 10, Cardwell v. Am. 
River Bridge Co., 113 U.S. 205 (1885) (No. 855).  
On the contrary, it [was] a general and sweeping prohibition of all such regulation by 
the State, and an assumption by Congress of the sole and exclusive right with respect 
to California, to initiate and enact laws of a class which, in the States generally, may 
be enacted by their respective Legislatures, and enforced until Congress steps in and 
supersedes the action of the State.  
Id. Escanaba and Withers, argued counsel, squarely held that this “would have the effect of 
depriving the State of its equal rights under the Constitution.” Id. at 11. The Supreme Court 
agreed, holding that Escanaba was directly controlling and could not be distinguished, and that 
the state admission act therefore violated the equal footing doctrine. See Cardwell, 113 U.S. at 
211–12.  
  After the Supreme Court’s decision in Cardwell, counsel for the appellant in Hatch, in 
lieu of crafting an argument in his brief, chose simply to rely on the Cardwell decision as “so far 
a controlling authority in this, that it is not deemed either necessary or proper to take the time 
of the Court in discussing it.” Statement at 12, Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1 
(1888) (No. 80). The Court indeed reversed, but did not discuss the issue, instead deciding on 
the different ground (offered as an alternative ground in many of the prior cases, e.g., supra note 
156) that it was immaterial whether or not the admitting-act provision remained in effect 
because, properly construed, that provision did not apply to bridges and other physical 
obstructions, but rather prohibited only tolls and duties. See Willamette, 125 U.S. at 9–12.  
 169. Escanaba, 107 U.S. at 688; cf. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. 
421, 433, 435 (1855) (acknowledging that federally erected bridges in one state can end up 
diverting traffic to other states and, indeed, that “[t]here are many acts of congress passed in the 
exercise of this power to regulate commerce” that end up “operat[ing] to the prejudice of the 
ports in a neighboring State”—such as the “improvement of rivers and harbors” and “the 
erection of light-houses”—but explaining that those acts do not run afoul of the Port Preference 
Clause, because “what is forbidden is, not discrimination between individual ports within the 
same or different States, but discrimination between States”). 
 170. Escanaba, 107 U.S. at 689.  
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Thus, as future-Justice Sotomayor recognized in her law-review 
note, the “equal footing doctrine ultimately rests on concepts of 
federalism: the United States is a ‘union of political equals.’”171 It is 
true that the doctrine itself applies by its terms only to the admission 
of new states. But it is a doctrinal reflection of a broader 
constitutional mandate. It is not just a shallow, freestanding precept 
covering only the admission of new states, but rather a specific 
manifestation of a deep, fundamental, and general principle that “the 
Constitution guarantees sovereign equality to the states”—all of 
them.172 Put differently, the equal footing doctrine itself may be a 
narrow rule about the particular terms on which new members can be 
admitted to the club, but it is grounded in and dependent upon a 
broader understanding of the very nature of the club itself. The equal 
footing cases are clearly and explicitly premised on the notion that 
equal sovereignty among all states is inherent in the very notion of 
our union of states. Indeed, the Supreme Court closed its opinion in 
Coyle v. Smith—the leading equal footing case—with this 
observation: “[T]he constitutional equality of the States is essential to 
the harmonious operation of the scheme upon which the Republic 
was organized. When that equality disappears we may remain a free 
people, but the Union will not be the Union of the Constitution.”173 
As such, South Carolina v. Katzenbach was technically correct in 
asserting that the “doctrine of the equality of States” that was 
established in Coyle and the other equal footing cases—that is to say, 
the equal footing doctrine—doctrinally “applies only to the terms 
upon which States are admitted to the Union, and not to the remedies 
for local evils which have subsequently appeared.”174 But the explicit 
 
 171. Sonia Sotomayor, Note, Statehood and the Equal Footing Doctrine: The Case for Puerto 
Rican Seabed Rights, 88 YALE L.J. 825, 835 (1979) (quoting Case v. Toftus, 39 F. 730, 732 
(C.C.D. Or. 1889)).  
 172. Id. at 839.  
 173. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911).  
 174. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328–29 (1966) (citing Coyle, 221 U.S. 559). 
Katzenbach may have meant to declare that not only the equal footing doctrine, but also the 
entire notion of equal sovereignty, applies only to the admission of new states. See id. (“The 
doctrine of the equality of States, invoked by South Carolina, does not bar this approach, for 
that doctrine applies only to the terms upon which States are admitted to the Union . . . .” 
(emphasis added)). In its brief, South Carolina invoked a broad principle of equal sovereignty. 
See Brief of the Plaintiff at 13–15, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (No. 22). 
If Katzenbach did indeed declare that broader principle to be limited to new states only, “that 
declaration was,” in Professor Laurence Tribe’s words, “a quite gratuitous dictum,” 1 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-13, at 915 n.17 (3d ed. 2000)—
one that I believe to have been mistaken. Indeed, if that is what the Katzenbach Court was 
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rationale behind the equal footing cases was broader. And for that 
reason, those cases indicate that Justice Ginsburg was mistaken in 
declaring in her Shelby County dissent that the “proper domain” of 
the “equal sovereignty principle” is limited only to “the admission of 
new States.”175 
B. Additional Precedent and History 
The Court did not pull this vision of equal sovereignty—of which 
the equal footing doctrine is only a particular manifestation—out of 
thin air, either in Shelby County or in the earlier equal footing cases 
just discussed. Rather, as Professor Gillian Metzger has recognized, 
this notion was “[l]ong a staple of nineteenth-century political 
discourse.”176 On the Senate floor in 1820, for instance, Senator 
William Pinkney of Maryland forcefully argued that the “Union” 
established by the Constitution is a “confederation of States equal in 
sovereignty. . . . It is an equal Union between parties equally 
sovereign.”177 Four years later, Representative John Holmes of 
Massachusetts echoed that 
 
saying, then it was every bit as guilty as the Shelby County Court of ruling by naked fiat, in 
disregard of precedent, history, and constitutional structure. 
 175. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2649 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
added).  
 176. Metzger, supra note 83, at 1517.  
 177. 35 ANNALS OF CONG. 397 (1820) (statement of Sen. Pinkney); see also, e.g., 34 ANNALS 
OF CONG. 1230 (1819) (statement of Rep. McLane) (“It is of the very essence of our 
Government, that all the States composing the Union should have equal sovereignty. It is the 
great principle on which the Union reposes—the germ of its duration.”); Letter from President 
James Monroe to Spencer Roane (Feb. 15, 1820), in DANIEL C. GILMAN, JAMES MONROE 149 
(1898) (“[A]ll the states composing our Union, new as well as the old, must have equal rights, 
ceding to the general government an equal share of power, and retaining to themselves the 
like . . . .” (emphasis added)); James K. Polk, Harbours and Rivers, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 81, 93 
(2004) (reproducing a draft veto message prepared by President Polk in 1848, which declared 
that “[t]he equality of the States, as separate communities and distinct sovereignties, is one of 
the corner stones of our political fabric”). In the nineteenth century, members of Congress 
frequently articulated the argument, later picked up by the Supreme Court in the equal footing 
cases just discussed, that Article IV’s provision for admitting “new States” into “this Union” 
implicitly guarantees equal footing, because, in this country, the “States” all have the same 
sovereign power, and to allow otherwise would create a different union from “this Union.” See, 
e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 639 (1870) (statement of Sen. Trumbull) (“The States 
which formed this Union were coequal States. . . . Congress has authority to admit new States 
into the Union. Into what Union? A Union of coequal States. There is no authority to admit 
States into any other Union. . . . You have a different Union if you have a Union of unequal 
States.”); 35 ANNALS OF CONG. 321 (1820) (statement of Sen. Barbour); id. at 397 (1820) 
(statement of Sen. Pinkney) (arguing that if a new state is admitted with less sovereignty than 
the others, “it is not into the original Union that it comes. For it is a different sort of Union. The 
first was a Union inter pares: This is a Union between disparates, between giants and a dwarf, 
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[t]he original States, which formed the Constitution, were equally 
sovereign and independent. Each gave up an equal portion of power 
to the United States, and consequently what was retained must be 
equal. Equality of power is essential to the existence of a State. It 
cannot have less than the rest, and when it has, it ceases to be a 
State. Nothing is so essential to the harmony and perpetuity of the 
Union as this equality.178 
And the equal sovereignty principle has a long judicial pedigree 
as well—even apart from the equal footing cases. The Supreme Court 
has repeatedly emphasized “the structure of our Nation as a union of 
States, each possessing equal sovereign powers.”179 “One cardinal 
rule, underlying all the relations of the States to each other, is that of 
equality of right. Each State stands on the same level with all the 
rest.”180 It has long been a “standard federalism axiom that all states 
are equal in value as quasi-sovereigns.”181 
 
between power and feebleness, between full proportioned sovereignties and a miserable image 
of power”); id. at 1080–81 (1820) (statement of Rep. Hardin) (“[W]hat is meant by the word 
Union? Is it not the . . .agreement between the States . . . which is called the Constitution? . . . If 
Congress makes Missouri surrender any portion of her sovereignty that was not surrendered by 
the old States, how can she be a party to the original agreement . . . ?”); CURRIE, supra note 
139, at 243.  
 178. 41 ANNALS OF CONG. 547 (1824) (statement of Rep. Holmes).  
 179. Underwriters Nat’l Assurance Co. v. N.C. Life & Accident & Health Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 
455 U.S. 691, 704 (1982).  
 180. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907); see also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (noting that the law of personal jurisdiction is based in part 
on the states’ “status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system”); Wisconsin v. Michigan, 295 
U.S. 455, 462 (1935) (noting the “rule that the States stand on an equal level or plane under our 
constitutional system”); Spooner v. McConnell, 22 F. Cas. 939, 943 (C.C.D. Ohio 1838) (No. 
13,245) (“[T]he states are equal. Equal in rank, equal in their powers of sovereignty . . . .”); 
United States v. Williams, 28 F. Cas. 647, 656 (C.C.D.C. 1833) (No. 16,711) (noting “the 
principle of equality among sovereign states”); Viet D. Dinh, First Impressions: A Tribute to 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 3, 3–4 (1997) (declaring that “the 
United States remains a sovereign union of equally sovereign states” (quoting Sandra Day 
O’Connor, Federalism: Problems and Prospects of a Constitutional Value, Speech to the 
Woodrow Wilson Center (June 11, 1992))). 
 181. David A. Dana, Democratizing the Law of Federal Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 
507, 512–13 (2008). I would be remiss in ignoring the possibility that support for the equal 
sovereignty principle might also be found in the deplorable antiprecedent of Dred Scott v. 
Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). See generally James Blacksher & Lani Guinier, Free at Last: 
Rejecting Equal Sovereignty and Restoring the Constitutional Right to Vote, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 39 (2014). But I do not believe that the Dred Scott case should be thought of as “the 
origin” of the equal sovereignty principle—the principle’s origins in fact long predate Dred 
Scott—or that a possible connection to Dred Scott necessarily taints the principle with a 
uniquely “racially discriminatory pedigree.” Id. at 39, 42. To begin with, as Akhil Amar has 
explained, Dred Scott was a “preposterous ruling” based on an “extravagant anticongressional 
theory of state equality.” Akhil Reed Amar, The Lawfulness of Section 5—and thus of Section 5, 
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This axiom was born of history. There was an “attention to 
general Equality that governed the deliberations of [the 
Constitutional] Convention.”182 A pervasive theme in those 
deliberations was the obsession, on the part of some of the Framers, 
with equal sovereignty—an obsession that comes through most 
clearly in the Convention’s most fundamental and drawn-out debates: 
those concerning the question whether representation in the Congress 
should be proportional to population or equal for each state.183 As 
every school child learns, the large states demanded proportional 
representation, whereas the small states insisted on equal 
representation. The impasse nearly derailed the Convention, before 
agreement was ultimately reached on the Connecticut Compromise, 
 
126 HARV. L. REV. F. 109, 118 (2013) (explaining the convoluted theory); see also Alfred L. 
Brophy, Note, Let Us Go Back and Stand Upon the Constitution: Federal-State Relations in Scott 
v. Sandford, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 192, 204–05, 208–11 (1990) (detailing Chief Justice Taney’s 
state-equality theory in Dred Scott, and tracing its origins to radical antebellum Southern 
constitutional theory). Dred Scott was not actually grounded in the principle of equal 
sovereignty that is defended in this Article. What is more, the entire notion of American 
federalism has always—from the framing, through the Civil War and Jim Crow, right up to the 
present day—been heavily entwined with slavery and racism. See Guy-Uriel Charles, Dissent, 
Diversity, and Democracy: Heather Gerken and the Contingent Imperative of Minority Rule, 48 
TULSA L. REV. 493, 502 (2013) (“[I]t is high time for federalism scholars to confront and 
conquer federalism’s racist history. Race is the big African elephant in the room that federalism 
scholarship and doctrine have essentially tried to ignore.”). Virtually every federalism doctrine 
and principle can trace its origins in substantial part to efforts by the Southern states to 
perpetuate slavery and racial injustice. Equal sovereignty is admittedly no exception; much of 
the rhetoric in its favor in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was directly tied up with 
reprehensible Southern efforts to avoid federally imposed racial justice. As Senator Sumner 
once said, “Equality of States on the lips of slave-masters was natural, for it was a plausible 
defense against the approaches of Freedom.” CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 3025 (1868) 
(statement of Sen. Sumner). But the equal sovereignty principle was neither uniquely nor 
exclusively born of racist purposes. The possible similarities between Shelby County and Dred 
Scott are important factors to consider in evaluating whether the Shelby County Court 
misapplied the equal sovereignty principle (as Dred Scott surely did, to the extent that it was 
invoking that principle at all), but they do not, in my view, discredit the existence of the 
principle itself. 
 182. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 81, at 149 
(remarks of Convention delegate James McHenry to the Maryland House of Delegates). 
 183. See Michael J. Teter, Equality Among Equals: Is the Senate Cloture Rule 
Unconstitutional?, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 547, 574 (2010) (“The delegates who supported state 
parity in the Senate believed that the new national government represented the states, not 
individuals, and that . . . those states required an ‘equality of voices.’ The underlying fear . . . was 
that proportional representation in the upper chamber would erode the equal sovereignty each 
state possessed.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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granting proportional representation in the House of Representatives 
and equal representation in the Senate.184 
Throughout that long drama, the notion of equal sovereignty 
consistently held center stage. Indeed, as Madison once noted, even 
before the framing of the Constitution—back when the terms of the 
Articles of Confederation were still being hammered out—the 
founding generation faced a difficult challenge in trying to determine 
an appropriate “rule of suffrage among parties unequal in size, but 
equal in sovereignty.”185 That remark reveals an important truth. The 
delegates to the Constitutional Convention vehemently disagreed 
about which form of representation was more fair and appropriate, 
but they did not disagree as to the antecedent assumption that the 
states were to possess equal sovereignty. As Gunning Bedford of 
Delaware put it at the Convention, “That all the states at present are 
equally sovereign and independent, has been asserted from every 
quarter of this house.”186 
The small-state delegates—those who insisted upon equal 
representation—were most vocal. In the words of William Patterson 
of New Jersey, the primary architect of the New Jersey Plan, which 
centered around equal representation, “[a] confederacy supposes 
sovereignty in the members composing it, and sovereignty supposes 
equality.”187 Patterson noted that “it cannot be denied that all the 
states stand on the footing of equal sovereignty.”188 Indeed, he was of 
the view that the very notion of state sovereignty necessarily entails a 
principle of equal state sovereignty: “If the sovereignty of the states is 
to be maintained, . . . we have no power to vary the idea of equal 
sovereignty.”189 To Patterson, proportional representation was 
squarely inconsistent with that principle. He wrote that “every State 
in the Union as a State possesses an equal Right to, and Share of, 
Sovereignty,” but proportional representation would mean that 
 
 184. See id. For an argument that this traditional story may fail to fully capture the true 
nature of the compromise, see Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of 
Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1357–67 (2001). 
 185. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 81, at 542 
(undated preface to Madison’s notes from the Convention). 
 186. 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 60, at 471. 
 187. 5 id. at 176. 
 188. Id. at 194. 
 189. Id. 
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“some of the States of the Union will possess a greater Share of 
Sovereignty . . . than others.”190 
The colorful Luther Martin of Maryland agreed “that an equal 
vote in each state” was an essential “right of sovereignty.”191 He gave 
a ponderous oration to the Convention seeking to establish “that the 
states, like individuals, were, in a state of nature; equally sovereign 
and free.”192 As Madison recounted it, 
[i]n order to prove that individuals in a state of nature are equally 
free and independent, [Martin] read passages from Locke, Vattel, 
Lord Somers, Priestly. To prove that the case is the same with states, 
till they surrender their equal sovereignty, he read other passages in 
Locke, and Vattel, and also Rutherford.193 
Returning then to the issue of proportional representation, Martin 
insisted “that the states, being equal, cannot treat or confederate so as 
to give up an equality of votes, without giving up their liberty.”194 He 
held steadfast to the view that proportional representation was a 
nonstarter, because “no modifications whatever could reconcile the 
smaller states to the least diminution of their equal sovereignty.”195 
The supporters of proportional representation did not share the 
small-state representatives’ obsession with equal sovereignty. Indeed, 
many of them did not share an obsession with state sovereignty at all. 
Rufus King of Massachusetts, for instance, argued that the states 
already did not “possess the peculiar features of sovereignty”; “[t]hey 
could not make war, nor peace, nor alliances, nor treaties.”196 And 
 
 190. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 81, at 613 
(Patterson’s notes on his New Jersey Plan). 
 191. 5 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 60, at 248. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 248–49. 
 195. Id. at 270; see also 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra 
note 81, at 491 (statement of Mr. Bedford) (“[The states] must continue if not perfectly, yet 
equally soverign [sic],” because “an inequality of power will . . . result from an inequality of 
votes. Give the opportunity, and ambition will not fail to abuse it. The whole history of mankind 
proves it.”); Notes of Rufus King in the Federal Convention of 1787, THE AVALON PROJECT, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/king.asp [http://perma.cc/25CZ-FB57] (Rufus King’s 
notes from the Convention, summarizing the remarks of Charles Pinkney of South Carolina) 
(“If Representatives be apportioned among the States in the Ratio of numbers . . . the States 
will be unequal, and their sovereignty will be degraded.”). 
 196. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 81, at 323 
(statement of Mr. King); see also JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND 
IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 65 (1996). 
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Hamilton took the position that the states should be abolished 
altogether, or at least relegated to the status of “subordinate 
jurisdictions.”197 Madison’s stance was, in effect, not much different.198 
In their view, sovereignty rested always with the people—not 
with the states or the federal government. The people chose to grant 
certain sovereign powers to each of those governments, but the states 
were never the locus of the sovereignty itself.199 And it was not the 
rights of the states that mattered; it was the rights of the people. As 
James Wilson put it, “Can we forget for whom we are forming a 
Government? Is it for men, or for the imaginary beings called 
States? . . . We talk of States, till we forget what they are composed 
of.”200 The goal of the Convention was to ensure “that every man in 
America was secured in all his rights,” and it would be foolish “to 
sacrifice this substantial good to the phantom of State sovereignty.”201 
Still, the large-state delegates did not disagree that whatever 
sovereign powers and prerogatives the states possessed, they 
possessed them equally, and would continue to do so under the 
 
 197. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 81, at 323 
(statement of Mr. Hamilton). 
 198. See RAKOVE, supra note 196, at 169 (“Only by abolishing the states altogether could 
Madison have moved to alter the structure of the Union more radically.”). Even at the turn of 
the nineteenth century, many Federalists still hoped to do away with state sovereignty 
altogether. See PETER ONUF & NICHOLAS ONUF, FEDERAL UNION, MODERN WORLD: THE 
LAW OF NATIONS IN AN AGE OF REVOLUTIONS 1776–1814, at 179–80 (1993) (“[Federalists] 
questioned . . . that—even in the absence of European interference—the union itself could 
survive unless those egregious baubles of sovereignty, those pestiferous incitements to 
demagogy, the State Governments were more adequately controlled, if not abolished.” (citation 
and quotation marks omitted)). 
 199. See ONUF & ONUF, supra note 198, at 85–86, 131; RAKOVE, supra note 196, at 190 
(discussing the writings of James Wilson). In this regard, the Framers may not really have 
viewed themselves as “split[ting] the atom of sovereignty.” U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 
514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 200. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 81, at 483; see 
also id. at 199 (statement of Mr. Franklin) (“The Interest of a State is made up of the interests 
of its individual members. If they are not injured, the State is not injured.”); RAKOVE, supra 
note 196, at 67. Madison elaborated in the Federalist Papers,  
Was . . . the American revolution effected, . . . was the precious blood of thousands 
spilt . . . not that the people of America should enjoy peace, liberty, and safety; but 
that the Governments of the individual States . . . might enjoy a certain extent of 
power, and be arrayed with certain dignities and attributes of sovereignty? . . . [A]s 
far as the sovereignty of the States cannot be reconciled to the happiness of the 
people, the voice of every good citizen must be, let the former be sacrificed to the 
latter. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra note 129, at 309 (James Madison).  
 201. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 81, at 489 
(statement of Mr. King).  
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Constitution.202 They disagreed instead with the insistence that equal 
representation was necessary for equal sovereignty. So long as each 
state ceded the same authority to the federal government, the states 
would retain equal sovereignty, regardless of the measure of 
representation. Hugh Williamson of North Carolina, for instance, 
expressed the view “that, if any political truth could be grounded on 
mathematical demonstration, it was, that if the states were equally 
sovereign now, and parted with equal proportions of sovereignty, that 
they would remain equally sovereign.”203 Similarly, Madison asserted 
that it is fallacious to argue “from the equality of the sovereign states” 
that any compact that they enter into—even one “by which an 
authority was created paramount to the parties, and making laws for 
the government of them”—must necessarily afford them equal voting 
rights.204 To the same effect is Federalist 22, in which Hamilton labeled 
as “[s]ophistry” and “logical legerdemain” the argument that a “right 
of equal suffrage” necessarily follows from the principle “that 
sovereigns are equal.”205 Indeed, since the people, not the states, are 
the true locus of sovereignty, the large-state delegates felt that 
concerns for equality counseled against giving equal representation to 
states with very unequal populations.206 
The ultimate compromise may not have been entirely pleasing to 
anyone—compromises rarely are—but it effectuated both visions of 
equal sovereignty, one for each congressional chamber. The idea was 
that, in Madison’s words, “[t]he Senate will represent the States in 
their political capacity, the other House will represent the people of 
 
 202. See, e.g., Letter of James Madison to Unknown (Mar. 1836), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF 
JAMES MADISON 607, 608 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910): 
It is well known that the equality of the States in the Federal Senate was a 
compromise between the larger, & the smaller states, the former claiming a 
proportional representation in both branches of the Legislature, as due to their 
superior population; the latter, an equality in both, as a safeguard to the reserved 
sovereignty of the States, an object which obtained the concurrence of members from 
the larger States.  
(emphasis added).  
 203. 5 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 60, at 250. 
 204. Id.  
 205. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 138–39 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 206. See, e.g., 5 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 60, at 258 (statement of Alexander 
Hamilton) (“But as states are a collection of individual men, which ought we to respect most, 
the rights of the people composing them, or of the artificial beings resulting from the 
composition? Nothing could be more preposterous or absurd than to sacrifice the former to the 
latter.”). 
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the States in their individual capacity.”207 In each case, equal 
sovereignty prevailed; just as the people were to have equal 
sovereignty in their individual capacity,208 “the States in their political 
capacity” were to be equally sovereign. Writing as “Fabius” during 
the ratification debates, Federalist John Dickinson, a Convention 
delegate from Delaware, explained that “[i]n the senate the 
sovereignties of the several states will be equally represented; in the 
house of representatives, the people of the whole union will be 
equally represented.”209 Those who felt that equal representation was 
necessary for equal state sovereignty got their wish with the Senate; 
those who felt that equal state sovereignty would be preserved by 
federalism even with proportional representation (which would better 
respect the equality of the people) got their wish with the House. In 
any case, as Madison explained at the Virginia ratifying convention, 
the Constitution—compromises and all—created “a government of a 
federal nature, consisting of many coequal sovereignties.”210 
C. Text and Structure 
Now, at last, we come to the constitutional text. It is true that 
there is no clause in the Constitution that explicitly articulates an 
equal sovereignty principle. But we must be careful not to assign too 
 
 207. 1 THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS 
JEFFERSON AND JAMES MADISON 1776–1826, at 499 (James Morton Smith ed., 1st ed. 1995) 
(Oct. 24, 1787, letter from Madison to Jefferson); see also Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 13 
(1964) (“‘[I]n one branch the people, ought to be represented; in the other, the States.’” (quoting 
1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 81, at 462 (remarks of 
William Samuel Johnson of Connecticut))); Max Farrand, Popular Election of Senators, 2 YALE 
REV. 234, 239 (1913) (“There was undoubtedly a feeling in the Convention that . . . the lower 
house represented the people of the States in their individual capacity, while the Senate 
represented the States in their political capacity.”). 
 208. Cf. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 471–72 (1793) (Jay, C.J.) (“[A]t the 
Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people; and they are truly the sovereigns of the 
country . . . . [T]he citizens of America are equal as fellow citizens, and as joint tenants in the 
sovereignty.”). 
 209. 17 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 180, 
182 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1981) (emphasis omitted).  
 210. 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 60, at 381; see also Letter of James Madison to 
Spencer Roane (June 29, 1821), in 3 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, 
1816–1828, at 222, 223 (1865) (arguing that, without Supreme Court review of state court 
judgments, “the State governments would not stand all in the same relation to the General 
Government, some retaining more, others less, of sovereignty, and the vital principle of 
equality, which cements their Union, thus gradually be deprived of its virtue”). 
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much weight to that fact.211 When it comes to fundamental principles 
of constitutional federalism, a lack of specific textual support is 
actually par for the course. As Professor John Manning has noted, 
“[i]n recent years, the Supreme Court has embraced a freestanding 
federalism that is not tied to any particular clause of the 
Constitution.”212 Consider, as a particularly striking example, Printz v. 
United States,213 in which the Court looked to history, structure, and 
precedent to find a constitutional limit on federal power despite its 
open admission that there was “no constitutional text speaking to 
th[e] precise question.”214 This is by no means an entirely recent 
phenomenon, either. The Court has been enforcing federalism 
principles lacking a clear textual foundation ever since Chief Justice 
 
 211. To be sure, the textual argument against the equal sovereignty principle is not simply 
that the principle finds no explicit basis in the constitutional text. It is that the text affirmatively 
cuts against an equal sovereignty doctrine, insofar as the Constitution enumerates a number of 
narrow and specific guarantees of state equality, thus implying the absence of a broad and 
general guarantee. See supra Part I.B. But this argument is less compelling than it might first 
appear. For one thing, as I have sought to demonstrate in great detail elsewhere, the fact that 
the Constitution explicitly requires Congress to legislate uniformly among the states only 
pursuant to some powers, but not others (including, in particular, the uniquely significant 
commerce power), is more of an accident of drafting history than a conscious choice on the part 
of the Framers or a significant structural feature of the Constitution. See Colby, supra note 11, 
at 266–88. More importantly, this argument miscomprehends the nature of the equal 
sovereignty principle. As discussed infra Part III, the equal sovereignty principle is not a 
generalized principle of state equality in all respects, or a generalized mandate that Congress 
must treat the states equally in every regard—thus rendering the specific constitutional 
guarantees of certain forms of uniformity and state equality redundant. Rather, it guarantees 
only a specific kind of state equality—equal sovereignty—that is conceptually and functionally 
distinct from the enumerated equality norms.  
 212. John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2004 (2009); see also John F. Manning, Foreword: The 
Means of Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4, 31–32 (2014) [hereinafter Manning, 
Foreword]. 
 213. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 214. Id. at 905; see also, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 730 (1999) (“This separate and 
distinct structural principle is not directly related to the scope of the judicial power established 
by Article III, but inheres in the system of federalism established by the Constitution.”); 
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996):  
Although the text of the Amendment would appear to restrict only the Article III 
diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, we have understood the Eleventh 
Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the 
presupposition . . . which it confirms[:] . . . first, that each State is a sovereign entity in 
our federal system; and second, that [i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to 
be amendable to the suit of an individual without its consent.  
(citations omitted).  
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Marshall’s iconic decision in McCulloch v. Maryland,215 if not before 
that.216 Recall Marshall’s colorful words from McCulloch: “There is no 
express provision for the case, but the claim has been sustained on a 
principle which so entirely pervades the constitution, is so intermixed 
with the materials which compose it, so interwoven with its web, so 
blended with its texture, as to be incapable of being separated from it, 
without rending it into shreds.”217 
This method of interpretation was best described and defended 
by Professor Charles Black nearly a half-century ago. Black argued in 
favor of sometimes determining constitutional meaning not from 
specific text, but rather from “the method of inference from the 
structures and relationships created by the constitution.”218 The Court, 
he said, should at times rely on reasoning “sounding in the structure 
of federal union, and in the relation of federal to state governments,” 
even when it “can point to no particular text as its authority.”219 Black 
noted that, although this genre of reasoning is often rejected or 
ignored in our legal culture, it has carried great weight in some areas 
of constitutional law—federalism in particular, as exemplified by 
McCulloch.220 Black explained that the Court’s reasoning in that case 
on the question whether Maryland could tax the Bank of the United 
States was “essentially structural,” relying on “the warranted 
relational properties between the national government and the 
government of the states, with the structural corollaries of national 
supremacy—and, at one point, of the mode of formation of the 
Union.”221 
Here was the heart of Chief Justice Marshall’s reasoning in 
McCulloch: 
This great principle is, that the constitution and the laws made in 
pursuance thereof are supreme; that they control the constitution 
 
 215. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 425–37 (1819) (holding, despite the 
lack of explicit constitutional text, that states may not tax an instrumentality of the federal 
government). 
 216. See Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Legitimacy of Freestanding Federalism, 122 
HARV. L. REV. F. 98, 102–03 (2009) (explaining that before McCulloch, “several justices [on the 
Court] invoked constitutional purposes and general arguments about the nature of state 
sovereignty” in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793)).  
 217. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 426 (emphasis added). 
 218. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
7–8 (1969).  
 219. Id. at 11.  
 220. See id. at 13–15. 
 221. Id. at 15. 
COLBY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/21/2016 10:25 PM 
2016] IN DEFENSE OF EQUAL SOVEREIGNTY 1135 
and laws of the respective States, and cannot be controlled by them. 
From this, which may be almost termed an axiom, other 
propositions are deduced as corollaries, on the truth or error of 
which, and on their application to this case, the cause has been 
supposed to depend. These are, 1st. that a power to create implies a 
power to preserve. 2nd. That a power to destroy, if wielded by a 
different hand, is hostile to, and incompatible with these powers to 
create and to preserve. 3d. That where this repugnancy exists, that 
authority which is supreme must control, not yield to that over 
which it is supreme.222 
The structuralism of this argument is obvious. Text was largely 
beside the point—again, there was “no express provision for the 
case”223—except perhaps as a secondary hook upon which to attach 
the structural conclusion. Black explained, “You can root the result, if 
you want to (and Marshall sometimes may seem to be doing this) in 
the supremacy clause of Article VI, but that seems not a very 
satisfying rationale, for Article VI declares the supremacy of 
whatever the national law may turn out to be, and does not purport to 
give content to that law.”224 Rather, “[i]n this, perhaps the greatest of 
our constitutional cases, judgment is reached not fundamentally on 
the basis of that kind of textual exegesis which we tend to regard as 
normal, but on the basis of reasoning from the total structure which 
the text has created.”225 
Let us now return to the question of equal sovereignty, with this 
method in mind. To be sure, the constitutional text is far from self-
evidently conclusive here. But, as just noted, neither was the textual 
support for McCulloch,226 or, for that matter, for Marbury v. 
Madison227—which also famously relied primarily on abstract 
 
 222. McCulloch, 17 U.S.(4 Wheat.) at 426. 
 223. Id. 
 224. BLACK, supra note 218, at 15. 
 225. Id. Black also pointed to Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868), which struck 
down a state law imposing a tax on every person exiting the state, and explicitly rejected the 
notion that the decision needed to be grounded in any particular constitutional text. See BLACK, 
supra note 218, at 15–17. Black further explained that the Supreme Court’s early Dormant 
Commerce Clause cases are best understood and defended as reasoning from constitutional 
structure, rather than from the flimsy textual hook of the Commerce Clause itself. See id. at 19–
22. 
 226. See Metzger, supra note 216, at 102 (noting McCulloch’s “derivation of federal 
immunity from state taxes, relying not on any specific textual provision but instead on the 
general principle of federal supremacy and the representative differences between federal and 
state governments”).  
 227. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137 (1803). 
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structural reasoning, anchored only loosely to various textual hooks 
that did little work on their own.228 When it comes to ascertaining 
principles of constitutional structure—and of federalism in 
particular—the Court often focuses primarily on the institutional 
design of the constitutional system as a whole (informed by history), 
and looks to the text not for concrete and free-standing answers, but 
rather for textual hints that help us to understand and buttress the 
core structure of the constitutional system. 
That mode of reasoning supports the equal sovereignty principle. 
Indeed, leaving aside for a moment the unique history and nature of 
the American experience, equal sovereignty is an essential, implicit 
structural component of virtually any federalist system of 
government. Scholars of comparative federalism have often observed 
that “[o]ne of the characteristics of federalism is its aspiration and 
purpose simultaneously to generate and maintain both unity and 
diversity.”229 Federalism “is from its roots a means to accommodate 
diversity as a legitimate element in the polity.”230 A federalist system 
is “an institutionalization of the compromise” between the centripetal 
forces that pull toward greater centralization—the desire for 
economic efficiency, security, and the like—and the centrifugal forces 
demanding recognition and accommodation of diversity among the 
member states.231 Such a system divides sovereignty between the 
central and the regional governments, allowing efficient centralization 
while simultaneously accommodating diversity by respecting the 
rights of the regional governments to establish their own laws within 
their own spheres of influence. 
But granting certain powers to the central government—even 
when limited only to those areas in which the demands for 
centralization predominate—poses a substantial risk in a community 
characterized by regional diversity. With diversity often comes 
 
 228. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 6 (1962) (arguing that Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury 
provided “merely a hint” of textual support for judicial review, and that “nothing more explicit 
will be found”).  
 229. DANIEL J. ELAZAR, EXPLORING FEDERALISM 64 (1987); see id. at 274 n.23 (collecting 
sources).  
 230. Id. at 66.  
 231. William S. Livingston, A Note on the Nature of Federalism, in AMERICAN FEDERALISM 
IN PERSPECTIVE 33, 42 (Aaron Wildavsky, ed. 1967).  
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animosity,232 and there is an ever-present danger that the central 
government, even when it operates only within its legitimate spheres, 
will be controlled by certain regional factions who will use its powers 
to discriminate against and minimize the authority of the other 
regional factions. Allowing that to happen would be inconsistent with 
the very purpose of the federation: generating unity while respecting 
diversity. It would contravene efforts to achieve unity, and it would 
fail to respect the integrity and the diverse cultures of the weaker 
regional states. For a federalist system to function effectively and 
consistently with its overarching goals, then, the central government 
must be compelled to respect and treat all member states—regardless 
of their differences—as legitimate equal sovereigns. Thus, as scholars 
of both domestic and comparative federalism have recognized for 
decades, an antidiscrimination norm is inherent in the very notion of 
a federalist system. Sovereign equality of the member states is 
presumptively233 an essential, inherent structural feature of federalism 
itself.234 (Again, as the framers of the American Constitution 
 
 232. Cf. Larry May, How is Humanity Harmed by Genocide?, 10 INT’L LEGAL THEORY 1, 
17 (2004) (“Humans in their diversity must overcome the animosity that diversity inspires in 
order to attain the promised equality.”).  
 233. Some scholars have noted—pointing to the situation of Canada and Quebec as an 
example—that perhaps, when some regional states are extremely different from all of the 
others, a federalist system could be structured in a way that gives greater sovereign powers to 
those states than to others in order to protect their unique diversity. See Jaime Lluch, The 
Constitutional and Political Recognition of Stateless Nations in Canada and the United States, 47 
REVISTA JURÍDICA UNIVERSIDAD INTERAMERICANA P.R. 549, 552–55 (2013) (explaining that 
Quebec was given substantial powers to “guarantee[] its ability to make decisions in key areas, 
without being overwhelmed by the larger society,” thereby convincing Quebec to join Canada). 
Those scholars recognize, however, that the United States does not present such a situation. 
Whereas, in the United States, “federalism is a conception of political federalism that assumes 
the essential equality of the states and a relatively homogeneous country, Canadian federalism 
is different, partly because of the distinctiveness of Quebec.” Id. at 554 (quoting SAMUEL 
LASELVA, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CANADIAN FEDERALISM: PARADOXES, 
ACHIEVEMENTS, AND THE TRAGEDIES OF NATIONHOOD 131 (1996)); cf. GORDON S. WOOD, 
EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789–1815, at 39, 48 (2009) (noting 
that, although America at the time of the framing was much more ethnically diverse than most 
European nations, it nonetheless was distinctive in its common language and comparatively 
homogenous culture). 
 234. See, e.g., Arthur W. Macmahon, The Problems of Federalism: A Survey, in 
FEDERALISM: MATURE AND EMERGENT 3, 5 (Arthur W. Macmahon ed. 1955) (“A further 
essential is the equality of the constituent states, absolute as to legal status . . . .”); José Julián 
Alvarez González, The Empire Strikes Out: Congressional Ruminations on the Citizenship Status 
of Puerto Ricans, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 309, 334–35 (1990) (“Federalism presupposes that 
states exist on equal standing before the national government, and that government has an 
obligation to treat such states as equals.”); Michael S. Greve, Compacts, Cartels, and 
Congressional Consent, 68 MO. L. REV. 235, 366 (2003) (“Federalism must start with a premise 
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recognized, equal representative voting power is not essential to 
equal sovereignty. But equal sovereignty is essential to federalism.235) 
If it is essential to federalism itself, then of course equal 
sovereignty must be an inherent structural principle of the federalist 
system set out in the American Constitution. And indeed it is, as the 
cases and history discussed above make clear.236 The very nature of 
our constitutional compact is one in which the states stand as equal 
sovereigns. Again, the equal sovereignty principle “does not rest on 
any express provision of the constitution . . . but on what is 
considered . . . to be the general character and purpose of the union 
of the states . . . —a union of political equals.”237 And because our 
federalist system recognizes that the states retain genuine sovereignty 
in vast areas in which Congress is empowered to act, our commitment 
to the “perfect equality” of all of “members of the Confederacy” with 
regard to their “attributes as . . . independent sovereign 
 
of formal equality among states—not because they are in fact equal, but because no other 
genuinely federal principle is plausible.”); Bereket Habte Selassie, Self-Determination in 
Principle and Practice: The Ethiopian-Eritrean Experience, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 91, 
115 (1997) (noting “an essential principle of federalism (i.e., equality among the component 
parts of the federation)”); cf. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional 
Court] Feb. 28, 1961, 12 BVerfGE 205 (Ger.), http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/
transnational/work_new/german/case.php?id=652 [http://perma.cc/X3YT-9TNP] (“In the 
Federal Republic of Germany, all states have the same constitutional status; they are States that 
are entitled to equal treatment in transactions with the Federation.”); CHESTER JAMES 
ANTIEAU, STATES’ RIGHTS UNDER FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS § 7.04 (1984) (“Constitutions in 
federal societies are replete with a variety of provisions that guarantee equality of the states or 
prohibit discrimination against the member states.”); GEOFFREY SAWER, MODERN 
FEDERALISM 14, 16 (1969) (listing “Guarantees against Centre discrimination in dealings with 
Regions” as among the standard features of federalist systems worldwide that have been 
derived from the American system). This principle is sometimes referred to as (or is understood 
to be contained within a broader principle that is sometimes referred to as) the principle of 
“[f]ederal fairness,” SAWER, supra, at 16, or “federal comity,” EDWARD MCWHINNEY, 
COMPARATIVE FEDERALISM: STATES’ RIGHTS AND NATIONAL POWER 78–89 (1962).  
  There are, of course, many different theories of federalism—chief among them “dual 
federalism,” “cooperative federalism,” and “dynamic federalism.” See ANTHONY J. BELLIA, JR., 
FEDERALISM 183–224 (2011). But this Article’s argument does not depend on which of those 
theories the reader prefers. Equal sovereignty is inherent in all of them. 
 235. Cf. Christoph Schönberger, Lisbon in Karlsruhe: Maastricht’s Epigones at Sea, 10 
GERMAN L.J. 1201, 1215 (2009) (arguing that a system that gives small states disproportionately 
large but not fully equal representation is consistent with basic principles of federalism, as 
“federal comity [entails] an effort to accommodate the statehood of all Member States. A 
federal Union of States always requires that the big states take into due consideration the 
interests of smaller States”). 
 236. See supra Part II.A–B.  
 237. Case v. Toftus, 39 F. 730, 732 (C.C.D. Or. 1889). 
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[g]overnment[s]”238 must necessarily preclude Congress from 
overriding that sovereignty unequally.239 
The equal sovereignty principle has always been understood to 
be essential to the harmony of the nation—as the foregoing cases and 
history amply demonstrate. As far back as the 1790s, Republican 
pamphleteer Joel Barlow sought to describe to the Europeans how, 
here in America, “[t]he principle of equality guaranteed harmonious 
union.”240 In his Advice to the Privileged Orders, first published in 
1792, Barlow explained that, “[a]mong the several states, the 
governments are all equal in their force, and the people are all equal 
in their rights.”241 Barlow’s argument was that, “[j]ust as the state 
constitutions secured individual rights, the federal Constitution 
secured the rights of states; these states—as self-governing republics 
guaranteed against internal subversion and external assault—were 
much more comprehensively, substantially, and enduringly ‘equal’ 
than the states of Europe could ever hope to be.”242 
The sovereign equality of the American states may well have 
exceeded that of the European nations, but it was nonetheless drawn 
from European notions of international law. In the Declaration of 
Independence, the American colonies freed themselves from British 
control and declared themselves to be “Free and Independent 
States.”243 As the Supreme Court has observed, “[w]hen 
independence was achieved, the precepts to be obeyed . . . were those 
of international law.”244 Under the law of nations, all free states were 
 
 238. Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 84, 92 (1857).  
 239. See supra notes 128–69 and accompanying text; infra note 264.  
 240. ONUF & ONUF, supra note 198, at 141 & n.48.  
 241. Joel Barlow, Advice to the Privileged Orders, in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOEL 
BARLOW 3, 67 (1796). 
 242. ONUF & ONUF, supra note 198, at 142. 
 243. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776); see also ARTICLES OF 
CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. II (“Each State retains its Sovereignty, freedom and 
independence . . . .”). To be sure, not all of the Framers were of the view that the states were 
truly “free and independent” of each other as a result of the Declaration. To Wilson, Hamilton, 
and other Federalists, the states declared their independence jointly, and had never—even 
before the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution—individually possessed all of the 
attributes of national sovereignty. See RAKOVE, supra note 196, at 163–68 (“For Wilson and 
later nationalists, the idea that the states and nation emerged simultaneously, or that only a 
national act . . . could give the states political identity, suggested that the rights they retained 
were not absolute.”); 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 81, 
at 324 (indicating that Wilson and Hamilton ascribed to the view that the States “were 
independent, not Individually but Unitedly”). 
 244. New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 378 (1934). 
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entitled to the “perfect equality and absolute independence of 
sovereigns.”245 When the states subsequently joined together under 
the Constitution, they gave up some of that “absolute independence 
of sovereigns,” but they manifested no desire to give up their “perfect 
equality”246 as well. 
That equality was not spelled out in so many words in the 
Constitution. It was, rather, a background assumption on which the 
Constitution was drafted.247 As Senator Pinkney put it, discussing in 
 
 245. The Schooner Ex. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch.) 116, 137 (1812); see EDWIN 
DEWITT DICKINSON, THE EQUALITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 114–15, 120 (1920) 
(“States are equal in the law of nations.”); Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A 
Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1328 (1996) (stating that “[u]nder the law 
of nations, such ‘Free and Independent States’ are entitled to the ‘perfect equality and absolute 
independence of sovereigns’”); see also U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 1 (“The Organization is based on 
the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.”).  
 246. See Clark, supra note 245, at 1328 (illustrating that “[a]lthough the states necessarily 
compromised their ‘absolute independence’ by uniting under the Constitution, it does not 
follow that they forfeited their ‘absolute equality’”). As one Member of Congress later 
expounded, 
[a]t the Declaration of Independence, all the States were left perfectly equal and 
sovereign. When the Articles of Confederation were formed, they were still equal and 
sovereign, too, except so far as powers were surrendered in those articles. When these 
articles were dissolved by the Federal Constitution, they were still equal and 
sovereign in every respect, where powers were not surrendered by that instrument. 
35 ANNALS OF CONG. 1258 (1820) (statement of Rep. Anderson). Professor Thomas Lee has 
explained that “the Founders understood the States as sovereign entities bound together in an 
interdependent coexistence very much like the community of nations, and they therefore 
frequently consulted international law and political theory to craft rules conducive to a peaceful 
and mutually respectful coexistence.” Thomas H. Lee, Making Sense of the Eleventh 
Amendment: International Law and State Sovereignty, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1027, 1031 (2002). Lee 
argues that “the sovereign equality of the States” was one of the international law principles 
that the Framers made a “purposive decision to incorporate into the Constitution”—rather than 
to jettison. Id. at 1028; cf. Peter J. Smith, States as Nations: Dignity in Cross-Doctrinal 
Perspective, 89 VA. L. REV. 1, 80–82 (2003) (suggesting that the Supreme Court’s recent state 
sovereign immunity cases can be understood as incorporating, from international law, notions of 
state sovereign equality).  
 247. Other scholars have made this same observation, albeit without offering substantial 
support or elaboration. See Clark, supra note 245, at 1328 (“[T]he Constitution proceeds on the 
assumption that the states are coequal sovereigns within the federal union.”); Laycock, supra 
note 107, at 288 (“The Constitution assumes, without ever quite saying so, that the several states 
are of equal authority.”); James R. Pielemeier, Why We Should Worry About Full Faith and 
Credit to Laws, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1299, 1325 (1987) (“A major premise underlying American 
federalism and our traditional concern for interstate autonomy is that the states are equal 
sovereigns.”). 
  The notion of equal sovereignty might be seen as a “constitutional backdrop,” as 
Stephen Sachs has helpfully used that phrase. See Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 
80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1813, 1816 (2012) (explaining that “constitutional ‘backdrops’” are 
“rules of law that aren’t derivable from the Constitution’s text, but instead are left unaltered by 
the text, and in fact are protected by the text from various kinds of legal change”). 
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1820 the question whether Congress could abolish slavery in Missouri 
alone, “the Constitution recognises” the “natural equality of 
States, . . . not only because it does not deny them, but presumes them 
to remain as they exist by the law of nature and nations.”248 
“Inequality in the sovereignty of States,” explained Senator Pinkney, 
“is unnatural, and repugnant to all the principles of that law. Hence 
we find it laid down by the text-writers on public law, that ‘Nature has 
established a perfect equality of rights between independent 
nations.’”249 Here, Senator Pinkney was quoting Emer de Vattel, 
whose treatise, as Professor Thomas Lee has explained, “was the 
most popular and widely available tract of its kind in late eighteenth-
century America,” and was “one of the most influential legal treatises 
in American constitutional law.”250 “[T]he conceptualization of state 
sovereignty in Vattel’s work” had a substantial impact on the 
Framers’ shaping and understanding of our federalist system.251 
Vattel argued forcefully that equal sovereignty is a natural trait 
of all states:252 
Since men are naturally equal, and a perfect equality prevails in 
their rights and obligations, as equally proceeding from nature,—
nations composed of men, and considered as so many free persons 
living together in a state of nature, are naturally equal, and inherit 
from nature the same obligations and rights. Power or weakness 
does not in this respect produce any difference. A dwarf is as much a 
man as a giant; a small republic is no less a sovereign state than the 
most powerful kingdom.253 
 
 248. 35 ANNALS OF CONG. 400 (1820) (statement of Sen. Pinkney).  
 249. Id. (quoting Emer de Vattel); see EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS bk. 2, ch. 
111, § 36 (London ed. 1797) (1758) (“[N]ature has established a perfect equality of rights 
between independent nations. Consequently none can naturally lay claim to any superior 
prerogative: for, whatever privileges any one of them derives from freedom and sovereignty, the 
others equally derive the same from the same source.”).  
 250. Lee, supra note 246, at 1061; see also id. at 1061–67 (recounting Vattel’s influence on 
the Framers). 
 251. Id. at 1064–65. 
 252. Vattel “uses the words ‘State’ and ‘nation’ interchangeably.” Michael B. Rappaport, 
Reconciling Textualism and Federalism: The Proper Textual Basis of the Supreme Court’s Tenth 
and Eleventh Amendment Decisions, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 819, 832 (1999). 
 253. VATTEL, supra note 249, prelim. § 18. Vattel specifically noted that “several sovereign 
and independent states may unite themselves together by a perpetual confederacy” into a 
“federal republic” “without ceasing to be, each individually, a perfect state.” Id. bk. 1, ch. 1, 
§ 10. 
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This was the backdrop understanding against which the Framers 
had operated.254 Without expressly saying so, explained Senator 
Pinkney, the “Constitution of the United States proceeds upon the 
truth of this doctrine. It takes the States as it finds them, free and 
sovereign alike by nature. . . . It diminishes the individual sovereignty 
of each, and transfers, what it subtracts, to the Government which it 
creates: it takes from all alike, and leaves them relatively to each 
other equal in sovereign power.”255 
If we are looking for textual clues, then, we might flip the burden 
of proof and begin with the dog that did not bark.256 Given the 
historical background, we might reasonably expect that, if the 
Framers had meant to disturb the fundamental notion of equal 
sovereignty that prevailed in the law of nations and consumed the 
delegates at the Convention, they would have done so explicitly. But 
they did not. As Professor Douglas Laycock has noted, “[e]very 
reference to state authority is to the states generically; no provision 
gives more authority to some states than to others.”257 
If we are nonetheless going to demand affirmative textual 
“hooks”—hints in the text to buttress and validate the background 
structural principle—we need look no further than the preamble. 
“We the People of the United States, in order to form a more perfect 
Union, . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United 
States of America.”258 The very notion of a “union” would seem 
implicitly to suggest the equality of the member states.259 It is, of 
course, true (as Professor David Currie has observed) that “unions of 
unequal states are surely conceivable.”260 But, especially in light of the 
historical context in which the Constitution was drafted, “a more 
perfect Union” must be a union of equals.261 
 
 254. Recall that Luther Martin quoted these same passages from Vattel in calling for equal 
sovereignty at the Convention. See supra notes 192–95 and accompanying text. 
 255. 35 ANNALS OF CONG. 400 (1820) (statement of Sen. Pinkney). 
 256. Cf. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 396 n.23 (1991) (“Congress’[s] silence in this 
regard can be likened to the dog that did not bark.” (citing Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, Silver 
Blaze, in 1 THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES 335 (1927))). 
 257. Laycock, supra note 107, at 288.  
 258. U.S. CONST. pmbl.  
 259. See Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REV. 493, 507 (2008) (observing 
that “the equality norm may have some implicit textual foundation in the Constitution’s vision 
of a ‘Union’”); see also supra Part II.A; supra note 177.  
 260. CURRIE, supra note 139, at 243. Those unions would probably not, however, establish 
federalist systems of government. 
 261. As one early nineteenth century representative put it, 
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On top of that, not only do the states enjoy equal representation 
in the Senate,262 but the Constitution purports to insulate that equality 
permanently from the possibility of amendment.263 This speaks 
directly to a deep constitutional commitment to equal sovereignty 
among the states.264 
 
[a] principal object of the Constitution was ‘to form a more perfect union.’ The 
parties made an equal surrender of sovereignty, and retained equal powers in the 
Federal Government. The sovereignty ceded is equally operative upon every State. 
The powers exercised by the several States, in Congress, are equal—in the Senate, in 
numbers; in the House, in strength. 
35 ANNALS OF CONG. 975 (1820) (statement of Rep. Holmes). 
 262. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.  
 263. See id. art. V (“[N]o State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage 
in the Senate [through constitutional amendment].”). 
 264. See 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 600 (1816) (statement of Rep. Wright) (“The Senate 
represented the sovereignty of the States; and the sovereignty of the States, like all 
sovereignties, are equal, and, of course, correctly equally represented.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 
39, at 255 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (“The Senate . . . will derive its powers 
from the States, as political and co-equal societies; and these will be represented on the 
principle of equality in the Senate . . . .”); id. NO. 43, at 296 (James Madison) (noting in a 
discussion of Article V that “[t]he exception in favour of the equality of suffrage in the Senate 
was probably meant as a palladium to the residuary sovereignty of the States, implied and 
secured by that principle of representation in one branch of the Legislature; and was probably 
insisted on by the States particularly attached to that equality”); RAKOVE, supra note 196, at 
170 (“After July 16, no one could deny that the Senate was intended to embody the equal 
sovereignty of the states . . . .”); 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE UNITED STATES 173, § 691 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) (noting that, in the Senate, 
“each state in its political capacity is represented upon a footing of perfect equality, like a 
congress of sovereigns”); id. at 178, § 696 (noting that the Senate is “fixed upon an absolute 
equality, as the representative of state sovereignty”); 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 60, at 46 
(statement of Fisher Ames at the Massachusetts ratifying convention) (“The senators [in their 
equal numbers] represent the sovereignty of the states . . . .” (emphasis omitted)); id. at 47 
(statement of Rufus King at the Massachusetts convention) (“[T]he Senate preserved the 
equality of the states . . . .”); id. at 319 (statement of Alexander Hamilton at the New York 
convention) (admitting that “the equal vote in the Senate was given to secure the rights of the 
states” (emphasis omitted)); 4 id. at 125 (statement of James Iredell at the North Carolina 
convention) (“[T]he great caution of giving the states an equality of suffrage in making treaties, 
was for the express purpose of taking care of [state] sovereignty.”); 3 THE RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 81, at 371 (Mar. 30, 1796, Message from President 
Washington to the House of Representatives on Jay’s Treaty) (asserting, “[h]aving been a 
member of the General Convention, and knowing the principles on which the Constitution was 
formed,” that “the sovereignty and political safety of the smaller States were deemed essentially 
to depend” on equal suffrage in the Senate); Clark, supra note 245, at 1328; Erbsen, supra note 
259, at 507–08; Metzger, supra note 83, at 1518. 
  Of course, as a result of the Connecticut Compromise, the states do not have equal 
representation in the House of Representatives. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; id. amend. XIV, § 2. 
But the fact of permanent equality in the Senate, along with the history recounted above, see 
supra Part II.B, demonstrates that the compromise was not intended or understood to 
undermine the sovereign equality of the states. As one former House representative observed,  
COLBY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/21/2016 10:25 PM 
1144 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:1087 
Finally, perhaps textual support for striking down laws that 
violate the equal sovereignty principle can be found in the Necessary 
and Proper Clause265—in particular in its propriety requirement. The 
Supreme Court has previously established that “a law is not proper 
for carrying into Execution” a federal power within the meaning of 
that clause “when it violates a constitutional principle of state 
sovereignty”—even if that principle is not otherwise expressly 
enumerated in the constitutional text.266 On that reasoning, a law that 
 
[t]he sovereignty of each State was solemnly guarantied [sic] by the Constitution, and 
as each State, whether great or small, was equally sovereign and independent, each 
State is equally represented in the Senate of the United States; each State sends two 
members; and this is the federative feature in our Constitution; but the House of 
Representatives was intended as the immediate representation of the people of the 
United States.  
17 ANNALS OF CONG. 911 (1807) (statement of Rep. Key).  
  Further support for the notion that this constitutional commitment to equal sovereignty 
should be understood to limit Congress’s ability to exercise its legitimate powers in a way that 
unequally curtails state sovereignty can be found in Benjamin Franklin’s proposed compromise 
regarding the method of representation in the Congress. To resolve the impasse between the 
small and large states, see supra Part II.B, Franklin initially proposed full proportional 
representation in the House, but that the Senate’s voting rules should vary according to the 
nature of the action being taken. Generally, the Senate should vote by proportional 
representation (apportioned not strictly by population, but rather by the amount of money that 
each state contributes to the federal treasury), but “in all cases or questions wherein the 
Sovereignty of individual States may be affected, or whereby their authority over their own 
Citizens may be diminished, or the authority of the General Government within the several 
States augmented, each State shall have equal suffrage” in the Senate. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 81, at 489. This was a highly impractical suggestion, 
CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 257 (2d ed. 1937), and it went 
nowhere; the impasse was eventually resolved instead by the Connecticut Compromise, see 
supra Part II.B, in which Franklin also played a role, see 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 81, at 526. But Franklin’s proposal nonetheless illustrates that 
the guarantee of equal representation in the Senate was tied up with concerns about Congress’s 
ability to use its delegated powers to infringe upon state sovereignty, perhaps in a 
discriminatory manner. That is to say, the equal sovereignty that many of the Framers were 
committed to protecting was the states’ “authority over their own Citizens” and the “authority 
of the General Government within the several States,” id. at 489, and the Framers were 
committed to protecting that equal sovereignty from the acts of Congress. 
 265. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o make all Laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other 
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any 
Department or Officer thereof.”). 
 266. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 39 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis and brackets 
omitted) (citing Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923–24 (1997)); see also Gary Lawson & 
Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the 
Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 322–23 (1993) (hypothesizing that principles of state 
sovereignty embodied in the Necessary and Proper clause may limit Congress’s authority). But 
see J. Randy Beck, The New Jurisprudence of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 2002 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 581, 638–40 (questioning the validity of this interpretation of the clause); Manning, 
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violates the equal sovereignty principle is not consistent with the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.267 
This last is surely something of a flimsy textual hook, as it is 
ultimately circular. It does not so much give us a textual indication of 
what the unwritten structural principles of federalism are as it gives us 
a textual anchor for reading those structural principles—whenever we 
find them elsewhere—into the constitutional text.268 
And it is therefore highly manipulable.269 An injudicious judge 
might strike down a law that is otherwise consistent with the 
Constitution on the ground that it contravenes the judge’s own, 
personal view of the appropriate—the “proper”—federal–state 
balance, and is therefore, according to the judge, beyond the scope of 
the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
This is a serious concern, to be sure. And it is one that extends 
more broadly—not just to the manipulability of abstract textual 
hooks like “proper,” but also to the entire use of nontextual, 
structural reasoning of the type championed by Charles Black and 
 
Foreword, supra note 212, at 32, 48–67 (noting that “the Court treats the ‘propriety’ 
requirement of the Necessary and Proper Clause as a textual hook for the assertion of broad 
judicial power to judge the appropriateness of legislatively prescribed means” and criticizing this 
practice).  
 267. Other textual hooks might include (1) the requirement in the Effects Clause of Article 
IV, section 1, that Congress act pursuant to “general laws,” see Metzger, supra note 83, at 1494, 
1518; (2) the provision of Article II, section 1 that provides that, in the event that no candidate 
for President receives a majority of the electoral vote, the House of Representatives shall 
choose the President from the top five vote-getters, but “the Votes shall be taken by States, the 
Representation from each State having one Vote,” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; see also Letter from 
James Madison to George Hay (Aug. 23, 1823), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra 
note 202, at 148–49 (noting that this provision was “an accommodation to the anxiety of the 
smaller States for their sovereign equality”); (3) the use throughout the Constitution of the 
word “State,” which at the time of the framing was understood to refer to an independent 
government with the attributes of sovereignty cataloged by Vattel and other writers, see 
Rappaport, supra note 252, at 830–34; (4) and the Full Faith and Credit Clause of Article IV, 
section 10, see Robert A. Sedler, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law: The Perspective 
of Constitutional Generalism, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 59, 98 (1981) (“[T]he broad, organic purpose 
of the full faith and credit clause is to promote equality among the states and respect for the 
sovereignty of each state in the federal system . . . .”). For an argument that the Eleventh 
Amendment is also a textual reflection of the principle of equal sovereignty among the states, 
see Lee, supra note 246 at 1032–40.  
 268. Cf. supra note 224 and accompanying text (noting that the same can be said of the 
textual hook in McCulloch).  
 269. See Manning, Foreword, supra note 212, at 54–57 (noting that, “[b]ecause neither 
[federalism nor separation of powers] provides firm answers in the abstract, the particulars of 
each almost invariably require the creation, rather than the excavation, of constitutional 
meaning,” and explaining that the Necessary and Proper Clause in particular “unquestionably 
delegates interpretive lawmaking discretion”).  
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employed here. Professor Michael Dorf has argued that, despite its 
strong appeal, Charles Black-style structural reasoning is 
underutilized in constitutional theory precisely because, “a 
constitutional regime still haunted by the ghost of Lochner and 
fearful, by turns, of both politically conservative and politically liberal 
overreaching by the judiciary, inference from institutional structures 
appears to be too open-ended a methodology” when compared to 
arguments grounded more clearly in the language of the document 
itself.270 
The point is well taken. This is not the place to attempt a full-
throated defense of structural reasoning in constitutional law.271 I will 
instead offer two very brief observations. First, for better or for 
worse, this type of reasoning is already commonplace in federalism 
cases. Whatever normative view one takes about what should be the 
proper method of constitutional interpretation in the federalism 
arena, the fact remains that the equal sovereignty principle fits well 
within the currently prevailing structuralist methodology for crafting 
federalism doctrine.272 Second, to admit that this type of reasoning is 
susceptible to manipulation is not to suggest that any particular 
application of it is necessarily invalid. The validity of a particular 
structural decision depends on the strength of the historical evidence 
and structural arguments upon which it is based. I am personally 
inclined to believe that some of the Supreme Court’s recent, 
 
 270. Michael C. Dorf, Interpretive Holism and the Structural Method or How Charles Black 
Might Have Thought About Campaign Finance Reform and Congressional Timidity, 92 GEO. 
L.J. 833, 838 (2004) (referring to Lochner v. New York, 298 U.S. 45 (1905)).  
 271. For a thoughtful defense of Professor Black’s approach, see Metzger, supra note 216, at 
103–05; see also Bradford R. Clark, Translating Federalism: A Structural Approach, 66 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1161, 1161 (1998) (defending Black’s approach not as a means of ignoring or 
contravening the text, but rather as a means “to determine the specific import of the 
constitutional text by reference to the constitutional structure”). In short, structural reasoning 
has the benefits of practicality, functionalism, and common sense. As Black explains, some 
things just have to be true of the Constitution for it to fulfill its functions effectively, regardless 
of whether those things are spelled out in the text. See BLACK, supra note 218, at 12 (“Could a 
state make it a crime to file suit in a federal court? Could a state provide that lifelong 
disqualification from voting or holding property was to result from even a short service in the 
United States Army?”). Structural reasoning allows us to focus on “the practicalities and 
proprieties of the thing, without getting out dictionaries whose entries will not really respond to 
the question we are putting, or scanning utterances, contemporary with the text, of persons who 
did not really face the question we are asking.” Id. at 22–23. 
 272. Indeed, as Professor Metzger explains, categorically rejecting this type of structural 
reasoning would have a serious destabilizing effect and would call into question the legitimacy 
of a huge body of constitutional doctrine, both in federalism cases and elsewhere in the 
constitutional corpus juris. Metzger, supra note 216, at 103–05. 
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nontextual federalism decisions were wrongly decided, precisely 
because I do not find the historical evidence and structural arguments 
upon which they are based to be sufficiently compelling.273 But, in my 
view, the structure, history, and precedent discussed here make equal 
sovereignty a very different case. 
III.  THE BASIC CONTOURS OF THE EQUAL  
SOVEREIGNTY DOCTRINE 
Critics of the Court’s invocation of equal sovereignty, including 
Justice Ginsburg in her Shelby County dissent, have emphasized—to 
suggest either that the equal sovereignty principle is utterly 
revolutionary, or that it cannot possibly be right—that Congress 
routinely discriminates among the states. “Federal statutes that treat 
States disparately,” observes Justice Ginsburg, “are hardly novelties. 
Do such provisions remain safe given the Court’s expansion of equal 
sovereignty’s sway?”274 Condemning the Shelby County decision, 
Professor Eric Posner opines that, “[i]n fact, the federal government 
doesn’t treat states equally and couldn’t possibly. Nearly all laws 
affect different states differently. . . . So whatever explains the court’s 
decision today, the putative principle of equal sovereignty can’t be 
it.”275 
But these arguments are too crude. A more refined 
understanding of equal sovereignty demonstrates that the vast 
majority of congressional discrimination among the states—including 
the vast majority of legislation flagged by critics—does not run afoul 
of the Constitution. 
 
 273. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 760–814 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (criticizing the 
majority opinion not for employing the wrong methodology, but rather for drawing the wrong 
conclusions from history and structure); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 970–76 (1997) 
(Souter, J., dissenting) (same).  
 274. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations 
omitted).  
 275. Posner, supra note 4; see also, e.g., Price, supra note 24, at 28–29 (“Congress routinely 
enacts legislation that presumes only a rational basis is necessary for unequal treatment of 
states. . . . Courts have never before considered such legislation suspect.”); cf. Reva B. Siegel, 
Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 71 (2013) (“[O]ne could marvel at the 
Court’s willingness to treat differentiation among states, in this context, as an affront, without 
ever explaining how it is different from the other contexts in which Congress differentiates 
among states.”).  
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A. What Equal Soverignty Is Not 
To be sure, the Framers were deeply concerned that Congress 
might use its delegated powers to discriminate among the states.276 
“The fears and jealousies among the states and the apprehensions 
that the general legislature might discriminate in favor of one state or 
region to the economic detriment of another were among the most 
strident themes of the Convention.”277 The equal sovereignty principle 
must be understood in light of those fears. 
Yet the Framers fully realized that perfect equality of federal 
legislation is not possible. At the very least, even laws that are drafted 
in facially nondiscriminatory terms will almost always have a greater 
impact on some states than others. For instance, at the Constitutional 
Convention, the Southern delegates—whose states had no ship-
building industry—feared that, once the federal government was 
vested with the power to regulate commerce, the Northern states 
would force through Congress a bill (similar to those that had already 
been enacted in some Northern states) requiring all American 
imports and exports to be carried in American-made ships. Such a law 
would have greatly enhanced the Northern ship-building industry at 
the expense of Southern exports to foreign nations.278 But it was well 
understood that it would be constitutional. Indeed, some Anti-
Federalists opposed ratification for just this reason. Luther Martin, 
for instance, lamented to the Maryland legislature that Congress was 
empowered to enact taxes and regulations that would have a 
disparate effect on certain states: 
[T]hough there is a provision that all duties, imposts, and excises, 
shall be uniform,—that is, to be laid to the same amount on the 
same articles in each state,—yet this will not prevent Congress from 
having it in their power to cause them to fall very unequally, and 
much heavier on some states than on others, because these duties 
may be laid on articles but little or not at all used in some states, and 
of absolute necessity for the use and consumption of others; in which 
case, the first would pay little or no part of the revenue arising 
therefrom, while the whole, or nearly the whole, of it would be paid 
 
 276. This point is discussed in detail in Colby, supra note 11, at 266–88. 
 277. Judith Schenck Koffler, The Bankruptcy Clause and Exemption Laws: A 
Reexamination of the Doctrine of Geographic Uniformity, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 22, 37–38 (1983). 
 278. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 81, at 450–53 
(reflecting widespread agreement that such a law would benefit the North at the expense of the 
South); WARREN, supra note 264, at 579–80 (same). 
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by the last, to wit, the states which use and consume the articles on 
which the imposts and excises are laid.279 
But the Constitution was ratified anyway, with a full understanding 
that it was unavoidable that many acts of Congress would be 
discriminatory in effect. As the Supreme Court observed in the 
nineteenth century, in rejecting an argument that Congress had 
impermissibly discriminated between states, “[p]erfect uniformity and 
perfect equality of taxation [and regulation], in all the aspects in 
which the human mind can view it, is a baseless dream.”280 
The equal sovereignty principle thus does not categorically 
preclude Congress from “treat[ing] States disparately”281 in any 
manner whatsoever; it does not foreclose “all laws [that] affect 
different states differently.”282 It is a guarantee of equal sovereignty, 
not of equal treatment in all respects. Of course, “‘[s]overeignty’ is a 
term used in many senses and is much abused.”283 But, as the 
foregoing makes clear, when they are discussing the equal sovereignty 
principle, judges and politicians (including the Framers) are using the 
term in its dictionary sense, to refer to a state’s “independent 
authority and . . . right to govern itself.”284 Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines “state sovereignty” as the “right of a state to self-
government.”285 Thus, “[t]he true constitutional equality between the 
states only extends to the right of each, under the constitution, to 
have and enjoy the same measure of local or self-government, and to 
be admitted to an equal participation in the maintenance, 
administration, and conduct of the common or national 
government.”286 Far from being a sweeping mandate for across-the-
board state equality, the equal sovereignty principle is nothing more 
than “the truism that the Union under the Constitution is essentially 
 
 279. 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 60, at 369. 
 280. The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 595 (1884). 
 281. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2649 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 282. Posner, supra note 4. 
 283. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 754 (2008) (quoting 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 206 cmt. b (1986)); see generally John 
Hilla, The Literary Effect of Sovereignty in International Law, 14 WIDENER L. REV. 77 (2008) 
(reviewing the variety of conceptual and linguistic meanings that have attached to 
“sovereignty”).  
 284. Sovereignty, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
sovereignty [http://perma.cc/9MTP-T3WC]. 
 285. State Sovereignty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (indicating that this 
definition dates back to the eighteenth century). 
 286. Case v. Toftus, 39 F. 730, 732 (C.C.D. Or. 1889). 
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one of States equal in local governmental power.”287 And so, unequal 
or discriminatory federal laws implicate the equal sovereignty 
principle only when they grant more regulatory authority or capacity 
for self-government to some states than to others (or allow some 
states a greater role than others in the federal government). 
The equal sovereignty principle is therefore not undermined by, 
nor does it threaten, federal laws that are drafted in general, 
nongeographic terms, but have a disparate impact on some states.288 
Such laws treat the states as equal sovereigns; they just end up 
affecting some states more than others.289 To the extent that such a 
law undermines state sovereignty, all states have the same decreased 
sovereign rights over its subject matter, even if the reduction in 
sovereignty ends up mattering much more to some states than to 
others.290 
 
 287. Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565, 593 (1918).  
 288. As the Supreme Court has observed,  
[t]he “equal footing” clause has long been held to refer to political rights and to 
sovereignty. It does not, of course, include economic stature or standing. There has 
never been equality among the States in that sense. . . . Area, location, geology, and 
latitude have created great diversity in the economic aspects of the several States. The 
requirement of equal footing was designed not to wipe out those diversities but to 
create parity as respects political standing and sovereignty.  
United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 716 (1950) (citations omitted). A law of this sort could 
implicate equal sovereignty only if a disadvantaged state “was deprived of any right to 
participate in the national political process or . . . was singled out in a way that left it politically 
isolated and powerless.” South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 512–13 (1988). 
 289. Cf. The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 594 (1884) (“Is the tax on tobacco void, 
because in many of the States no tobacco is raised or manufactured? . . . The tax is uniform 
when it operates with the same force and effect in every place where the subject of it is found.”). 
 290. As such, Professor Posner does not undermine the equal sovereignty principle by 
pointing out that “[d]isaster-relief laws benefit disaster-prone states at the expense of disaster-
free states. Pollution-control laws burden industrial states. Progressive taxes burden states 
where the rich are concentrated.” Posner, supra note 4; see also id. (“Indeed, Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act will continue to burden states with substantial minority populations relative 
to other states, just because you can’t discriminate against a minority population that doesn’t 
exist.”). Nor does Professor Price when he notes that “benefits formulas may result in unequal 
distribution of funds, depending on where eligible beneficiaries (whether individuals, school 
districts, foundations, or other parties) reside.” Price, supra note 24, at 28 (discussing 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1411 (2006) (special education funding); 23 U.S.C. § 104 (2006) (highway funding); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396d (2006) (medical assistance benefit formulas)).  
  The same can be said of Justice Stevens’s assertion that the Three-Fifths Clause of 
Article I, section 2—which ended up giving the Southern states more voting power in the House 
of Representatives than they would have had if slaves had not been counted in apportionment 
at all—“created a basic inequality between the slave states and the free states” that 
“contradict[s] the notion that the ‘fundamental principle of equal sovereignty among the States’ 
is a part of our unwritten Constitution.” John Paul Stevens, The Court and the Right to Vote: A 
Dissent, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, 37 (Aug. 15, 2013) (reviewing GARY MAY, BENDING TOWARD 
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The same is true of federal spending. The fact that the federal 
government spends money in ways that benefit some states more than 
others does not implicate the equal sovereignty principle.291 The 
Supreme Court has long held that federal spending does not infringe 
upon state sovereignty unless it amounts to “coercion” or 
“compulsion” of the state governments that effectively removes their 
agency as independent sovereigns.292 Giving money to one state but 
 
JUSTICE: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
(2013)). Under the Three-Fifths Clause, all states retained the same sovereign right to 
implement slavery (and thus increase their populations for apportionment purposes), even 
though the South chose to rely much more on slavery than did the North. Indeed, although 
slavery was much more widespread in the South, it persisted in all but one Northern state at the 
time of the framing, and the slaves in the Northern states, just like in their Southern 
counterparts, were counted as three-fifths persons in the early congressional apportionments. 
See Charles M. Biles, Congressional Apportionment Based on the 1790 Census 6–9 (Mar. 2015) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://media.wix.com/ugd/9ae4b0_6cec7ab68b6141809555aecfc33f20
e8.pdf [http://perma.cc/8W8J-ECWP]. 
 291. Most of the statutes that Justice Ginsburg listed as potentially imperiled in her Shelby 
County dissent fall into this category:  
26 U.S.C. § 142(l) (EPA required to locate green building project in a State meeting 
specified population criteria); 42 U.S.C. § 3796bb (at least 50 percent of rural drug 
enforcement assistance funding must be allocated to States with “a population density 
of fifty-two or fewer persons per square mile or a State in which the largest county 
has fewer than one hundred and fifty thousand people, based on the decennial census 
of 1990 through fiscal year 1997”); §§ 13925, 13971 (similar population criteria for 
funding to combat rural domestic violence); § 10136 (specifying rules applicable to 
Nevada’s Yucca Mountain nuclear waste site, and providing that “[n]o State, other 
than the State of Nevada, may receive financial assistance under this subsection after 
December 22, 1987”). 
Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2649 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). So do many of the 
laws that Professor Price cites to undermine the equal sovereignty principle. Price refers to 
“notorious congressional ‘earmarks’—line items funding particular parties or projects—that 
litter annual appropriations bills and single out particular entities, localities, or even states for 
federal largesse.” Price, supra note 24, at 28. Price notes in particular the Water Resources 
Development Act of 2007 (which appropriates funds for various specified navigation-related 
projects), the appropriation of funds for the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority 
in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2012, and the Disaster 
Relief Appropriations Act of 2012 (which appropriates funds for repairs on the Mississippi 
River and its tributaries). Id. at 28 n.22. Price further adds that “Congress sometimes establishes 
pilot projects that test particular federal initiatives in one state or several states before imposing 
them on the nation as a whole” and provides as examples 
42 U.S.C. § 280g-6 (Supp. V 2012) (authorizing the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services to select “at least 3 states” for pilot projects relating to chronic kidney 
disease); Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 
112-55, div. A, tit. VII, § 727, 125 Stat. 552, 585 (2011) (funding a pilot project to test 
reforestation techniques in Gulf Coast areas); tit. III, 125 Stat. at 567 (appropriating 
funds “to conduct a demonstration” regarding certain public housing programs). 
Id. at 128 & n.23. 
 292. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601–03 (2012) 
(“Congress may use its spending power to create incentives for States to act in accordance with 
federal policies. But when ‘pressure turns into compulsion,’ . . . the legislation runs contrary to 
COLBY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/21/2016 10:25 PM 
1152 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:1087 
not another—or spending money in one state but not another—is a 
form of discrimination, but not one that directly impedes the 
regulatory authority or sovereign autonomy of the state that got the 
short end of the stick.293 
In seeking to discredit the equal sovereignty principle, Professor 
Price notes the prevalence of federal laws that burden or reward the 
states unequally in various ways, such as those just mentioned, and 
explains that “[c]ourts have never before considered such legislation 
suspect.”294 Price continues, 
In perhaps the most thorough consideration of the issue to date, the 
D.C. Circuit rejected arguments that the location of the federal 
 
our system of federalism.” (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937))); 
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (“Our decisions have recognized that in some 
circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the 
point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’” (quoting Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 590)). 
For that reason, discriminatory conditions imposed on federal funds do not violate the equal 
sovereignty principle unless the conditions are unduly coercive. Accordingly, despite Professor 
Price’s contrary suggestion, the equal sovereignty principle is not undermined by, or 
inconsistent with, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. 
No. 112-55 § 211, 125 Stat. 552, 695 (2011), which exempts “[a] public housing agency or such 
other entity that administers Federal housing assistance for the Housing Authority of the county 
of Los Angeles, California, the States of Alaska, Iowa, and Mississippi” from the requirement 
that such entities must generally include a resident on their respective governing bodies, Price, 
supra note 24, at 29 n.26. 
 293. It is no doubt true that there can be indirect, attenuated effects on equal sovereignty 
both from facially neutral federal laws that have a disparate impact and from unequal federal 
spending. For instance, a federal tax on individuals or activities that hits some states extremely 
hard, while leaving others virtually untouched—such as a tax on corn farming or oil 
production—can limit the burdened states’ practical ability to raise their own state taxes. 
(People only have so much money and will only tolerate a certain combined federal and state 
tax burden.) That reality, in turn, limits the burdened states’ practical ability to fund 
government initiatives relative to their peers, which, in a sense, limits the comparative extent to 
which they can realistically exercise their sovereign authority. Likewise, lavish federal spending 
for, say, infrastructure improvements in some states but not others can functionally require the 
other states to raise the money for the same ends themselves, through state taxes, which 
effectively limits their ability to raise funds to pursue other governmental initiatives—which, in 
turn, limits the amount of sovereign power that they can in practice exercise relative to the 
other states. But no court has ever suggested that such laws violate the equal sovereignty 
principle. Nor could they. Since all federal laws are discriminatory in effect, see Colby, supra 
note 11, at 329 (“For better or for worse, disparate impact of this sort is an unavoidable 
consequence of nationwide regulation in a diverse country.”), and it is often impossible for 
Congress to spend money in an entirely equal manner, see id. at 332–33 (“[T]his type of 
‘discrimination,’ however unfortunate and however contrary to the spirit of the Convention, is 
simply unavoidable . . . .”), if the equal sovereignty principle extended that far, it would mean 
the end of the federal government. But the principle does not, of course, extend that far; it is 
concerned instead only with direct, categorical restrictions on state sovereignty.  
 294. Price, supra note 24, at 29.  
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nuclear waste facility in Nevada violated a constitutional principle of 
state equal treatment. Although Nevada argued that the facility’s 
selection violated a constitutional requirement that federal 
legislation treat states equally, the D.C. Circuit found ‘no basis in 
the Constitution’ for Nevada’s argument.295 
But the D.C. Circuit was absolutely correct to reject Nevada’s 
assertion that there is a generalized “‘equal treatment’ requirement” 
that runs throughout the Constitution.296 There is not. There is, 
instead, a limited principle of equal sovereignty. The law at issue in 
the D.C. Circuit case was enacted pursuant to the Property Clause.297 
Congress was simply choosing what use to make of some property 
that the federal government owns in Nevada; it was not interfering 
with the state’s powers of self-government. As the D.C. Circuit 
correctly noted, “while the designation of Yucca as a repository may 
impose a burden on Nevada, it does not infringe upon state sovereign 
interests” in a way that implicates the structure of constitutional 
federalism.298 
Even laws that explicitly regulate unevenly between the states in 
geographic terms do not necessarily implicate the equal sovereignty 
principle. Congress might well regulate individuals in different states 
in a discriminatory manner—even explicitly along state lines—
without raising equal sovereignty concerns.299 Regulating individuals 
differently in different states implicates the equal sovereignty 
principle only when it has the effect—in conjunction with the 
Supremacy Clause—of limiting the sovereign authority of some 
states, but not others. So, for instance, a federal law that prescribes a 
greater punishment for counterfeiting United States currency in State 
 
 295. Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Nuclear Energy Inst. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1305 (D.C. 
Cir. 2004)). 
 296. Nuclear Energy Inst., 373 F.3d at 1305. 
 297. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all 
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the 
United States . . . .”).  
 298. Nuclear Energy Inst., 373 F.3d at 1306. 
 299. To be sure, such discrimination would often be unconstitutional if Congress were 
exercising a power upon which the Constitution imposes a uniformity constraint. For instance, 
the Constitution empowers Congress to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and 
uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 4. Creating an easier path to citizenship in Massachusetts, or more stringent rules for 
discharging debt in the South, would be unconstitutional not because of the equal sovereignty 
principle, but rather because of the uniformity constraint imposed on Congress’s exercise of 
those powers. For an argument that such a constraint is also implicitly contained within the 
commerce power, see Colby, supra note 11, at 301–46. 
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A than in State B, or that sets a higher price for stamps in State A 
than in State B, does not implicate equal sovereignty because it does 
not unequally affect the states’ sovereign authority to govern. 
B. What Equal Sovereignty Is 
But equal sovereignty would be implicated by a federal law that 
provided that State A is permitted to regulate in a particular area, but 
State B is not.300 Such a law would discriminatorily regulate the states 
directly, in their exercise of their sovereign authority. And equal 
sovereignty would also be implicated by a federal law that regulated 
individuals, rather than the states themselves, but applied only in 
State A, and not in State B—if the federal law had the preemptive 
effect of precluding State A, but not State B, from regulating in the 
area. Imagine, for instance, a federal law prohibiting bullfighting in 
Texas. Such a law would operate directly upon individuals—those 
who wish to conduct bull fights—rather than the states. But it would 
have an immediate impact upon the sovereign regulatory authority of 
the State of Texas, relative to its peers. By operation of the 
Supremacy Clause, the federal law would preempt any attempt by 
Texas to exercise its sovereign authority to enact legislation 
permitting or regulating bullfighting. But since the federal law would 
not apply outside of Texas, the other forty-nine states would be free 
to regulate bullfighting as they saw fit. Texas would be denied its 
equal sovereignty.301 
Once we understand the limited nature of the equal sovereignty 
principle, we can see that most of the federal laws identified by 
Justice Ginsburg as imperiled by the equal sovereignty principle are 
not, in fact, threatened at all.302 But one of the laws that she invokes 
does indeed fit the bill: the Professional and Amateur Sports 
Protection Act of 1992303—discussed in the Introduction to this 
Article—which prohibits sports gambling, but exempts Nevada from 
 
 300. Cf. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(5) (2012) (exempting Hawaii’s prepaid health plan law from the 
scope of ERISA preemption). 
 301. As explained above, federal preemption implicates state sovereignty, but not in a way 
that generally runs afoul of the Constitution. Geographically discriminatory preemption, 
however, does violate a fundamental principle of federalism. See supra Part II.A (discussing the 
equal footing principle).  
 302. See supra notes 290–98 and accompanying text. 
 303. Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-559, 106 Stat. 
4227 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3704). 
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its scope.304 PASPA “does not merely regulate private conduct; it 
curtails the regulatory and revenue-raising authority of the states. It 
precludes non-exempted states from legalizing sports gambling . . . . 
Nevada may derive enormous financial benefits from casino sports 
book betting, but other states may not.”305 As such, PASPA 
contravenes the principle of equal state sovereignty.306 
Professor Price identifies another federal law that raises genuine 
equal sovereignty concerns: the Clean Air Act, which “permits one 
state (California) to establish its own more stringent motor vehicle 
emissions and engine design standards while requiring other states to 
follow either California’s standards or standards established by the 
federal government.”307 
The fact that we can identify, at most, only a handful of current 
federal laws that do not afford equal sovereignty to the states suggests 
that the equal sovereignty principle is not actually “capable of [as] 
much mischief” as Justice Ginsburg initially feared.308 It also dispels 
the assertion that the sheer volume of federal laws that violate it 
indicates that the principle cannot possibly be valid. 
What is more, the simple fact that a law raises equal sovereignty 
concerns does not render it automatically unconstitutional, just as the 
mere fact that a law discriminates between people on the basis of a 
suspect classification does not necessarily mean that it is invalid under 
the Equal Protection Clause. Like most other constitutional 
principles, equal sovereignty is not absolute.309 A federal statute that 
contravenes the equal sovereignty principle should simply trigger 
 
 304. See id. § 3704; Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2649 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting); see also Price, supra note 24, at 29 nn.26–27 (arguing that PASPA’s existence 
undermines the equal sovereignty principle). A more complete discussion of PASPA’s 
exemptions can be found in Colby, supra note 11, at 250 n.3. 
 305. Colby, supra note 11, at 250–51. 
 306. See Justin Willis McKithen, Note, Playing Favorites: Congress’s Denial of Equal 
Sovereignty to the States in the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, 49 GA. L. REV. 
539, 560–62 (2015) (arguing that PASPA violates the equal sovereignty principle). 
 307. Price, supra note 24, at 29. Price argues that courts “have rejected challenges to the 
Clean Air Act provisions granting special regulatory powers only to California.” Id. at 29 n.27 
(citing, for this proposition, Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 498 F.3d 
1031 (9th Cir. 2007); Ass’n of Int’l Auto. Mfrs., Inc. v. Comm’r, Mass. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 208 
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000); Am. Auto. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Cahill, 152 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. 1998); Virginia v. 
EPA, 108 F.3d 1397 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). But none of those cases directly addressed or upheld the 
discrimination between states. 
 308. Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 309. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (“Distinctions 
can be justified in some cases.”). 
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some form of heightened scrutiny, requiring the federal government 
to justify the disparate treatment. The Supreme Court expressed that 
understanding in Northwest Austin when it announced that “a 
departure from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty 
requires a showing that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is 
sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.”310 The Court has yet 
to spell out the exact contours of that inquiry; those will have to be 
worked out in detail over time. But, however the test is ultimately 
structured, at base, it will require Congress to provide a strong 
justification for treating the states as unequal sovereigns.311 
In the case of PASPA, it is highly questionable whether such a 
justification can be found. Even Congress admitted that the problem 
that the law addresses is national in scope.312 The only possible 
justification for treating the states differently is a desire to 
“grandfather” existing state laws that had relied to a substantial 
degree on the lack of contrary federal regulation.313 Whether that is a 
sufficient justification for permanently favoring some states over 
 
 310. Id.; see also Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2624 (“At the same time, as we made clear in 
Northwest Austin, the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty remains highly pertinent in 
assessing subsequent disparate treatment of States.”). 
 311. The Supreme Court has already developed a body of caselaw addressing similar 
concerns in the somewhat analogous context of the Tax Uniformity Clause and the Bankruptcy 
Clause, both of which require Congress to legislate uniformly among the states. See Colby, 
supra note 11, at 335–40 (analyzing the cases). Those cases are not as clear and consistent as one 
might hope, but in essence they establish the proposition that “Congress is empowered to tackle 
geographically isolated problems, but . . . federal laws must apply uniformly wherever those 
problems are presented.” Id. at 336; see also The Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 
U.S. 102, 159 (1974) (“The uniformity provision does not deny Congress the power to take into 
account differences that exist between different parts of the country, and to fashion legislation 
to resolve geographically isolated problems.”).  
 312. See S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 5 (1991), as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553, 3556 
(“Sports gambling is a national problem.”). 
 313. See id. at 8 (“Neither has the committee any desire to threaten the economy of Nevada, 
which over many decades has come to depend on legalized private gambling, including sports 
gambling, as an essential industry, or to prohibit lawful sports gambling schemes in other States 
that were in operation when the legislation was introduced.”). Other examples of federal 
statutes that trigger equal sovereignty concerns by grandfathering existing state laws include the 
Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-719 (1998) (codified at 47 U.S.C. 
§ 151), which precludes all state taxes on Internet access, but exempts those state taxes already 
in place when the statute was enacted. The Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 
(1974) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 55a), which precludes the states from requiring individuals to 
disclose their social security numbers to receive a government benefit or to exercise a right, but 
exempts those states that already required disclosure as a condition of voting, provides another 
example. See McKay v. Thompson, 226 F.3d 752, 755 (6th Cir. 2000). 
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others in their ability to regulate an important subject is, at the very 
least, a dubious proposition.314 
The Clean Air Act should trigger a similar analysis. It too is a 
“grandfather” law.315 It generally prohibits the states from enacting 
their own motor vehicle emissions standards, but provides that the 
Environmental Protection Agency can waive preemption for states 
that regulated auto emissions prior to March 30, 1966.316 Congress was 
well aware that only California meets that condition.317 Unlike 
PASPA, the Clean Air Act does not simply allow California to leave 
in place its preexisting regulations; it empowers California—and only 
California—to continue to promulgate new emissions standards. 
California alone is granted, in the words of one House Report, “the 
broadest possible discretion in selecting the best means to protect the 
health of its citizens and the public welfare.”318 This is a classic 
example of unequal sovereignty. The question is whether California’s 
situation in relation to the problem of air pollution is sufficiently 
unique to justify the disparate treatment.319 
It is not my intent here to answer such questions. My object is 
only to identify them, and to note that there will be, no doubt, 
situations in which federal laws that afford more (or less) sovereignty 
to some states than others will still be constitutional. This is yet 
another reason why the equal sovereignty principle is less 
revolutionary than critics have suggested. And it is yet another reason 
why the existence of the equal sovereignty principle is not fatally 
undermined by the litany of unequal federal statutes identified by 
critics.320 
 
 314. See Colby, supra note 11, at 342–43. 
 315. See id. at 343–45. 
 316. See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a)–(b) (2012). 
 317. See Brader, supra note 83, at 121. 
 318. H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 301–02 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1380–
81. 
 319. See Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 281, 314 (“The prospect of fifty separate standards for automobiles is untenable. 
But California has unique air pollution problems and an economy large enough to support 
separate standards.”); id. at 311 (noting that California “is probably unique in the country in the 
amount of expertise and sophistication it has developed in the regulation of auto emissions”); 
Rachel L. Chanin, Note, California’s Authority to Regulate Mobile Source Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 699, 713–21 (2003) (explaining California’s unique air 
pollution problems and Congress’s reasons for affording special leeway to that state). 
 320. Most of those statutes, as noted above, do not even trigger equal sovereignty concerns 
at all. But even those that do might well still be constitutional. For instance, Professor Price 
identifies “[a] statute from the early years of the Republic [which] granted jurisdiction over 
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It is at this stage of the inquiry—whether the “departure from 
the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty” is justified by the fact 
that the “statute’s disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently 
related to the problem that it targets”321—that the critics of Shelby 
County should focus their objections.322 The Court concluded that, 
although the coverage formula used to determine which states were 
subject to the statute’s onerous restrictions on election lawmaking 
was justified in 1965, when the Voting Rights Act was first enacted, 
that formula was no longer justified in 2006, when the law was 
reauthorized.323 Because the coverage formula continued to be “based 
on decades-old data and eradicated practices,” including the past use 
of “literacy tests” that “have been banned nationwide for over 40 
years,” and on disparities in minority “voter registration and turnout 
in the 1960s and early 1970s” that no longer persisted, the Court 
found that the 2006 reauthorization statute’s disparate geographic 
coverage was not sufficiently related to the problem of twenty-first-
century racial discrimination in voting that it targeted.324 But, as 
Justice Ginsburg explained, Congress, prior to the 2006 
reauthorization, held extensive hearings, amassed voluminous 
evidence, and made specific findings that racial discrimination in 
voting remains a serious and widespread problem in the covered 
 
certain federal revenue offenses only to specified state courts in New York and Pennsylvania.” 
Price, supra note 24, at 29 n.26. It may well be that that “statute’s disparate geographic coverage 
[was] sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.” Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. 
Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009). The statute empowered state courts only in frontier counties 
that were uniquely and impractically far from the nearest federal courts: 
[The legislative] committee further observe [sic], that the revenue districts on the 
northern frontier are at a distance of between three and four hundred miles of the 
place of residence of the district judges and of the district courts; that any petitioners 
from those districts would be forced to travel from six to eight hundred miles with 
their evidences [sic], in order to avail themselves of the benefits contemplated by the 
law; that the persons who are liable to infringe the laws of the United States, on 
account of their local situation, are generally poor, or in very moderate 
circumstances; that they have not the ability to bear the expenses of so long a journey. 
15 ANNALS OF CONG. 330–31 (Jan. 1806) (statement of Rep. Sailly). 
 321. Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203. 
 322. The Voting Rights Act clearly implicates equal sovereignty because the covered 
“[s]tates [alone] must beseech the Federal Government for permission to implement laws that 
they would otherwise have the right to enact and execute on their own.” Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 
133 S. Ct. 2612, 2624 (2013). “While one State waits months or years and expends funds to 
implement a validly enacted law, its neighbor can typically put the same law into effect 
immediately, through the normal legislative process.” Id.  
 323. See id. at 2627–28. 
 324. Id.; see also id. at 2629 (“Congress—if it is to divide the States—must identify those 
jurisdictions to be singled out on a basis that makes sense in light of current conditions. It 
cannot rely simply on the past.”). 
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jurisdictions.325 Whether Congress’s evidence was good enough to 
justify the continued use of the old coverage formula, rather than a 
fresh formula crafted anew to address current conditions,326 is a hard 
question about the past and present state of racial discrimination in 
voting across the country—one that is made even more complicated 
by the fact that it is difficult to tell whether improved conditions in 
the covered jurisdictions today are the result of the continuing 
operation of the Voting Rights Act, as opposed to evidence that the 
act is no longer needed.327 This is not an issue that I will tackle here. 
My point is only that one can accept the equal sovereignty principle 
while still believing that Shelby County was wrongly decided. 
C. Equal Sovereignty and the Reconstruction Amendments 
Indeed, there is a strong argument—the possibility of which was 
ignored by the Shelby County majority—that the courts should be 
more forgiving of violations of the equal sovereignty principle in the 
context of federal civil-rights laws, like the Voting Rights Act, that 
were enacted pursuant to the Reconstruction amendments. As 
Professor Mark Graber explains, “One of the most remarkable 
features of Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion . . . in Shelby County . . . is 
the almost complete absence of any reference to the Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, the Civil War, or anything 
that happened during Reconstruction.”328 The Court’s opinion reads 
as though “the Civil War and Reconstruction never occurred or, as 
 
 325. See id. at 2635–36, 2639–44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Ellen D. Katz et al., 
Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act Since 1982, Final Report of the Voting Rights Initiative, University of Michigan Law School, 
39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 643, 650–52 (2005) (seeking to demonstrate that the coverage formula 
accurately identifies the jurisdictions in which racial discrimination remains most prevalent).  
 326. Cf. Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE 
L.J. 174, 208 (2007) (suggesting that “the coverage formula . . . is both overinclusive and 
underinclusive of jurisdictions of concern with respect to their record of minority voting rights 
violations” and that, “[a]t least in the abstract, . . . it is difficult to defend a formula which, for 
example, covers counties in Michigan and New Hampshire, but does not cover the counties in 
Ohio and Florida with the most notorious voting rights violations in recent elections” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 327. See Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2638 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“If the statute was 
working, there would be less evidence of discrimination, so opponents might argue that 
Congress should not be allowed to renew the statute.”). 
 328. Mark Graber, The Missing Amendments, BALKINIZATION (June 25, 2013, 11:00 AM), 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/06/the-missing-amendments.html [http://perma.cc/2D7L-D8
BH]. 
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the Dunning School maintained, they were blots on American 
constitutionalism that ought to be erased.”329 
But, of course, the Civil War and Reconstruction did happen. 
And they did work profound changes in American 
constitutionalism.330 One might take a very expansive view of that 
change, opining that it effectively eradicated the notion of state 
sovereignty altogether,331 but of course the Supreme Court has never 
countenanced that suggestion,332 and certainly not of late. More 
productively, one might argue that, although the Reconstruction 
amendments did not annihilate state sovereignty altogether, they did 
work significant alterations to the structure of federalism, one of 
which was the total elimination of the structural principle of equal 
 
 329. Id. The Dunning School was a school of historical thought founded at Columbia 
University by historian William Dunning and political scientist and law professor John W. 
Burgess. See Fishkin, supra note 6, at 183–84. The Dunning School perpetuated a twisted 
narrative pursuant to which the Radical Republicans in Congress, consumed by a vicious 
passion for revenge, forced oppressive and tyrannical misrule upon a victimized Southern 
people (whose just cause was simply state sovereignty, rather than white supremacy). See id.  
 330. See Hasen, supra note 6, at 732 (“[C]onspicuously absent from the majority opinion is 
any real appreciation of how the Civil War amendments, including the Fifteenth Amendment, 
changed the state-federal balance of power and the scope of the Tenth Amendment.”); Katyal 
& Schmidt, supra note 5, at 2134 (“If [the equal sovereignty principle] is a structural inference, 
how can it be squared with the Reconstruction Amendments, which had specifically authorized 
massive (and unequal) federal intrusions into the States to protect the rights of newly freed 
slaves?”). 
 331. See Dunning, supra note 63, at 425 (“No argument based in any particular upon the 
principle of state-sovereignty can ever again be tolerated in the arena of constitutional debate. 
Our fundamental law must always henceforth be viewed as the expression of a nation’s will.”).  
 332. Beginning with The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872), the Court has generally 
insisted that the Reconstruction amendments were not “so great a departure from the structure 
and spirit of our institutions,” did not “degrade the State governments by subjecting them to the 
control of Congress, in the exercise of powers heretofore universally conceded to them of the 
most ordinary and fundamental character,” and did not “radically change[] the whole theory of 
the relations of the State and Federal governments to each other and of both these governments 
to the people.” See id. at 78. As an historical matter, I am not unsympathetic to the argument 
that the Court has it wrong. Cf. Thomas B. Colby, Originalism and the Ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1627, 1644–52 (2013) (detailing the extent to which 
the Southern states, which were forced at gunpoint to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment, 
viewed it as radically reworking the very nature of the American system of government and 
utterly destroying the institution of state sovereignty). But cf. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: 
AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–77, at 242 (1988) (explaining that moderate 
Republicans generally “did not believe the legitimate rights of the states had been destroyed, or 
the traditional principles of federalism eradicated,” as a result of the Civil War); id. at 259 
(explaining that, in framing the Fourteenth Amendment, “few Republicans wished to break 
completely with the principles of federalism”). 
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sovereignty among the states.333 After all, the rebel states’ readmission 
to the Union after the war was conditioned on their capitulating to a 
mandate that they could never amend their state constitutions so as to 
abridge the right of black suffrage.334 As this occurred two years prior 
to the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment, the sovereignty of the 
Southern states was thereby restricted in a way that the sovereignty of 
the Northern states was not. And this was a particularly egregious 
disparity, in light of the fact that most of the Northern states did not, 
in fact, grant voting rights to blacks at the time.335 One might read 
these events—in conjunction with the many other (deserved) 
indignities visited uniquely upon the South after the war—as 
indicating that the equal sovereignty principle simply did not survive 
the reshaping of federalism during Reconstruction.336 
But that seems a bridge too far, for a number of reasons. First, 
most of the equal footing cases—with their aggressive enforcement of 
equal sovereignty for newly admitted states, and their unambiguous 
rhetoric of equal sovereignty for all states—were decided after 
Reconstruction.337 Second, Congress had been recalcitrantly trying to 
impose on newly admitted states conditions that are inconsistent with 
the equal sovereignty principle since long before the Civil War.338 
Congress’s failure to respect that principle (or the equal footing 
doctrine) in admitting (or readmitting) states during and after the war 
does not seem to have been dictated or facilitated by a paradigm shift 
 
 333. Indeed, Professor Dunning himself, the namesake of the Dunning School, authored an 
article in 1888 suggesting that recent Congressional activity had rendered the notion of equal 
sovereignty “finally defunct,” though he suggested that it could be revived by the courts. See 
Dunning, supra note 63, at 452; Fishkin, supra note 6, at 184.  
 334. Biber, supra note 66, at 143–44.  
 335. See AMAR, supra note 83, at 374 (“In 1865, only a handful of Northern states allowed 
blacks to vote.”); FONER, supra note 332, at 447 (“[T]he Northern states during Reconstruction 
actually abridged the right to vote more extensively than the Southern.”).  
 336. See Vik Kanwar, A Fugitive from the Camp of the Conquerors: The Revival of Equal 
Sovereignty Doctrine in Shelby County v. Holder, 17 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 272, 
288 (2015) (stating that the equal sovereignty principle “definitively ended at the time of 
Reconstruction”). Joseph Fishkin elaborates, 
To remember what actually happened between 1861 and 1870 is to remember a 
shattered nation reconstructed on new foundations, where the terms of readmission 
of the conquered South were based, fundamentally, not on principles of equal 
sovereignty, but on military conquest, surrender, and occupation. It is to remember a 
series of amendments that remade the . . . constitutional order on new terms far less 
amenable to claims of either the sovereign dignity or the equality of the Southern 
states.  
Fishkin, supra note 6, at 179–80 (footnote omitted).  
 337. See supra Part II.A. 
 338. See supra Part I.C; supra note 114. 
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during Reconstruction. Third, Republican leaders argued during 
Reconstruction that it was permissible to mandate suffrage for 
Southern blacks, even while Northern blacks could not vote, because 
blacks were only a tiny percentage of the population in the North, but 
were a huge percentage of the population (in some states, a majority) 
in the South.339 Thus, in the South, but not in the North, racial 
discrimination in the franchise effectively established a nonrepublican 
form of government. And the Constitution not only allows Congress 
to act in those circumstances, but affirmatively obligates Congress to 
ensure that all states maintain a republican form of government.340 
Whatever one thinks about the strength of that argument, it was 
offered as a justification for a particular incident of unequal 
sovereignty, rather than a claim of an unfettered right to discriminate. 
In addition, there were many in Congress, including some of the 
leading Republicans who voted for the acts of Southern readmission, 
who viewed the conditions imposed as inconsistent with the essential 
principle of equal sovereignty341 and fully expected that the courts 
 
 339. See AMAR, supra note 83, at 374–76. 
 340. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this 
Union a Republican Form of Government . . . .”); Amar, supra note 181, at 112–13 (“At a 
certain point, states with abysmal track records could be deemed unrepublican within the 
meaning of Article IV, and Congress had broad powers to enforce that Article’s promise of 
republican government . . . .”). 
 341. Recounting the views of the Judiciary Committee, Senator Trumbull explained, 
I did not believe this could be a Union of unequal States. I believe that when a State 
is entitled to representation in this Union, and becomes one of the States of the 
Union, it is a full and complete State, with all the rights in all respects of every other 
State. I want the State of Mississippi here as a full-grown State. I want its 
representatives to stand up in the Congress of the United States as the 
representatives of a coequal State of the Union, and not of an inferior and 
subordinate State, or a State with conditions imposed upon it not imposed upon the 
other States of the Union. 
CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1174 (1870) (statement of Sen. Trumbull); see also CONG. 
GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2211 (1868) (statement of Rep. Bingham) (“I oppose this, 
because . . . there is nothing in the Constitution of the country that authorizes it.”); CONG. 
GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2739 (1868) (statement of Sen. Johnson) (arguing that, although 
there are no “express terms to be found in the Constitution declaring the equality of the States,” 
it is nonetheless “clear, beyond all reasonable doubt” from structure and history that the states 
retain equal sovereignty, and asserting that the conditions regarding the franchise imposed on 
the Southern states cannot be squared with that constitutional mandate). For examples of fiery 
speeches by Democrats opposing these conditions on equal sovereignty grounds, see, for 
instance, CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2927–28 (1868) (statement of Sen. Saulsbury); 
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2606 (1868) (statement of Sen. Buckalew) (insisting on the 
paramount need to “maintain as a settled, as an invaluable principle, that each State, under the 
legislation of Congress, shall stand the peer and equal of every other”); CONG. GLOBE, 40th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 2195 (1868) (statement of Sen. Kerr) (arguing that these conditions will “admit 
into the Union a State inferior in most vital powers to her sister States. The great bond and 
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would therefore never treat them as valid.342 Indeed, that is, in part, 
why we have the Fifteenth Amendment. Imposing permanent 
suffrage for blacks as a condition for readmitting the Southern states 
initially allowed Congress to ensure perpetual voting equality in the 
South without having to impose the same mandate on the North.343 “If 
there had been no doubt as to the validity and unalterable character 
of such a condition,” one historian has explained, “it would have 
made the Fifteenth Amendment . . . unnecessary. The fear was freely 
expressed, however, that the theory of the equality of the States was 
 
precious principle of equality, of equal statehood in the Union, is broken, is rejected, and a 
hateful Union of unequal members is to be established”); id. at 2196 (noting “the essential 
principles of the equality of State governments, of equal self-government, which have always 
characterized the legislation of the country”). For an example of a radical Republican 
passionately rejecting the notion of equal sovereignty, see CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 
3025 (1868) (statement of Sen. Sumner) (“The song of State Rights has for its constant refrain 
the asserted Equality of the States. Is it not strange that words so constantly employed, as a 
cover for pretensions against Human Rights, cannot be found in the Constitution?”).  
 342. Senator Trumbull further explained, 
The States of this Union must be equal in all their rights as members of the Federal 
Union, or you cannot preserve it. Such is the Constitution; such is the language of the 
acts by which new States have been admitted; and though I have voted for the 
admission of States here with conditions imposed I have done it because I was in 
favor of the admission of the States, and a majority of the Senate insisted upon 
imposing the conditions which, in my opinion, were of no validity whatever. 
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2699–700 (1868) (statement of Sen. Trumbull); see also id. 
at 640 (“I am so anxious to see Virginia and all these States restored that I am willing to vote for 
the bill when the Senate put conditions on over my vote if I think those conditions are 
inoperative . . . .”); id. (“I shall be compelled to vote for the motion, because I regarded it as a 
condition that cannot be enforced.”); CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 493 (1870) (statement 
of Rep. Bingham) (declaring that, should the provision imposing conditions be enacted, the 
Constitution would render it “as void as the paper on which it is printed”); id. (“Even on such 
conditions, I say let the State come in, and let those who have undertaken to put fetters upon 
her in violation of the Constitution stand responsible for that impotent endeavor. I wash my 
hands of it.”); CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 514–16 (1870) (statement of Sen. Fowler) 
(championing the equal sovereignty principle and then declaring that “these conditions have not 
even the form or the sanction or the respectability or the appearance of law; they can never be 
enforced; they are worthless in every respect”); cf. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., 2700 
(1868) (statement of Sen. Henderson) (indicating his agreement that the imposed condition was 
unconstitutional, but refusing to vote for the bill because of the possibility that “the Supreme 
Court may say that it is not a provision inimical or hostile to the Constitution; that it does not 
contravene the Constitution, and that therefore we may constitutionally impose it. The Senator 
from Illinois [Trumbull] may be right, but he may be wrong.”). 
 343. JOHN MABRY MATHEWS, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE FIFTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 17–18 (1909); Republican Party Platform of 1868 (May 20, 1868), THE AM. 
PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29622 [http://perma.cc/5QVQ-
ZX62] (“The guaranty by Congress of equal suffrage to all loyal men at the South was 
demanded by every consideration of public safety, of gratitude, and of justice, and must be 
maintained; while the question of suffrage in all the loyal States properly belongs to the people 
of those States.”).  
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too deeply rooted in our constitutional system ever to make the 
observance of such a condition practically enforceable.”344 Thus, the 
Reconstruction Congress pursued the Fifteenth Amendment, 
which—importantly—did not seek to de-constitutionalize the equal 
sovereignty principle, but rather sought to solve the suffrage problem 
according to that principle, by prohibiting racial discrimination in 
voting nationwide.345 
Indeed, it was likely not possible to resolve the issue by 
amending the Constitution to explicitly de-constitutionalize the equal 
sovereignty principle. Due to the strictures of Article V, the 
Constitution could not be amended without the support of some of 
the Southern states.346 It is difficult to believe that any of them would 
have gone along voluntarily, and forced ratification at gunpoint—the 
method employed for the Fourteenth Amendment347—was no longer 
 
 344. MATHEWS, supra note 343, at 18; see also id. at 20 (noting that, once Radical 
Reconstruction would come to an end, “the only remaining security for negro suffrage in the 
South lay in the extent to which fundamental conditions of readmission had rendered the 
reconstruction constitutions [of the Southern states] unalterable in respect to suffrage. 
Confidence in the validity of these conditions was now perceptibly on the wane”); CONG. 
GLOBE 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2666 (1868) (Sen. Conkling) (“[I]t will hardly do for the Congress 
of the United States to make a blank motion . . . confessedly . . . in violation of the Constitution 
of the United States. . . . We all know that inwrought with the genius of our Government, 
imbedded in our organism, written in the Constitution again and again, is the equality of the 
States in all the attributes attaching to States as such.”); 1 ROGER FOSTER, COMMENTARIES ON 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 53, at 331 & n.9 (1895) (noting that the Supreme 
Court’s equal footing decisions in cases like Permoli v. New Orleans, 44 U.S. 589 (1845), and 
Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 84 (1857)—discussed supra Part II.A—rendered these 
conditions “inoperative upon the power of those States to amend their constitutions so as to 
restrict the right of suffrage”); Whittington, supra note 114, at 1315 (noting that the Supreme 
Court’s antebellum equal footing “decisions did not stop Congress from using its statehood 
enabling acts (and comparable bills) to make declarations about what the future states could 
‘never’ do, but it was now widely understood . . . that such declarations had no legal force. They 
were symbolic and hortatory. The courts would not enforce the supremacy of federal law in such 
cases”); Editorial, Amending the Constitution, N.Y. TRIB., Dec. 1, 1868, at 4 (endorsing the 
Fifteenth Amendment because the uncertainty about Congress’s powers “can best be set at rest 
by a Constitutional Amendment”). 
 345. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. App. 101–02 (1869) (statement of Rep. 
Hamilton) (arguing in support of the Fifteenth Amendment on the ground that “[e]quality of 
the States, their ‘equal footing’ in their relations to the General Government, must . . . be 
maintained,” and asserting, “[o]ur ears are still ringing with cry from the [Democratic Party] . . . 
that ‘universal suffrage was forced upon the South.’ I acknowledge the fact, and I shall never 
rest, God helping me, until it is forced upon the North in the same way!”); MATHEWS, supra 
note 343, at 18–19. 
 346. See Colby, supra note 332, at 1643–44 (noting that “a mere ten states voting no would 
have been enough to defeat” an amendment and there were “eleven former Confederate 
states”). 
 347. See id. passim. 
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an option, as most of the Southern states had already been readmitted 
and military rule had ended. What is more, even the Northern 
Republicans were embarrassed about having violated the equal 
sovereignty principle. As James G. Blaine, a House Republican from 
Maine who soon became Speaker of the House, recalls, 
[t]he evasive and disreputable position in regard to suffrage, taken 
by the National Republican Convention that nominated General 
Grant in 1868, was keenly felt and appreciated by the members of 
the party when subjected to popular discussion. There was 
something so obviously unfair and unmanly in the proposition to 
impose negro suffrage on the Southern States by National power, 
and at the same time leave the Northern States free to decide the 
question for themselves, that the Republicans became heartily 
ashamed of it long before the political canvass had closed. When 
Congress assembled, immediately after the election of General 
Grant, there was found to be a common desire and a common 
purpose among Republicans to correct the unfortunate position in 
which the party had been placed by the National Convention; and to 
that end it was resolved that suffrage, as between the races, should 
by organic law be made impartial in all the States of the Union—
North as well as South.348 
After all, as Representative John Bingham—perhaps the 
Reconstruction Era’s most influential congressional Republican349—
explained in the course of denouncing attempts to limit the Southern 
states’ sovereignty, “equality of men and States before the law, was 
the watchword, the central, informing, vital thought of the 
Republican party.”350 
 
 348. 2 JAMES G. BLAINE, TWENTY YEARS OF CONGRESS 412–13 (1886). 
 349. See GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, AMERICAN FOUNDING SON: JOHN BINGHAM AND THE 
INVENTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 1–2 (2013). 
 350. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 493 (1870) (statement of Rep. Bingham) (emphasis 
added); see Schmitt, supra note 19. A similar sentiment was offered by Gideon Welles, President 
Lincoln’s Secretary of the Navy:  
Where is the authority for Congress . . . to prescribe new conditions to one of the . . . 
States . . . ? Where is the authority for the President or Congress to deprive her of 
rights reserved and guaranteed to all, — to dictate her local policy, — these restrictive 
conditions being new, not a part of the Federal compact or known to the 
Constitution. The States must have equal political rights or the government cannot 
stand on the basis of 1789. . . . The Federal Government has no warrant to impose 
conditions on any of the States to which all are not subjected . . . . 
1 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES 411, 414 (1911) (Aug. 22, 1863). 
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Finally, the notion that the Southern states “reentered the 
Union” during Reconstruction351—and did so upon terms affording 
them less sovereignty than the other states—does not accord with the 
official story. The official story was that the Southern states did not 
have to be readmitted into the Union, because they never left it in the 
first place. All along, the North’s fundamental theory of the war was 
that the Southern states had never lawfully seceded.352 The North 
claimed that the entire purpose of the war had been “to preserve the 
Union with all the dignity, equality, and rights of the several States 
unimpaired.”353 
In sum, as a leading historian of Reconstruction has explained, 
if the Civil War created the national state and Reconstruction added 
the idea of a national citizenry whose common rights no state could 
abridge, most Republicans still believed the states retained rights 
beyond the scope of federal intervention, and expected the relatively 
 
 351. Fishkin, supra note 6, at 179. 
 352. See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 113–14 (1998). The 
Northerners refused to seat the Southern representatives in Congress until such time as the 
Southern states formed republican governments that satisfied the Congress. But they treated 
the Southern states as part of the Union the entire time, and therefore included them within the 
denominator in calculating when the Reconstruction amendments had been ratified by the 
necessary three-fourths of the states and therefore became part of the Constitution. See id.; 
Colby, supra note 332, at 1682. 
 353. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 222 (1861) (emphasis added); see also WELLES, 
supra note 350, at 414:  
We are testing the strength and inviolability of a written constitution. To impose 
conditions on the States which are in rebellion is allowable on no other premise than 
that they actually seceded and left the Union. Now, while it is admitted and we all 
know that a majority of the people in certain States have rebelled and made war on 
the central government, none of us recognize or admit the right or principle of 
secession. People—individuals—have rebelled but the States are sovereignties, not 
corporations, and they still belong to and are a part of the Union. We can imprison, 
punish, hang the Rebels by law and constitutional warrant, but where is the authority 
or power to chastise a State, or to change its political status, deprive it of political 
rights and sovereignty which other States possess? 
; see also id. at 415 (“The constitutional relations of the States have not been changed by the 
Rebellion, but the personal condition of every Rebel is affected. The two are not identical. The 
rights of the States are unimpaired; the rights of those who have participated in the Rebellion 
may have been forfeited.”). This may explain the relevance of the Northwest Austin Court’s 
citation of Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869), in support of the equal sovereignty 
principle. See supra note 40. White held that the Southern states had never lawfully seceded 
from the Union because ours is “an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States.” 74 
U.S. at 725. Since, at its core, “‘[t]his Union’ was and is a union of States, equal in power, dignity 
and authority,” Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 567 (1911); see also supra note 177, the fact that 
the Union was held in 1869 to be “indestructible” suggests that nothing that happened during or 
after the Civil War could change its fundamental character as a union of equal sovereigns.  
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rapid return of the Southern states as equal members of the 
Union.354 
Still, the fact remains that the Reconstruction Congress believed 
that the Southern states were still states, and yet at times self-
consciously afforded them less sovereignty than it afforded to the 
Northern states.355 (Indeed, Congress afforded them no sovereignty 
rights at all during the initial phase of Radical Reconstruction, 
disbanding their governments and placing them under temporary 
military rule.356) This is surely significant—not as an outright 
repudiation of the constitutional commitment to equal sovereignty, 
but rather as an indication that slavery, attempted secession, the 
Black Codes, and the many other racist sins of the South sometimes 
justified targeted departures from that general commitment. 
It was in this arena—civil rights—that Reconstruction worked 
profound changes in American federalism. Reconstruction probably 
did not radically alter the basic architecture of federalism generally, 
including the inherent structural principle of equal state 
sovereignty,357 but it did bring about a sea change in the federal–state 
balance in one particular regard: the ability of the federal government 
to protect the fundamental rights of the people from state 
infringement.358 And it was in service of this goal that the 
Reconstruction Congress both felt the need to create new federal 
powers and felt entitled, under the circumstances, to sometimes limit 
 
 354. FONER, supra note 332, at 277; see also AMAR, supra note 83, at 379 (noting that even 
those Republicans, in the minority of their party, who were inclined not to count the rebel states 
in the Article V denominator “proposed to nurse the South back into republican health, much 
as predecessor Congresses had weaned young territories into proper states to be thereafter 
admitted on equal footing” (emphasis added)).  
 355. For instance, some Southern states were precluded, as a condition for reseating their 
representatives, from ever amending their state constitutions to abridge the right to hold office 
or the right to access to an education. FONER, supra note 332, at 452.  
 356. See Act of Mar. 2, 1867, 14 Stat. 428; Colby, supra note 332, at 1652–53. 
 357. Cf. Abigail B. Molitor, Comment, Understanding Equal Sovereignty, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1839, 1865 (2014) (“By the close of the Reconstruction era, most Americans agreed that the 
states held a position subordinate to the national government; nonetheless, the question of what 
exactly that position was or whether all states held it equally remained open.”). 
 358. See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 82 (1991) (arguing 
that the constitutional transformation of Reconstruction was a “quantum leap . . . in 
nationalizing the protection of individual rights against state abridgment”; the “question was no 
longer whether state sovereignty was more important than individual rights, but which 
individual rights were sufficiently fundamental to warrant national protection”); FONER, supra 
note 332, at 259 (explaining that Republicans viewed the Fourteenth Amendment as not 
radically altering the principles of federalism, but rather as empowering the federal government 
only when the states failed to protect individual rights). 
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the sovereignty of only the Southern states. Recall that, with the 
Connecticut Compromise, the framers of the original Constitution 
intended to preserve both the equal sovereignty of the states and the 
equal sovereignty of the people.359 Reconstruction can be viewed as 
altering the federalist system to prioritize, to some degree, the latter 
goal over the former.360 Thus, the history supports a claim that 
Congress should be afforded greater leeway to bend the equal 
sovereignty principle when it is acting pursuant to its Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendment enforcement powers.361 
And recent caselaw supports that claim as well. In defining 
Congress’s enforcement powers under those amendments, the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that geographic tailoring 
renders a law more likely to be upheld, rather than less.362 In City of 
Boerne v. Flores,363 for instance, the Court, in partially striking down 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1994 (RFRA), declared 
that the national 
reach and scope of RFRA distinguish it from other measures passed 
under Congress’[s] enforcement power, even in the area of voting 
rights. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the challenged provisions 
were confined to those regions of the country where voting 
discrimination had been most flagrant . . . . [L]imitations of this kind 
tend to ensure Congress’[s] means are proportionate to ends 
legitimate under § 5 [of the Fourteenth Amendment].364 
Similarly, in United States v. Morrison,365 the Court refused to 
uphold the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA) under 
 
 359. See supra Part III.B. 
 360. Cf. supra notes 199–201 and accompanying text (noting the views of many Federalists 
that individual rights were more important than state sovereignty). 
 361. Cf. Amar, supra note 181, at 114 (“This general history of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments . . . supports broad congressional power to administer strong and even selective 
medicine to individual states with poor democratic track records—the exact sort of medicine 
employed by . . . the Voting Rights Act.”); id. at 118 (arguing that, even after Reconstruction, 
disparate treatment of the states can violate “proper principles of federalism and state equality,” 
but that “Congress can properly require . . . states with especially sorry democratic track records 
to meet the proper standards tailor-made to address the unique historical lapses in these specific 
jurisdictions”).  
 362. See Greenbaum et al., supra note 6, at 850 (noting several cases in which the Supreme 
Court “appears to have viewed the limited geographic scope [of a law] as a virtue of Section 5, 
not a vice”). 
 363. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 364. Id. at 532–33. 
 365. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
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Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, in part 
because the law “applies uniformly throughout the Nation,” even 
though “Congress’[s] findings indicate that the problem of 
discrimination against the victims of gender-motivated crimes does 
not exist in all States, or even most States.”366 “By contrast,” the Court 
explained, “in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the remedy was directed 
only to those States in which Congress found that there had been 
discrimination. For these reasons, we conclude that Congress’[s] 
power under § 5 does not extend to the enactment of [VAWA].”367 
There is a way in which the combination of these cases and 
Shelby County seems perverse and hypocritical. These opinions were 
crafted by the very same bloc of Justices who formed the majority in 
Shelby County.368 Yet in tandem, they seem to create a no-win 
situation for civil-rights laws. If the law applies nationwide, it is not 
sufficiently targeted to be permissible under the Reconstruction 
amendments, but if the law is geographically targeted, it violates the 
principle of equal sovereignty among the states. 
But there is, I believe, a way to reconcile the equal sovereignty 
principle with the earlier cases. Geographic tailoring of the type that 
denies equal sovereignty is generally prohibited by the Constitution, 
for all of the reasons discussed in this Article. But when Congress acts 
to enforce the Reconstruction amendments, such tailoring is not only 
permissible, it is arguably preferable.369 The new federal powers 
established by those amendments are strong medicine, and strong 
medicine should be applied topically only where needed; these 
 
 366. Id. at 626. 
 367. Id. at 626–27 (citations omitted). 
 368. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 564 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I would 
not . . . abandon the requirement that Congress may impose prophylactic § 5 legislation only 
upon those particular States in which there has been an identified history of relevant 
constitutional violations.”); Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 741–42 (2003) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting): 
There is no guilt by association, enabling the sovereignty of one State to be abridged 
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment because of violations by another State, or by 
most other States, or even by 49 other States. . . . Congress has sometimes displayed 
awareness of this self-evident limitation. That is presumably why the most sweeping 
provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 . . . were restricted to States “with a 
demonstrable history of intentional racial discrimination in voting.”  
(citations omitted) (quoting City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 177 (1980)). 
 369. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533 (“This is not to say, of course that § 5 legislation 
requires . . . geographic restrictions . . . . Where, however, a congressional enactment pervasively 
prohibits constitutional state action in an effort to remedy or to prevent unconstitutional state 
action, limitations of this kind tend to ensure Congress’s means are proportionate to ends 
legitimate under § 5.”). 
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powers often call for a certain amount of unequal sovereignty. Still, 
precisely because it runs counter to a fundamental principle of 
constitutional structure—a principle that Congress sought to preserve 
when it enacted the Reconstruction amendments—Congress’s ability 
to use those powers unequally is circumscribed. Congress might be 
expected to pass geographically targeted legislation, but it is also 
expected (indeed obligated) to be able to justify its decision to draw 
the geographic lines in the way that it did. The yardstick for 
measuring whether Congress has adequately done so—the standard 
of scrutiny to which the courts should subject Congress’s line 
drawing—should be less rigorous in these contexts than in others. To 
obligate Congress to discriminate when it exercises these powers and 
then turn around and treat its enactments as presumptively invalid 
because of their discriminatory nature would make little sense, and 
would effectively gut essential federal powers—powers that were 
obtained the hard way, through a bloody Civil War in which more 
than 600,000 Americans lost their lives.370 But, because of the 
importance of equal sovereignty to the structure of the 
Constitution—even as modified by the Civil War—more than a mere 
rational basis should be required.371 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Shelby County v. Holder is far 
from perfect. But its faults do not include its declaration that “[n]ot 
only do States retain sovereignty under the Constitution, there is also 
a fundamental principle of equal sovereignty among the States.”372 
That assertion has been much disparaged. But it is not novel. And it is 
correct. In the words of James Madison, it is constitutionally 
“impossible for Congress,” whether it is dealing with “new or old 
 
 370. See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 854 
(1988). 
 371. It seems quite possible that the Court in Shelby County, in failing to acknowledge the 
distinctiveness of the Reconstruction powers, ended up employing an unduly stringent standard, 
and that the Voting Rights Act’s coverage formula, despite its imperfections, should have 
survived the proper (more forgiving) scrutiny. But again, resolving those questions necessitates 
an inquiry into the state of racial discrimination around the country that is beyond the scope of 
this Article. 
 372. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 (2013) (citations and emphasis omitted). 
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members of the Union, to vary the political equality of the States.”373 
As the Supreme Court itself explained more than a century ago, 
the whole Federal system is based upon the fundamental principle of 
the [sovereign] equality of the States under the Constitution. The 
idea that one State is debarred, while the others are granted, the 
privilege of amending their organic laws to conform to the wishes of 
their inhabitants, is so repugnant to the theory of their equality 
under the Constitution, that it cannot be entertained . . . .374 
 
 
 373. CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 1st Sess. App. 65 (1848) (letter of Nov. 16, 1820, from 
Madison to Monroe). 
 374. Bolln v. Nebraska, 176 U.S. 83, 89 (1900). 
